Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

2. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 5, 1979, 10:30–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary, Political Affairs
  • Harold Saunders, Asst. Sec., Bureau of Near East & So. Asian Affrs

• OSD

  • Secretary Harold Brown

• JCS

  • Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations

• DCI

  • Stansfield Turner

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • Gary Sick
  • William Odom

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The SCC met to review the present situation in Iran and next steps. The following issues were addressed:

1. Presidential Statement. There is an internal rivalry inside Iran between the religious authorities under Khomeini and the more moderate, secular elements represented by Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi. The U.S. Chargé this morning counseled extreme caution in any U.S. public statements which could undercut the position of the Bazargan-Yazdi forces or further inflame anti-American sentiments among the religious groups.² State and NSC will prepare on an urgent basis a statement which could be issued either by Jody Powell or by the President. The statement will stress that this is a time for coolness, not inflammatory rhetoric. (S)

2. Emissary. The SCC agreed that it would be useful to offer sending an emissary to Khomeini. This could provide a face-saving device for the religious authorities if they are looking for a way out of the situation. The two most likely candidates are Bill Miller, who has personal contacts with individuals close to Khomeini, and Ramsey Clark. On balance, the SCC preferred Miller, but both possibilities will be explored. All agreed that our offer of an emissary should be tied to Iranian willingness to release the hostages. A decision memorandum for the President will be prepared by State.³ In the meantime, State will proceed with efforts to find a secure channel to relay our thinking to Chargé Laingen. Professor Richard Cottam will also be approached to see if he would be willing to undertake a trip to Tehran on a private citizen basis to use his own contacts with religious authorities on behalf of the hostages. (S)

3. Security for the Shah. The Rockefeller group, which is managing the Shah’s affairs, has increased the security around the Shah. We will suggest that they seek help from the New York police if they have not yet done so. We have suggested that they issue a new medical bulletin on the Shah’s condition and the necessity of further surgery as something which might be helpful.⁴ The SCC agreed that a public statement by the Shah at this point would not be helpful. (S)

4. Contingency Plans. A small group of State, Defense, CIA and NSC will examine steps which we might have to take in the event hostages are harmed, if we are faced with threats from Iran, or if the country begins to come apart. This examination will be conducted with the greatest possible discretion, and no tangible steps will be taken without further review. The focus will be on possible rescue operations and on the integrity of the oil resources in the south.⁵ The SCC agreed that diversion of the Midway Task Force should be retained as an option in the event we are faced with direct threats to our people in Tehran. (TS)

5. Another meeting will be held tomorrow. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 97, Meetings File, 11/5/79: SCC re Iran. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Unless otherwise noted, no minutes of SCC meetings have been found. As standard procedure, Gary Sick prepared summaries of each SCC meeting, “identifying conflicting points of view and issues requiring presidential decision.” Brzezinski then reviewed the summary and sent it, within hours of the meeting, to the President, who then made handwritten comments in the margins. This annotated version was then used as the first item of business at the following SCC meeting. (Sick, All Fall Down, p. 247) According to Turner, members of the SCC never saw or were allowed to read these prepared summaries. (Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, p. 28)
2. Laingen’s message was not found.
3. According to handwritten notes of the meeting, Brzezinski passed on the message that Carter was “rather negative” at first on using Ramsey Clark as an emissary. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 97, Meetings File, 11/5/79: SCC re Iran) In the November 5 decision memorandum to the President, Christopher recommended that Ramsey Clark and Bill Miller speak “directly to the religious authorities in Tehran and Qom.” They were to stress early release of the hostages, speak on major issues between the United States and Iran, and listen to the Iranian response. (Ibid.)
4. The New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center released a November 5 update on the former Shah’s medical condition, citing his recuperation from a choledochotomy, the need to remove an additional stone in the bile duct, delayed chemotherapy for his malignant lymphoma, and radiation therapy for a tumor in his neck. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Briefing Book: The Shah, Oct–Nov 1979, Vol. III)
5. According to handwritten notes of the meeting, Brown and Brzezinski discussed taking Iranian airfields, cooperating with the Iranian military, and seizing the southern oilfields should Iran have a major civil war. The bombing of Qom was briefly discussed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 97, Meetings File, 11/5/79: SCC re Iran)