Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

11. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 7, 1979, 8:30–9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • David Newsom

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • General John Pustay

• Energy

  • Secretary Charles Duncan
  • John Sawhill

• Justice

  • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Frank Carlucci

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Hamilton Jordan
  • Jody Powell

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom
  • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The SCC addressed the following issues:

1. Situation. Secretary Vance briefed the group on the expected arrival of the two emissaries in Tehran tonight. In general, he detected a lowering of rhetoric from Tehran and considered the situation somewhat better than the day before. A legal analysis of the Iranian actions shows that they have broken numerous international agreements, from the UN Charter to bilateral treaties. We have a very strong case if and when we decide to go to the UN. Ambassador McHenry will approach the President of the General Assembly today to see if he will join the Secretary General’s actions of yesterday to put pressure on the Iranians.² (C)

2. Energy.³ If the Iranians reduce production significantly, this will pose a problem for us. If oil is only redirected away from the U.S., we could compensate. The chances are good that we could find 700,000 bpd additional production from other sources at least for a period of 3–4 months. The Saudis would probably be willing to help. A reduction of that amount would not trigger the IEA allocation mechanism, but we could manage redistribution through informal consultations with our IEA partners. We would almost certainly need to institute some demand restraint program of our own to manage the shortfall and persuade others to cooperate. DOE and Treasury will meet with oil company executives tomorrow and will raise with them the question of reallocation of supplies if that becomes necessary. An EC meeting next Friday will permit consideration of when and how to use the triggering mechanism. (S)

3. Economic Countermeasures. Secretary Vance will have a memorandum on this later in the day.⁴ Defense will reexamine the military pipeline, but they believe it can be stopped almost immediately upon request. One major issue is Fluor company’s construction of a refinery in Isfahan. The Iranians badly want this for internal needs, and they are treating Fluor personnel well. Our position has been to recommend that all Americans be pulled out, but for the moment Fluor is standing fast. In fact, their withdrawal at this point would be a highly negative factor in the negotiations. Henry Owen will head a small group to prepare a checklist of all material flowing from this country to Iran, including military items.⁵ (S)

4. Military Options. Thus far, the press has speculated on military options but has been unable to get any official sources to talk. It was agreed that no U.S. forces would be moved while the emissaries are conducting their talks. The principal weakness of the possible rescue operation is intelligence on exactly where the hostages are being held, how their captors are armed, etc. This is being worked on, but JCS continues to be very pessimistic at the odds of a successful operation. [1 line not declassified]. Stan Turner presented a Presidential Finding which would permit him to employ agents of influence and propaganda efforts to assist.⁶ The SCC recommended approval. The JCS will continue with planning on the possible rescue and punitive measures. We will not for the moment expand our contacts with former Iranian military and intelligence figures, although we have received strong indications on the part of some of them to launch a counterattack through Kurdistan. A meeting will be held tomorrow to examine the military and intelligence issues in greater detail. (TS)

5. Iranian Nationals and Property. The Attorney General presented a report on Presidential powers. Although the powers are wide, there is no quick, effective way to deport Iranians who are out of status.⁷ Justice will coordinate with local authorities and U.S. attorneys to try to withhold permission for Iranian student demonstrations during this difficult time. The SCC feared that popular reaction could be violent and thereby create a threat to the hostages. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 105, SCC 196 Iran. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Waldheim gave Iranian Chargé d’Affaires Jamal Shemirani a message for Khomeini that stressed the need “to preserve the framework under which diplomatic relations are conducted and without which the entire fabric of international relations could be in jeopardy.” He also appealed to Khomeini to “take all possible steps to assure the prompt release” of the hostages and “secure the continuing inviolability of the diplomatic premises concerned.” (Telegram 4969 from USUN, November 7, repeated in telegram 290429 to USDel Iran in Istanbul, November 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790512–0809)
3. This discussion on energy is based on a November 6 briefing memorandum from Katz and Goldman to Secretaries Vance and Duncan. (Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 105, SCC 196 Iran, 11/07/79) Attached to the November 6 briefing memorandum is an undated paper on Iranian Oil Contingencies prepared in the Department of State. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 242.
4. See footnote 9, Document 13.
5. In a November 7 memorandum, Odom informed Owen that he was to work with Katz and Murray to develop an inventory of economic sanctions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 27, Iran 11/78–11/79) Katz submitted the paper, “Possible Economic Measures Vis-à-Vis Iran,” with a November 7 briefing memorandum to Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800005–1863)
6. Brzezinski summarized the attached Presidential Finding as permitting the CIA to “employ agents of influence and propaganda actions aimed at ensuring the welfare and well-being of all U.S. nationals in Iran.” (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, November 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 142, Chron File, Sick 11/1/79–11/15/79)
7. Civiletti outlined the constitutional and practical problems associated with deportation of Iranians in a November 7 memorandum to Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 30, Subject File, 11/1/79–11/10/79) In a November 7 handwritten note to Brzezinski, Carter wrote: “When we get Americans out of Iran, I want all Iranian ‘students’ who are not enrolled full time in college to be expelled. Tell Ben [Civiletti] to prepare optimum implementation of this enforcement of U.S. law.” (Carter Library, Records of the White House Office of Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler, Box 10)