14. Record of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

In the course of the meeting, Vance brought up the Shah’s health, how soon he might be moved back to Mexico. Brown added that he would look into a military medevac C–9 aircraft to help speed up the move. The Shah might still be full of post-operation tubes and so forth. I was aghast at this turn of the discussion, and I watched Brzezinski boggle. Then he began in low voice, saying that if we were to return the Shah now, under any circumstances, to Mexico, we would be backing down to the demands of student mob in Tehran. A month ago we backed down to the Soviets and Cubans after declaring that we found the status quo unacceptable.2 Now we shall back down again. What will this mean for our international role as a global power? What will it mean for our allies? Who will find us credible on any commitment [Page 35] hereafter? Vance meekly argued that we don’t have to decide these things as a whole; we can decide the Shah’s disposition and then later do something different in connection to Tehran. ZB responded that he was quite prepared to move the Shah as part of a strategy to get our Embassy personnel back and then retaliate, but only as part of an overall strategy decided in advance. Vance and Brown argued that an overall strategy is not essential because we can take the decisions a step at a time. ZB repeated his lecture, adding that this would be a historical first for the United States as abject capitulation, not a first he cared to participate in creating: backing down before foreign mobs, sullying the dignity of US values and power. He explained that if he were a relative of one of the hostages, he would naturally be grieved about their fate and want a concession made for them. But in the position of responsibility for recommending a decision to the President, he could not let those feelings prevail. We in the SCC must look at the larger American interest and the significance for the fate of Americans and our allies elsewhere. From that viewpoint, Vance and Brown were making no sense at all. Again, he agreed to consider a plan of deception, using the Shah to get our people back, but only as a tactical ruse, not as an ignominious act of surrender.

Brown waffled, agreeing with ZB but also arguing that we should not take an overall strategic decision. Rather, take each in light of the current situation. ZB confronted him, “You can’t have it both ways, Harold; you must decide whether you will surrender the Shah to the mob or not. If not, you must accept my points.” Brown leaned, sheepishly, toward agreeing with ZB but tried to leave a loop hole for later escape. Vance’s “lawyer” Weltanschaung, dump the Shah now if expedient, was repeated.

Civiletti was the only other person to speak up. He supported ZB fully. Strangely, General Jones remained silent and poker faced.

One could only take away a feeling of disgust. Brown’s squeamish smiles and Vance’s naturally dull face revealed, in this exchange, a shocking lack of character and moral courage. A sniveling spinelessness informed their performance. One can only wonder if they are worthy of the power with which they are entrusted. I confess to a deep sense of satisfaction in watching ZB confront them so directly and candidly with the political and moral implications of their positions.

  1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic Files, Box 13. Secret. Brzezinski chaired the meeting. There is no drafting information. See also Document 13.
  2. In August, U.S. intelligence reported the existence of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba. Carter addressed the nation on October 1 but chose not to challenge the Soviet presence since investigations confirmed the brigade was the remnant of a much larger force that had been in Cuba since the early 1960s. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.