Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

171. Memorandum for the Record by Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹

Washington, January 30, 1980

SUBJECT

• Conversation of 29 January 1980

1. We talked about the Canadian Six operation² and I gave some details on how that went. There was obvious pleasure at the success of this operation. [portion marking not declassified]

2. I discussed the other hostages and, in connection with this, [less than 1 line not declassified] I urged more attention be given to the plight of the hostages in our public releases. [portion marking not declassified]

3. I then expressed my concern that, despite our hopes, Bani Sadr’s election did not necessarily mean that he would be able to take charge and work a release for the hostages. I felt that we needed to have a rescue operation capability on standby for situations such as the killing of some hostages, a prolonged stalemate for all of them, or the release of most but continued detention of the others for an indefinite period of time. I said that the key risk in the present operational plan was loss of surprise. I had rather good confidence once the rescue force reached the walls of the Embassy compound. The weak points were the number of aircraft that had to surreptitiously enter Iran and the capture of the airfield at Nain. I pointed out that’s why we wanted to fly our aircraft to look for a substitute landing place. I thought the probability of discovery was low, with the highest risk being danger of crackup on landing. That is one reason we want to do it in full moonlight. Our next opportunity, then, would be the end of February. [portion marking not declassified]

I urged that we continue to plan for this and that the Defense Department be encouraged to continue their planning. I pointed out that our exploratory flight, among other things, might just prod the Defense Department into finding still some different solution to this part of the problem. There was agreement that we should continue and the Defense Department should continue, and that there would be a Jones/Turner briefing on this sometime in a couple of weeks—well before a decision on the TWIN OTTER operation for the end of the month had to be made. [portion marking not declassified]

Stansfield Turner³

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R: Policy Files (1977–1981), Box 1, Folder 3: DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings With Various Officials and Subjects. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. On January 29 the six Americans hidden by the Canadian Embassy in Tehran left Iran through the Tehran airport under false identification provided by the Canadian Government. The Department’s briefing of the press on their escape and on the closing of the Canadian Embassy in Tehran on January 28 is reported in telegram 25394 to Ottawa, January 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800051–0921)
3. An unknown hand signed for Turner above his typed signature.