Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

104. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 18, 1979, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher
  • David Newsom
  • Harold Saunders

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • W. Graham Claytor

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • General John Pustay

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Charles Cogan

• Energy

  • John Sawhill**
• • Justice
  • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti**
  • John Shenefield**

• Treasury

  • Secretary William Miller**
  • Anthony Solomon**
  • Robert Mundheim**

• White House

  • Jody Powell
  • Stuart Eizenstat**
  • Frank Moore**
  • Hedley Donovan
  • Lloyd Cutler**
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom
  • Gary Sick

**Domestic issues only

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Domestic Issues:

1. Economic Steps. Dr. Brzezinski asked about the status of the Vance-Miller letter which was to be completed the night before.² State and Treasury said they had worked on it but they were not aware of the status. They said that in the absence of a clear decision by the Europeans on each issue, the letter will call for the allies to “agree and implement” the recommended voluntary steps. They said the letter would be provided within one or two hours for the President’s approval. Dr. Brzezinski briefed the group on the President’s comments on yesterday’s notes.³ Regarding the possibility of a Soviet veto of Chapter VII sanctions, he said we would go ahead in any case. The President indicated that he would prefer going for Article 39 finding at the same time as sanctions. We should not wait too long to proceed. Thursday⁴ was okay. Any exclusions from the trade embargo (e.g. food, medicine, etc.) should be defined narrowly. (S)

Mr. Solomon noted that Iran’s only real vulnerability was on food, but that was probably not feasible to include in the embargo for a number of reasons. Mr. Newsom wondered about mail for the hostages. Mr. Aaron pointed out that it could be provided by diplomatic pouch of a friendly power. (C)

The President approved a backgrounder on Wednesday to publicize the types of actions our allies have been willing to take. It was the President’s guess that the allies would be more willing to make their actions public after we had asked for Chapter VII. Mr. Eizenstat noted that the President had mentioned to the leadership breakfast that we were prepared to go to the UN to ask for an embargo to enforce UNSC decisions. There is a good possibility of leaks. (S)

State will follow up the decision to move ahead. Don McHenry will begin consultations in New York, a message will be sent to appropriate capitals, and we will consult with the Soviets. All agreed we should protest strongly to the Italians about their intention to permit licensed helicopters to go to Iran in the next five days. At the same time, State and Defense will review the possibility of revoking the licenses.⁵ (S)

The group reviewed briefly the results of the talks with the British.⁶ It appears they agreed to all the governmental actions we requested (short of a freeze, which they said required new legislation), but they have gone back to London to try and reverse the negative positions of the banks on those items which would involve only official government “guidance.” It is evident from intelligence that we may find it extremely difficult to get the necessary nine votes in the Security Council. Don McHenry is somewhat more optimistic than his West European counterparts, and we will not know just where we stand until consultations are well under way. The situation could be made much worse if Cuba gets a SC seat. All agreed that we should redouble our efforts in opposition to Cuban election, stressing that a vote for Cuba is a vote for Iran.⁷ (S)

2. Public Posture. Today is Unity Day. Is there something more we should do or say? Jody Powell noted that the joint communiqué with the British will come out today.⁸ If it is perceived that we cannot get full British cooperation on voluntary steps with Prime Minister Thatcher in Washington, the credibility of allied support will collapse. There is generally a sense of relaxation in the U.S. public and in world opinion, some of which has been generated by our own statements reflecting optimism. The SCC discussed a possible statement by the Vice President or Jody Powell which would focus on the renewed Iranian calls for trials. We could state that trials would be regarded as a grave provocation for which Iran would bear full responsibility. A firm restatement of our previous policy might be desirable at this point. Jody Powell will coordinate with State about the wording, timing and location of such a statement. State cautioned that a Swiss report indicates that Khomeini has already agreed that there will be no trials, despite what is being said publicly. Our statement should be carefully worded to avoid disrupting that.⁹ (S)

3. Trials. Lloyd Cutler will convene a small group to examine the question of how we can tread the line between protecting the legal rights of the hostages while not legitimizing Iranian trials. The SCC noted the President’s comment that it is important to lend legitimacy to any trial of the hostages.¹⁰ (C)

Political-Military Issues:

[Omitted here is information unrelated to the hostage crisis.]

3. Strategy. Dr. Brzezinski noted that [less than 1 line not declassified] we may not be able to get Chapter VII sanctions in the UN. Are we on the right path? As time passes, our posture might appear increasingly flabby. We need to ask if we may be inoculating the Iranians against our pressure at every stage, and they might be adjusting to it as they go. We did jolt them at one point by indicating flatly that severe measures would follow certain actions on their part. That warning appeared to be credible, but now it seems to have worn off and they are convinced that we are unwilling to pursue non-peaceful options. Secretary Brown noted that if the UN does not support us on sanctions, we will be worse off since there will be a question of whether our cause is just and stronger measures are justified. Mr. Aaron and Jody Powell, on the contrary, felt that going to the UN established a record of exhausting all peaceful remedies. Dr. Brzezinski said that our statement should make clear that sanctions are the last peaceful remedy but that other remedies are not excluded if that fails. That will pressure others to support us. General Jones added that there are a number of minor military steps, e.g. SR–71 overflights, which would underline our ability and willingness to turn to other options. Mr. Newsom argued that Ambassador McHenry should be given 48 hours to sound out attitudes in the SC. Secretary Brown warned that one outcome of the SC debate might be to get a resolution opposing the use of non-peaceful means.¹¹ Mr. Christopher observed that we could get a message back to the Iranians through the Swiss channel that our patience is running out. Mr. Donovan pointed out that we might succeed in getting Chapter VII sanctions then find that it produced no results while tying our hands from taking more vigorous action. (TS)

4. Covert Action. Dr. Brzezinski introduced the two papers (Plan A and Plan B) previously prepared by Stan Turner. Plan B was more modest. [3 lines not declassified] Secretary Brown said that Plan B was a logical first step toward Plan A. If we were not willing to go that far, we were abdicating our ability to influence events. [7½ lines not declassified] Dr. Brzezinski interpreted it to mean that we were opposed to a Khomeini-controlled regime, without specifying what type of government would emerge. We want a government we can work with, that is all. Mr. Christopher said he was prepared to support Plan B, but he found Turner’s description somewhat difficult. The SCC reviewed the wording of the specific proposed finding and agreed that it should be rewritten to be more in conformance with Plan B. A meeting would be held later with the Attorney General and OMB present to examine the finding officially. (TS)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 107. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: “Zbig—Convene an NSC mtg at 8:00 a.m. (breakfast). J.”
2. Carter placed an “x” after the first sentence and wrote in the margin: “As of 12:18 p.m. still unable to [illegible—extract?] it.” Carter approved the Miller-Vance letters to Germany and Japan on December 19. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 12/10/79–12/31/79). The letter to Genscher and German Finance Minister Matthoeffer was transmitted in telegram 327192 to Bonn, December 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790585–0566) The message to Okita and Japanese Finance Minister Takeshita was transmitted in telegram 327191 to Tokyo, December 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790585–0736)
3. See Document 102.
4. December 20.
5. Carter underlined the words “revoking the licenses” and wrote in the margin: “Expedite.” He approved the item with a checkmark.
6. See Document 103.
7. Carter approved this item with a checkmark.
8. For text of the December 18 White House statement on Thatcher’s visit, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 2267–2268.
9. The statement was issued on December 18. See ibid., pp. 2268–2269.
10. Carter inserted and double underlined the word “not” between “important” and “to lend.”
11. Carter underlined the words “opposing the use of non-peaceful means” and wrote in the margin: “We would veto.”