Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

173. Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State¹

Tehran, February 1, 1980

1. I asked this morning for a brief meeting with Ghotbzadeh which was immediately granted, although my colleagues have waited several weeks for an appointment. (I think that he values these contacts because they are businesslike and always brief.) Ghotbzadeh received me with a somber and detached air that eloquently expressed his miserable score of 38,000 votes, that is 1/4 of 1% of the electorate.

2. Having read the message (our appeal to limit the reaction to the Canadian affair),² he erupted, saying that the conduct of the Canadian Government was scandalous and that the affair risked blowing everything up at a time that he was making slow but sure progress. Not only did they commit illegal acts, but, moreover, they claimed victory and the government sent congratulations to the Canadian diplomats. This affair is going to have disastrous consequences for the hostages. (His remarks correspond more or less to the press conference that he gave yesterday morning. Swiss journalist Hottinger was there.) I told him that the affair was unfortunately exploited by the mass media. Ghotbzadeh immediately contradicted me, saying that it was not true. The Canadian Government had exploited the affair for reasons of internal politics.³ There had been a declaration by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I gave him some information then to show him how the press had behaved reasonably, quite differently from what he believed.

He remarked that if only there had not been this publicity and these governmental declarations that obliged him to make a violent counterattack.

3. While agreeing completely with him on the need for discretion and silence that was broken by the mass media, I put to him some arguments recalling what he had said in his press conference. What would he have done in the place of the Canadian Ambassador if he were faced with the following questions? What was the status of the six in Iran? Clearly, they were diplomats living on Iranian territory with the agreement of the Iranian Government and therefore enjoying privileges and immunities which would permit them to leave the country. What would you have wanted them to do? That they should go politely to ask the students on the compound with whom Ghotbzadeh himself has had little evidence of cooperation? Would anyone have given them passports and their personal effects? Should the Canadian Ambassador have asked for a meeting with the Revolutionary Council to request exit visas for the six to leave the country inasmuch as he did not have their papers? What would have been the position of Ghotbzadeh or the Revolutionary Council in terms of internal politics if the request had been made? An impossible situation, a true dilemma that the Canadian Ambassador and probably every Ambassador would want to avoid. It was necessary to find a way out which I imagine required creating identities which did not correspond to reality. But Ghotbzadeh himself and other Iranians pursued by Savak, didn’t they benefit from Syrian, Algerian and other passports which did not correspond to reality? What was the answer to this problem? Ghotbzadeh did not, of course, respond directly to my questions but said, “But at least they should not have made publicity and cries of victory over there.” In that he is, this time, completely right.

The American telegram is in this sense very good but the evil has been done. It is necessary, however, to avoid from the American side all expressions of joy and of victory. They should be restrained and the six should take into account that the 50 and Laingen and his two colleagues remain in Tehran.

Ghotbzadeh was as always very correct and agreeable with me. I asked him how he saw the development of the situation, knowing well that the political campaign had absorbed him. “I can’t see it very clearly,” he said. It is necessary to wait to see what will be the reaction of the Canadian affair. (In this connection, we note that the students on the compound have been much more restrained and cool than Ghotbzadeh who might intend to use the affair for political reasons, while the students have said that the treatment of the hostages will not be harsher because of the affair.) On the results of the campaign, Ghotbzadeh said that he had not been able to do anything because he had dedicated himself completely to the question of the hostages. (In other words, he said that the U.S. is responsible for his defeat.)

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 8. Confidential. The text is a typed copy of the Swiss telegram from Tehran bearing no identifying number or time of dispatch. All subsequent messages from Lang went by this channel.
2. In telegram 25212 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, January 29, the Department asked Laingen to inform Ghotbzadeh that the United States was “concerned that the press story could be misinterpreted by those occupying our Embassy and that it could have adverse consequences in Tehran for a speedy resolution to the crisis. Therefore, we hope that the Government of Iran will take whatever steps possible to minimize adverse publicity and reaction in Iran that might negatively affect the prospects for an end to the crisis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800051–0234)
3. Bourguet and Villalon had explained to “Ghotbzadeh that Canadian politics lay behind the affair, implying that the U.S. was being manipulated for political purposes by the Canadian Government.” Ghotbzadeh promised to try and control Iranian public pressure and asked that the United States do the same. (Memorandum for the Record, January 30; Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 1/80)