202. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT:
- Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, 7 March 1980 [portion marking not declassified]
1. I discussed my draft paper2 for use in the Presidential briefing next week on needing to keep covert action, political action, and military action pressures available in Iran. He thought it was a reasonable thing to present to the President, but that if the negotiations were going exceptionally well it might be a good idea to postpone it. [portion marking not declassified]
[Page 518]2. I discussed what we were doing in the Iranian covert action with respect to Bakhtiar. I gave him my estimate that we had a number of months in which we could drag this out without much problem. He agreed with the way in which we were proceeding and recommended that we not take too many details of these tactics up with the President until it became a “strategic decision.” I told him that at some point in the next month and one-half we were probably going to have to put up some more money to Bakhtiar for his organizational purposes, not for a coup. Brzezinski agreed that at that point we would need to go back to the President. [portion marking not declassified]
3. Let’s discuss. [portion marking not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R: Policy Files 1977–1981, Box 1, Folder 3: DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings With Various Officials and Subjects. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- Not further identified. The reference is possibly to an undated paper prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Covert Action in Iran,” which argued for two basic operational approaches: to encourage and lend support to Iranian moderates and anti-communists in Iran and the exile community; and to mount operations to weaken and discredit the Iranian left and the Soviet Union. The paper also points to Bakhtiar as having “the will and charisma” to lead a cohesive opposition movement. The paper notes his “excellent tribal contacts,” his support within the military, his staff in Baghdad and Tehran, his strong backing from Iraq, and the potential support from Israel and Turkey. Acknowledging the weaknesses of his movement, the paper suggests that the United States maintain contact with Bakhtiar, provide him with funds, and influence his planning for up to a year, at which time his movement may or may not be viable. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator, Box 13)↩