154. Record of a Special Coordination Committee Implementation/Coordination Group Meeting1
PARTICIPANTS
-
State
- Warren Christopher
- Richard Cooper
- Deane Hinton
-
OSD
- W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
- William Perry
-
Joint Chiefs
- Lt. Gen. Pustay
-
Treasury
- Robert Carswell
-
Commerce
- Homer Meyer
-
DCI
- [name not declassified]
- [name not declassified]
- Energy
- John Sawhill
-
Justice
- John Shenefield
- Nelson Dong
- Larry Simms
-
Agriculture
- Jim Williams
- Howard Hjort
-
White House
- David Aaron
- Henry Owen
- Lloyd Cutler
- Barbara Bergman
- David Rubenstein
-
NSC
- Tim Deal
Christopher reported on his recent consultations in Europe.
[Omitted here is material on Christopher’s consultation on Afghanistan.]
On Iran, Christopher said on the whole he was disappointed. The UK will continue to halt all military sales. The British do not accept our proposal that we should proceed “as if” the UN had voted sanctions. They simply don’t have the legal authority. But they will continue to do what they have in the past, including informal measures in the banking [sector?] about the desirability of sanctions. The British Embassy in Tehran questions their utility. The Italians will follow the other Europeans, are sympathetic to our position, but concerned about their people. Schmidt understands our “as if” concept and is inclined to cooperate on trade and banking measures if Germany has the legal authority. But the Germans doubt the efficacy of sanctions. The French will not be helpful publicly, but are likely to continue banking measures and to prevent military sales. The other allies will not do more than they have in the past. Enforcement of sanctions will only be possible [Page 407] on an informal basis. Our efforts on Afghanistan have to some extent eclipsed those on Iran. (S)
Cooper summarized: the UK and France have juridical problems. They needed the UN sanctions in order to take national action. The allies generally doubt both the efficacy and political wisdom of sanctions. They will continue to cooperate on an informal basis, and, if pressed, might institute a selective trade embargo. The EC mechanism might furnish the juridical umbrella they all need; the French do not favor this approach. (S)
Christopher noted that his trip was untimely in that it coincided with the UN vote. Still the allies were reviewing their laws. We should continue our efforts but try to keep the debate private. Aaron stressed the President’s desire that we emphasize to the allies the importance we attach to these issues. We should stick to the line that our allies are considering appropriate measures, that we are in continuing consultation, and that we are urging them to do what they can. He said that the President was unhappy with European efforts to date. He wants us to push them to the limit, even if uncomfortable and costly. Further, the Japanese must understand that we are upset by their lack of cooperation. We should communicate that point to them before it becomes a domestic political issue. (S)
[Omitted here is material on Pakistan.]
The group then briefly discussed procedures for future meetings. It was agreed to meet daily at 10:00 a.m. (U)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 154. Secret. The meeting took place in Room 305 of the Old Executive Office Building.↩