Please find attached summary notes on my discussions today with the
Panamanians. Also, several documents which I had translated pertaining
to the extradition of the Shah from Panama.2
There are no other copies of this document.
Attachment
Summary Prepared by the White House Chief of
Staff (Jordan)3
Summary of Notes from Trip
Warren Christopher called me
early Saturday morning to advise me that the President thought that
the trip to consult with the Panama
[Page 377]
nians at the request of General Torrijos was worth while.4 I returned
to Washington, was briefed by Henry
Precht on the status of our negotiations with the
Iranians through the Secretary General and prepared to take off for
Panama City to see Torrijos.
I called Torrijos to tell him
of my plans but was informed that after a night’s sleep and some
additional thought, the General was worried that my coming to Panama
might be noticed and alarm the Shah as there was a large press
contingent covering the country since the Shah’s arrival there. For
that reason he said that it would be better for him to meet me
halfway or to send a “personal representative” who could convey to
me “the very important message” that had prompted his Friday night
call to me. He said that he was also worried that his absence from
the country might be noticed so that he was generally inclined not
to go himself. We agreed to meet at 3 o’clock at Homestead AFB. I got there by three, checked in
with Warren to see if there were any new developments, made a few
calls to Iowa and spent some time reviewing the materials that the
State Department had given me.
The Panamanians arrived about 4:30. There were three persons in the
group: my old friend Gabriel
Lewis, the Panamanian Ambassador to the United
Nations5 who hardly spoke during
the three hours we spent together and Marcel Saliman (sp?) who was
the person who did most of the talking. At the outset Gabriel pulled
me aside and said that Marcel was very close to Torrijos and very shrewd. Gabriel
said that while he is “too much of a leftist for me” that he had
great credibility among the students in Panama and had been
instrumental in representing Torrijos with the Sandinistas.
I stated at the outset the posture that I was in—that I had conveyed
to the President the request of General Torrijos that I fly immediately to Panama to receive
some news about the hostages. That because of the President’s
friendship and respect for General Torrijos, he was anxious to honor his request that I
come to Panama. I also told them that I was involved only on the
periphery of our foreign policy process as related to Iran and the
hostages and had been even less involved in recent weeks due to the
pressures of the campaign. I told them that I was authorized by the
President only to listen and report back immediately the information
that they had and that I could neither speak for the President nor
make decisions. I told them that I intended to listen, ask questions
and take very careful notes, and that the essence of what was said
would be passed on directly to the three of you.
[Page 378]
They began by presenting me with the English version of the formal
request of extradition for the Shah from the Iranian
government.6 They said that now it was
publicly known that such a request had been made, and in spite of
their public statements that they did not intend to extradite the
Shah, they had a legal process which could not be ignored; that if
they attempted to ignore it, it would only play into the hands of
the students and leftists in Panama who were using the Shah’s
presence in Panama to try to bring down the government and Torrijos.
I prepared myself for a long discussion about the Shah and the
problems that he was causing the Panamanians, but from that point on
the entire conversation focused on the hostage situation and their
hope that this new information might be helpful to their early
release.
Marcel began by giving me a detailed chronology of the past couple of
weeks. He said that in late December two men presented themselves in
Panama as representatives of the Iranian government. They presented
letters from the Foreign Minister requesting the formal extradition
of the Shah from Panama. They also issued a verbal invitation for
the Panamanians to send back to Iran with them a personal
representative to meet with the Foreign Minister. The Panamanians
sent Marcel and Romulo Escobar back to Iran with them.
The two men—who I will call Mr. X and Mr. Y7—now live in France and
are longtime friends of Mr. Ghotbzadeh. Mr. X has known the
Ayatollah Khomeini for
ten years. He practices law in France. Mr. Y is an Argentinian who
was formerly associated with the Peron government. He also is a
longtime friend of the Foreign Minister.
Traveling with these two men, the Panamanians traveled to Iran,
arriving last weekend. They had four separate meetings with the
Foreign Minister. The other two men accompanied the Panamanians to
these meetings and seemed to Marcel to be on very close terms with
Ghotbzadeh. Their meetings with the Foreign Minister took place
right after the Waldheim
visit so Marcel has some information and reports on Ghotbzadeh’s
attitude that are interesting and possibly relevant.
They met with the Foreign Minister on Sunday, January 6th from 10:30
a.m. to 2:30 p.m. and later that same day from 8:00 p.m. to 8:45
p.m. On Monday, January 7th, they met with the Foreign Minister from
10:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. and later that afternoon from 4:00 p.m. to
5:00 p.m. They made much of showing me their schedules, appointment
books, etc., to convince me that they had seen the Foreign Minister
and had spent this much time with him. Based on all that I saw and
heard, I believe that they did. Marcel also took copious notes of
those
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meetings and read
from them to me, saying that “Ghotbzadeh said . . .” and “the Foreign Minister
told me . . .”
Instead of trying to retrace chronologically what was said at each
meeting, I will try to relate the essence of their meetings and
discussions with the Foreign Minister. I made comments throughout
the presentation in an attempt to clarify different things that were
said to the Panamanians and also to draw Marcel out.
Marcel said that at the beginning of the first meeting the Foreign
Minister said that he wanted to explain to them the background on
the embassy takeover. He said that the plot to overthrow the
American Embassy was an “American conspiracy” involving Rockefeller, Kissinger and others who had a
dual purpose: First, to create an international crisis that would
undermine the Ayatollah’s efforts to establish an effective and
strong Islamic Republic; and second, to create a crisis of great
magnitude for President Carter that would lead to his political defeat and
would result in the election of a Republican that was controlled by
Kissinger and Rockefeller who would work to have
the Shah reinstated as the leader of the Iranian people.
The Foreign Minister said that because of the “American plot”,
everyone was now in a very difficult position. He said that the
Panamanians were respected throughout Latin America and the Third
World, but their acceptance of the “criminal Shah” at the insistence
of the United States had done great damage to their image in the
world. He said that President Carter was in danger of losing his Presidency if he
did not successfully resolve the hostage situation. He said that the
Ayatollah was in a very difficult position in Iran—he said that
while he and Khomeini had no
hope or desire to recover the Shah, that the students had become an
increasingly powerful and difficult group with which to deal and
that some way had to be found to resolve the crisis that did not
make it appear that Khomeini
had given in to U.S. pressure. He said that the Ayatollah had
resorted to trying to substitute students totally loyal to him for
the “regulars” holding the hostages, but that once inside the
compound they all behaved the same way.
Ghotbzadeh talked quite
frankly about his own political plans, but often invoked Khomeini’s name to suggest that the
future of the Islamic Republic was in the hands of both men, not
just Khomeini. He said the
greatest threat to their “moderate” position was the sanctions vote
which was presently before the Security Council. He said that if the
vote was taken and the United States was successful in obtaining the
necessary nine votes, that this would make it much more difficult to
resolve the hostage situation at an early date. Also, he said that
the Soviet veto which was anticipated on the sanctions vote would be
a tremendous propaganda victory for “Communist elements in the
compound and in Iran”. (I interrupted here to point out to Marcel
that
[Page 380]
there was a
tremendous difference in the unsuccessful attempt of the Security
Council to impose sanctions and the actual imposition of sanctions.
Marcel said that he understood and had pointed this out to Ghotbzadeh whose response was that
it was the “political action of the vote itself” which would be
troublesome for he and Khomeini to deal with.)
Ghotbzadeh went on to talk
about the importance of trying to find some solution before the
elections on the 25th of January. Marcel reported that he expressed
repeatedly his concern about this date and that the only conclusion
he could draw was that it was perceived by the Foreign Minister as
something that was critical to his own chances of being elected
President.
The Foreign Minister said that there were three ways to resolve the
present crisis: the death of the “criminal” Shah, the potential of
the Waldheim channel or the
potential of a new channel of negotiation with the Panamanians.
The Shah’s Death. Ghotbzadeh said that before the Waldheim mission, it was widely
believed by Khomeini and many
members of the Revolutionary Council that the Shah’s illness had
been exaggerated. He said that no one could understand the paranoia
that existed in Iran about the Shah’s being returned and reinstated
by the United States. He said that Waldheim had brought a medical report (Marcel had
the impression that it was a written medical file) that convinced
the key people on the Council that the Shah was a “dying man”. He
said that the Shah would not die quick enough to satisfy he and
Khomeini, but that the
Shah’s death was a certain way to break the impasse.
The “Waldheim Channel”. The Foreign Minister
said that “more was accomplished by the Secretary-General than is
known publicly” and that there were problems but that the Waldheim visit had been
“worthwhile”. He said that with the consent of the United States,
the Secretary-General could put together a package which contained
three basic elements important to he and Khomeini. First, that Sean McBride would have to be involved in whatever
tribunal was established to investigate the crimes of the Shah.
Secondly, that while they did not want or expect the Shah back in
Iran,8 the General
Assembly had to recognize the right of the Iranians to seek the
legal extradition of the Shah from Panama. And finally, that once
the tribunal with McBride
was set up
[Page 381]
and the right
of Iran to seek extradition was recognized, the American hostages
would be released.
The “New Panamanian Channel”. He said that the
third possibility was the “Panamanian channel” which was opened by
the visit of the Panamanians to Iran. He said that they recognized
the great pressure that Panama was under from the United States to
accept and protect the Shah. He said that he and Khomeini realized that it would be
impossible for them to extradite the Shah. He said that his own
lawyers had researched the Panamanian law and found six separate
legal arguments that would prevent the Panamanians from actually
extraditing the Shah. But, Ghotbzadeh argued that it was the “principle of
extradition” that was important to he and the Ayatollah. And that if
the Panamanians could begin the legal process of extradition, that
would be enough for the Ayatollah to go [to] the students and insist
that they release the hostages.
Ghotbzadeh said that he
wanted to go to Panama to personally deliver the papers of
extradition. He said also that he wanted to meet with me (Jordan) secretly as I had two of
the three important relationships—a relationship with President
Carter and General
Torrijos, but not with
him (Ghotbzadeh). He said because of the Waldheim trip and the upcoming elections, he did not
know if there was time for such a mission now.
It is late—almost 4:00 a.m.—and I need to wrap this up and give you
some thoughts and recommendations.
I was skeptical at the outset about Marcel and his visit to Iran, but
the more I heard the more realistic and plausible it all sounded.
Specific things that Ghotbzadeh said to him all seem to reinforce things
that we had heard through other channels.
The larger question relates to the fact that for
better or worse, the Iranians have opened a channel of
communication with the Panamanians.
At best, I think you could argue that the Iranians did this
consciously to have a second channel open to them to pursue in a
serious way negotiations leading to the release to the hostages
and/or to reinforce the contacts that they are having with Waldheim. At worst, and much more
likely, the Iranians have made contact with the Panamanians to see
if they can use the leverage of the unrest in Panama and their
(Torrijos’) relationship
with us to soften our negotiating posture on the critical questions.
You might speculate that while the UN channel might be producing enough for Ghotbzadeh to live with, it was
not enough for the Ayatollah, and the Foreign Minister is hoping to
move the thing further along with the Panamanians.
This contact between the Panamanians and the Foreign Minister is both
an opportunity and a potential problem. To the extent that we
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can coordinate between the
Waldheim channel and the
Panamanians, we can reinforce the UN
package on the critical question of “the right of the Iranians to
seek legal extradition”. If we fail to coordinate with the
Panamanians, we risk their taking some unilateral action that
undermines the UN effort, destroys
our bargaining posture with Ghotbzadeh and scares the Shah to death.
Now that the Panamanians are involved in this process, we have little
choice but to treat them seriously and keep them generally informed.
If this present negotiation appears to have a real chance for
success, it is equally important that we brief the Shah, as he will
become nervous as stories about his “extradition” appear in the
Panamanian and international press. It seems that at the point and
time that our latest position is seriously considered by the
Iranians, Lloyd Cutler and/or
myself should fly to Panama to reassure the Shah. Or, to quote
Gabriel Lewis, “he should
be a part of this conspiracy”.
When I returned tonight, I contacted Harold Saunders and was debriefed by him. He said
that one thing that we might do to involve and also utilize the
Panamanians would be to give them tomorrow a general report on the
recent proposal that was sent to Iran,9 and that since a
critical element of it involved the principle of Iran being able to
“seek the legal extradition of the Shah”, we might encourage them
tomorrow to contact Ghotbzadeh directly, tell him that they are ready to
play a role in the resolution of the crisis and ask him to accept
the most recent UN proposal which
contains the language on extradition that is important to them.
Mr. President, there is a lot more I could tell you, but believe that
this covers the major points. I will be at home tomorrow and will be
glad to help further in any way possible.
