Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

97. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State and the Embassy in Israel¹

Jerusalem, October 21, 1978, 1008Z

2886. From Saunders. Subj: October 20 Meeting With Prime Minister Begin.

1. I saw Prime Minister Begin for two hours afternoon October 20. Ambassador Lewis, DCM Viets, Pol Counselor Blackwill and Howell accompanied me. On Israeli side, MFA Director General Ciechanover and Begin’s aide Avner were also present.

2. After Begin welcomed my visit and asked if I were tired as a result of my travels, I recalled that the President had remarked in connection with the Camp David meetings that making peace is harder than making war. I added that I had experienced some of the truth of this during my visit to Jordan and Saudi Arabia where some of the agonies of making crucial decisions related to peace were as evident as in Israel. Begin thanked me for recognizing the problems he faces, adding with evident feeling that some circles in the US always thought of ways to help out Sadat without realizing that others have problems as well in the aftermath of Camp David. “I have problems of my own,” Begin said which are internal in distinction to the external pressures on Sadat. “For the first time in thirty-five years, since January, 1944, there is division among my closest long-term associates in the Irgun.² This has never happened before, but now, a group within the old Irgun, men with whom I have risked my life, have been writing a letter in which they denounce the CDA and the policies of the Begin government.” All I ask, Begin noted is that it is recognized in justice that others besides Sadat have problems.

3. I responded to Begin’s remarks by saying that, in some respects, I thought that the difficulties he faces are harder than those of others because he has to work them out within a democratic process. He agreed, stressing that half his old friends and comrades-in-arms in Herut³ either abstained or voted against the CDA in the Knesset. Sensing, I think, that his dilemmas were understood, Begin asked what I could tell him about King Hussein’s readiness to participate in the peace negotiations as a result of my recent talks with him. I told Begin that Hussein is not yet prepared to enter the process, giving some of the flavor of Hussein’s agony in facing what he had characterized as one of the most difficult choices in Jordan’s history. I said he faces divisions within his country, feels he has no Arab support and believes he was let down by Sadat. Before Hussein reaches a final position, I commented, he must go through the Arab summit process which is already in train. I added, however, that Hussein has confirmed to us that he is prepared to encourage his friends and supporters on the West Bank to cooperate with the efforts leading to negotiations and will put his weight behind the West Bank aspect of the CDA. Begin inquired whether Hussein would go to the Baghdad summit and I said he would, if it takes place, but that he had emphasized that he will work for a positive outcome in terms of the peace process. I reported that he had stated that he will walk out of the summit if it takes a negative course, although there would obviously be tremendous Arab pressure on him not to follow through with this threat, if the time came.

4. Begin summarized his understanding of Hussein’s position and observed that, until this time, both the pro-PLO and the pro-Hashemite figures in Judea, Samaria and Gaza have adopted attitudes negative toward the CDA. What did I learn of the Saudi view, he asked? I said I had brought two essential conclusions away from my talks in Saudi Arabia. First, they do not believe the CDA is clear and precise enough as regards the ultimate future of the West Bank and Gaza. I said I had explained that the US neither can nor wishes to provide the kind of guarantee of an independent Palestinian state which the Saudis sought. Second, I said I came away convinced that the Saudis had adopted a position that may be described as neutral. They had told Hussein the decision was up to him. I observed that the Saudis, like the Jordanians, were concerned about the forthcoming Baghdad summit and want to maneuver to bring about a moderate outcome, although it is difficult to perceive any reasoned program to accomplish this.

5. Begin asked who I had seen in Saudi Arabia and I told him I had held conversations with the Crown Prince, Prince Saud, Kamal Adham, and Turki Bin Faysal. I said that some of them seemed to understand the process that we were seeking to set in motion and are intrigued by it. Our Embassy in Jidda felt that in the post-summit environment we might expect more support, but I had found the task of selling the CDA difficult, partly because of differences in cultural conditioning. Patience is limited and they want to see what lies at the end of the process now. I said that I had tried, for example, to explain why the US would regard a determination in advance of the eventual status and relationships of the Palestinians living in the West Bank/Gaza contradictory to the concept of allowing these people to participate in determining their future. My success had been limited.

6. Begin turned at this point to the replies⁴ which the USG had given Hussein in response to the questions posed by Jordan. He said he would like to give his analysis of some individual points but would first like to make a more general statement. He asked first that I express to President Carter his “deep sadness” that these answers were sent without prior consultation, stating that the subject matter affects Israel’s rights, security and its very survival. Israel had, he felt, a previous commitment from the United States to consult on such matters. He said that he had received copies of the answers only two days earlier and had an opportunity only to begin his study and that he is finding new things in the document every time he reads it. He expressed an intention to write to President Carter, implying that he would deal with some of the points on which he disagrees.

7. The next hour of the meeting was given over to Begin’s point-by-point discussion of his disagreement with specific aspects of the US replies. It was agreed that he would proceed through the document without my responses until the end. Begin’s comments, keyed to question numbers, follows.

8. Question 2 rpt 2, para 2 rpt 2, sentence beginning “It is expected. . . . : Begin observed that the previous reference to groups or organizations could apply to the PLO and the language used in the answer could suggest that the US commitment⁵ of 1975 regarding contacts with the PLO had been weakened, since what had been expressed as conditions (acceptance of UNSC resolutions and Israel’s right to exist) in 1975 had now become expectations. This was a violation of President Ford’s commitment.

9. Question 3 rpt 3, para 2 rpt 2: noting the use of the phrase “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,” Begin argued that at CD this expression had been accepted only after the Israelis had won agreement to the inclusion of the word “also” to reserve Israeli “rights.” The current formulation, without “also” is not rpt not what was agreed at CD. He would not have agreed to this wording at the summit. Begin said he had made it clear in his discussions at Camp David that at the end of the 5-year transitional period, Israel will claim sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. At CD, he asserted, it was agreed that the question of sovereignty would be set aside and left open to deal with the human problems of the territories. At the end of the transition, if there is agreement on Israeli sovereignty, fine. If there is no agreement, autonomy will continue and Israel will have security while the Palestinians will have autonomy, “and there will be no harm to anybody.” He noted that all the Arabs, including Sadat, are interpreting the phrase “legitimate rights” as meaning an independent Palestinian state. He would never have agreed to this interpretation at CD, Begin asserted, and would never have incorporated the phrase into the CDA without the inclusion of the word “also,” which reserves Israel’s rights as an integral part of the CDA language. “We will never place this area under foreign control.” The deletion of “also” is a most worrying departure from the CDA which the President witnessed as a “full partner.”

10. Question 4(a) rpt 4(a) and subsequent on Jerusalem: Begin said he wanted to underline that the differences between Israel and the US on Jerusalem are most serious problem between the two governments. He asked that I tell the President and the Secretary that the Israeli people “will never give up part of Jerusalem to anybody. This people is ready to fight and to die for Jerusalem. It’s as simple as that.” Jerusalem, he continued with great passion, is an Israeli city, the capital of Israel and will remain so as long as the Jewish people live. It is not a problem for Israel alone but for all the Jewish people everywhere. For three thousand years, since King David established it as our capital, it has remained so. Sometimes, he said, he asked himself, what is happening to our American friends? 140 capitals are recognized in the world. Why not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel? He said he realized that the US has other interests, such as oil, but for 30 years, his American friends had not recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.” Two generations had been born in Israel. How long can this go on? What other country in the world does not have its capital recognized? Why is this being done to us? We can’t comprehend it. “And now you repeat it in writing in midst of our peace negotiations with Egypt.”

11. Begin continued that we had a para on Jerusalem at CD. I told the President, he said, that we could not live with this letter. Israel would not have signed on those terms. But then the language was changed. Begin said he had read the Yost speech,⁶ which differs from that of Goldberg.⁷ Yost said that East Jerusalem is occupied territory. “In 1948, Jordan tried to occupy all of Jerusalem. It destroyed the Jewish quarter completely, including the synagogues. It never allowed us to come to the Western Wall to pray and almost destroyed the Haddassah hospital and the Hebrew University. On Monday, June 5, 1967, we asked Hussein through the American Embassy not to attack us. At one o’clock, he attacked seeking his share of the supposed spoil, but we fought and we liberated Jerusalem. Now we are called occupiers in the ancient city of David. The Jordanians were the occupiers without basis in international law.” Begin said he “is an old man and an old Jew doesn’t have much time left.” But he must say that “this is one of the greatest wrongs ever done in the history of the world to a nation.” Here in 1978, he said, the Israeli character of Jerusalem is being questioned by the US at a time when negotiations between Israel and Egypt are under way in Washington. Begin said he was sorry but on this question he was speaking from the heart as well as the brain. Focusing on para 2 rpt 2 of reply 4(a), Begin drew attention to the phrase that “the final status of Jerusalem could be different. . .” from the rest of the West Bank. He said this could be interpreted as meaning that Jerusalem in toto is part of the West Bank.

12. Question 4(d) rpt 4(d): Begin said he did not know what the term “Israeli security personnel” means when at Camp David everyone had spoken of the IDF. Where, he asked, had it been agreed that, after 5 years, we will negotiate about the presence of the IDF in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Israeli security was unimagineable without the IDF in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. That is why the CDA spoke of a presence for five years and “beyond.” When Dayan returned from the meetings at Leeds Castle,⁸ Begin reported, Dayan had told him (Begin) that the US agreed that the IDF could stay in those areas. The President had told Begin that it was his impression these forces should be in the Jordan Valley. Begin had explained the need to have forces in the Samarian Highlands and the President had agreed. Now, Begin said, you promise Hussein we will have to negotiate continued IDF presence. This is a violation of the CDA.

13. Question 4(e) rpt 4(e): Begin objected to the use of the phrase “legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.” He said that the President had agreed to delete this language at Camp David at Israeli insistence and substitute “requirements.” Now suddenly “aspirations” reappeared. Why?

14. Question 5 rpt 5: Begin next questioned the concept of an international supervisory authority, “nothing in the Framework excludes, etc.” “The self-governing authority, of course, means administration council,” Begin asserted. He said that there was nothing in the CDA on this and no mention of the UN as there is in the US answer. The question of such an international authority was never even discussed at CD he said. Why was it inserted? “We would have rejected it of course.” It was absolutely not consistent with CDA. I interrupted to agree that this was not discussed at CD but was raised in Hussein’s question and our answer was an effort to respond to him honestly.

15. Question 6(b) rpt 6(b): Begin drew attention to the statement regarding the participation of the “Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem: in elections to constitute the self-governing authority. This, he said, was never mentioned at CD. Israel had not agreed. It was not in CDA.

16. Question 7(a) rpt 7(a): Begin expressed surprise at the suggestion that Egypt would be a participant in the negotiations to establish the status of Jerusalem, saying pointedly that he did not recall Egypt being mentioned at CD in this connection.

17. Question 7(b) rpt 7(b): He questioned what was meant by the holy places of each faith being under “the full authority of their representatives?” He said they already had these powers and mentioned a dispute between two Christian sects which the GOI had been asked to solve. Each religion already had full control over its holy places. He said he would like an explanation.

18. Question 8(b) rpt 8(b): Begin said that the question of settlements had been an issue of debate at CD and since. He said he had given a three-month commitment to the President but had said that Israel might establish three nahals which are part of Israel’s defense establishment. He had also told the President that there could be increases in the size of existing settlements by several hundred families on the West Bank during the three months. In this response, to Hussein he said he found a repetition of the US position on the Israeli commitment, Israel had not agreed.

19. Question 8(c) rpt 8(c): Begin took issue with the phrase “in each others territory” which had been deleted at CD at Israel’s insistence. This language is not in the Framework and Israel does not accept it.

20. Question 9(b) rpt 9(b): Begin drew attention to the phrase “whatever number (of Israeli settlements) that might remain” which was very “hurtful” because it would lead the Arabs to expect that not all of the settlements would remain after the transitional period. Some would be liquidated. He said he had never heard at Camp David that Israel might be asked to remove any of them. He added that he is being cursed literally for agreeing to remove settlements from Sinai and had the day before attended an angry demonstration of settlers from Yamit. And now the US promises Hussein that some settlements in Judea and Samaria will be removed.

21. Question 10(a) rpt 10(a): Begin said he could not understand how the term “ratify” could be applied in this context. Ratification is a concept in international law that applies to states. The word does not appear in the CDA and now it is used with Hussein. He also took exception to the description of “a strong local police force” which would assure the political process. He said he understood the function of the police to be the maintenance of law and order.

22. Question 11(a) rpt 11(a), para 3 rpt 3: Begin objected to the mention of “political institutions of self-government” maintaining that there was not one word at CD about institutions of self-government, which in his mind implied a political organization quite beyond the autonomy which he envisages. Israel means autonomy, he stressed, not a state.

23. Question 11(b) rpt 11(b): Focusing on the phrase “applicable UN Resolutions,” Begin stated that could imply resolutions, including those of the General Assembly which are not binding, that Israel does not accept, especially the one of 1948. He said that at CD it had been made clear that the refugee question would include not only Palestinians but Jewish refugees as well. In the ensuing discussion at Camp David the US had suggested deleting such a phrase. President Carter had inserted it again into his address to Congress⁹ without Israeli concurrence. “I found it difficult to applaud that portion of the President’s speech,” Begin said. Now this idea appears in reply to Hussein.

24. Question 12 rpt 12: Begin charged that the reply was misleading in stating, as regards an eventual peace settlement between Israel and Syria for example, “the principles of the Framework should apply to treating.” He argued that the CDA enumerated a limited number of principles which were agreed to be applicable between Israel and other confrontation states. It was not, he said, agreed at CD that all the principles embodied in the framework document would be applicable in these cases: “We will withdraw to the international border in Sinai. We will not do that in Judea Samaria and Gaza Strip.”

25. Thanking me for my patience, Begin summarized his general reaction to the US responses to Hussein’s queries by stating that he felt the document will harden Sadat’s attitude in the Blair House negotiations. He wanted to express his “deep sorrow” that such a document was given to King Hussein. I replied to Begin’s lengthy analysis by stating that, as the signature on the document attested, President Carter had personally gone over every word of the replies carefully and is completely familiar with their content. He will, therefore, be especially interested in the Prime Minister’s comments.

26. I said that I would like to make two general points on the replies and then, with Begin’s agreement, try to respond to his specific comments and criticisms when I meet with Ciechanover on Sunday. He agreed. I said I felt that it was important to stress the philosophy of US strategy in the peace effort. We realize that we cannot solve all problems at one time and for this reason we decided a year and a half ago on the idea of a transition period in the West Bank/Gaza. We pursued this tack mindful of the interest Israel has in seeing what it can live with in the territories as we go along. Because we are putting some problems off for later resolution, however, we felt strongly that we should save for ourselves some options to tackle them in imaginative ways and there is an element in our replies to Hussein of keeping the door open to human creativity. It is true, as Begin noted, that we had not confined ourselves to decisions taken and language agreed at CD because some of the questions asked of us looked beyond the CDA to what might happen in the process. It is inherent in everything contained in those replies, I assured Begin, that the ideas will be negotiated by the parties.

27. As to the matter of prior consultations with Israel, I drew Begin’s attention to the fact that the second part of many of the questions asked for US positions. In the CDA is embodied what was agreed by the three participants. Just as Israel had made reservations on certain issues, so the United States reserves its position on a number of questions. In the communications between heads of state as we have not felt it proper to clear our views with a third state. It is fair to say, I continued, that Israel’s views on a full range of questions are known to us and we realized that Israel would not like some answers on issues where we have an honest difference of opinion. The US replies, however, do not commit Israel. We will enter negotiations, when they arise, in good faith and will inevitably face some differences of viewpoint. As we have told the Arabs as well, we cannot guarantee the results of the negotiating process but we can advance our ideas and cope with new concepts that arise.

28. Begin said he understood my points and that we are all free men when it comes to expressing opinions. He knew that the US had been asked by Hussein about matters concerning the CDA but Begin had found in our responses novelties, ideas that are not in the CDA and concepts which were inconsistent with the CDA. This was Israel’s serious complaint. Much in our response to Hussein had nothing to do with Camp David. He concluded without enumeration that some of the US replies were excellent and he had chosen not to dwell on them.

29. I told Begin that I wanted to take a moment to explain to him what I have been doing on this trip so that he would know first-hand. I said the CDA has posited a series of negotiations—first Sinai, then the Palestinian and Jordan aspects, Syria, and finally Lebanon. As he knew the Egyptians had been raising in the Washington negotiations the question of relationships within the series. While there is no formal linkage, we need to maintain, and discharge the commitments we all assumed at CD. I have been seeking to figure out how to carry out these obligations and had been seeking the ideas of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Palestinians about the way to crystalize the process and capitalize on the opportunity before us. I said I believe in what we did in CD and would like to find ways to generate moderate Arab support for Sadat and the peace process.

30. Begin replied that he was glad I understood that I should not use his comments on the US replies with the Palestinians with whom I would be meeting (he had earlier asked that I not do so and I assured him I did not intend to do so). He said he had no objection to my meeting with West Bank and Gaza Palestinians as he understood I would be doing that evening. He added, however, that he felt our Consulate General in Jerusalem was too active and should not take over the Israeli job of dealing with Palestinians. No American, he asserted, should negotiate with the West Bankers and Gazans since that, under the CDA, is an Israeli task. He said he knows that officials of ConGen Jerusalem sometimes have contacts with these people and are exercising an Israeli right. Begin said he had just received an intelligence report of threats against those who had met with Atherton. He said he is watching out for them but faces significant security problems, including the availability of large quantities of explosives in the area. He said he would soon be writing President Carter and would outline the security problem. In closing, Begin wished me success in my mission.

32. Ambassador Lewis said he would like to make one point before the meeting broke up. Under the American distribution of responsibilities, it is Embassy Tel Aviv that has responsibility for contacts in Gaza and the ConGen which carried out the function in the West Bank. What both are doing, Lewis stated, is exactly what I had said I was doing. We are quietly explaining the CDA and taking soundings of views. We were not negotiating. We had no intent to suplant the Israeli role. We are all on the same team, trying to implement the CDA and bring peace to the Middle East. We recognize the security problems related to our contacts but also know that the local inhabitants incur risks by their contacts with Israeli officials too. Begin nodded assent. If Begin has any question about what we are doing, Lewis said, he could ask and we would tell him frankly. I added that I held a similar meeting with Palestinians on the East Bank and believed I was sensitized to the problems associated with such contacts.

33. Comment: Begin was quite tense when the meeting began (he barely looked at me while shaking my hand), but loosened up as our talk went along, after I expressed recognition of the personally difficult time he had been having and gave him a chance to talk about it. Although markedly distressed with our replies to Hussein, he periodically punctuated his comments with humorous asides. He was always courteous, and emotional only when discussing the Jerusalem issue.

34. At the same time, he had obviously pored over our responses in his lawyerly way. He seemed genuinely hurt and unable to understand why we had departed from the agreed CDA language in responding to the King. My explanation appeared to make no dent on him and I think we can expect soon a lengthy letter to the President from Begin enumerating the Prime Minister’s grievances. The meeting served its purposes, however, in letting him put his initial reaction on the record and in letting me say that the US believes it is important to proceed deliberately in organizing the West Bank/Gaza negotiations.¹⁰

Newlin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0186. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.
2. Irgun Zvai Leumi was a militant Jewish underground movement in Palestine, founded in 1937 by former Haganah (precursor to the Israeli Defense Forces) commanders. The Irgun is most remembered for its July 22, 1946, attack on the King David Hotel, the British headquarters in Palestine, killing 91 soldiers and civilians, and the April 9, 1948, raid on the Palestinian village of Deir Yassin. Menachem Begin headed the Irgun from 1943 until 1948.
3. Founded by Begin in 1948, Herut formed a constituent part of the Likud alliance of Israeli right-wing political parties from 1973 until 1988, when Likud transformed itself into a unitary party.
4. See footnote 4, Document 91.
5. In the September 1, 1975, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States, the United States agreed to “adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 227)
6. See footnote 12, Document 64.
7. See footnote 11, Document 64.
8. See footnote 3, Document 3.
9. See footnote 14, Document 64.
10. On October 24, Begin wrote a brief letter to Carter to which he attached the minutes of his October 20 meeting with Saunders, requesting that the President read them “personally.” “I feel compelled to add, Mr. President,” Begin wrote, “that it is difficult for me to find the proper words to express the depth of feeling of pain and sadness in which I spoke to Mr. Saunders.” The letter was found attached to a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, bearing a handwritten date of October 26, upon which Carter wrote “No answer. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 9, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 7–12/78) Begin’s minutes of the meeting were, however, not found attached. Brzezinski provided Carter with a summary record of the meeting in an October 25 memorandum in which he described Begin’s objections to the answers provided to Hussein as “legalistic, even obscure.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 7–10/78)