Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

238. Draft Message From the U.S. Government to Iranian President Bani-Sadr and Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh¹

Washington, April 3, 1980

Please convey the following oral message from the US Government to President Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh:

“We are gravely disappointed by the failure of the Revolutionary Council in its meeting Thursday² to proceed with the transfer of the hostages to the care and protection of your government in accordance with its own announced decision and President Bani-Sadr’s commitment that the hostages would be transferred. The American people do not understand Iran’s inability to carry out what it has said will be done.

“On April 1, we responded publicly to the President’s statement by announcing that we would defer imposing further sanctions at this time.³ In view of today’s reported reversal of that position by the Revolutionary Council, you should know that, if your government is unable to take effective steps to transfer the hostages to the care and protection of the government [by Sunday, April 6,]⁴ [within the next few days,]⁵ we will put into effect further sanctions. The specific and concrete measures we have in mind will inevitably work hardships on many Iranians.⁶

“We are sure⁷ you understand the urgency of resolving this crisis before it deepens further.”

Ambassador Lang is requested to convey with utmost urgency the response of Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr to this message.

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 7. Secret; Sensitive. Sent via the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. Bracketed material represents alternative language. In an April 3 covering memorandum from Aaron to Carter, transmitting this draft message, Aaron pointed out that Vance wanted guidance on whether to include a specific date. Aaron offered two considerations—one, that failure to specify a date might lessen the impact of the message, and, two, that holding a date in reserve could be useful given the fluid situation in Iran. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 4/1/80–4/18/80)
2. April 3. See Document 237.
3. See Document 234.
4. Cy wanted your decision on whether we should state a specific date Sunday, April 6, or make a more generalized deadline “in the next few days.” He initially favored the former so as to give strength to the message but was concerned by Warren Christopher’s arguments that we are depending for our information on what has transpired upon Ghotbzadeh’s version of events and that should things begin to move, we would confront a major credibility problem if we have to once again pull back from a concrete deadline. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. Carter wrote in the left margin: “without further delay.”
6. An unknown hand, presumably Carter’s, crossed out a sentence that reads: “We do not desire to take these steps, but we have no choice when your government has proved itself unable to take the step of protecting 50 hostages held in your country.”
7. Carter changed the word “believe” to the words “are sure.”