413. Letter From the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz) to President Carter1

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to submit to you these two brief reports—one summarizing the progress thus far made in the Autonomy Negotiations and the other the developments in the Egyptian-Israeli normalization process. These reports reflect my experience in the area over the past [Page 1378] year and take into account my most recent consultations with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.2

As you know, during my December visit both leaders agreed that important progress had been made in the negotiations toward realization of the objectives of the Camp David Accords and they expressed their confidence that they would be able fully to fulfill the promise of Camp David.

President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin also affirmed3 their strong conviction that the process which you had developed with them at Camp David is, in their words, “the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East today.” I share that conviction and deeply believe that it is in the highest interest of the United States to press forward in the weeks and months ahead in order to conclude the negotiations at the earliest possible date.

I have been honored to serve as your representative in these negotiations.

Respectfully submitted,

Sol M. Linowitz4
Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations
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Attachment

Report Prepared by the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)5

PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

Egypt and Israel have over the past months, by virtue of their commitment and efforts, been able to make considerable progress and have appreciably narrowed their differences on a wide range of critical, substantive matters germane to the concept of “full autonomy” called for by the Camp David Accords.

While significant differences remain on important issues which will require extensive and intensive negotiations during the weeks and months ahead, it can fairly be said that a substantial consensus now exists between the parties on the elements set forth below.

Some of the positions reflected in this report have not yet been revealed by the parties to one another. Moreover, each of the parties has emphasized that its position on many of these matters is expressly conditioned on the completion of a comprehensive autonomy agreement. Accordingly, it is important to emphasize that one or both of the parties might deny aspects of this report were it to be made public. Nevertheless, the existing consensus as reflected below provides a solid foundation for the completion of a comprehensive agreement which will establish the transitional autonomy arrangements contemplated in the Accords.

1. Election of Self-Governing Authority

The parties would agree that a single body should be elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza as the Self-Governing Authority (hereinafter referred to as the “SGA(AC)”). The SGA(AC) would select its own officers from among the elected members and determine its own internal procedures.

Proposals have been made by both parties on the SGA(AC)’s size and structure, and some progress in narrowing the differences has been made. The parties are proceeding on the basis that these issues are more appropriately resolved once the scope and nature of the SGA(AC)’s powers and responsibilities have been more fully defined.

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As called for by the Camp David Accords, the SGA(AC) would be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years would begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration would be withdrawn, to be replaced by the SGA(AC) as specified in the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East.” A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces would then take place and there would be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

The parties are agreed that there must be free elections based on the principles of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order. Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities which has now been virtually completed. A system for apportioning representation will be determined in the course of the negotiations once the issue of participation by Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem is resolved.

The election would be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians—individual and institutional—as agreed upon by the negotiators. There will be free access for international media and for such experts as may be agreed upon by the parties.

2. Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA (AC)

The parties thus far in the negotiating process have agreed upon at least the following areas and functions with respect to which the SGA (AC) would exercise responsibility:

Administration of Justice

Agriculture

Budget

Civil Service

Commerce

Culture

Ecology

Education

Finance

Health

Housing and Construction

Industry

Internal Communication and Posts

Internal Transportation

Labor

Local Police and Prisons

Manpower

Municipal Affairs

Nature Preserves and Parks

Public Works

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Religious Affairs

Refugee Rehabilitation

Social Welfare

Taxation

Tourism

Other areas and functions in which the SGA (AC) would exercise responsibility are under discussion and negotiation.

The parties anticipate that the SGA (AC) would have the powers necessary and appropriate to the exercise of its responsibilities with respect to the defined areas and functions. These would include the power to formulate policies; to supervise implementation of the laws and regulations relating to them; to decide upon the budget and determine the means of financing it; to employ staff; to sue and be sued; and to enter into contracts.

Considerable attention has been devoted to defining the nature of the legislative power appropriate for the SGA (AC) to fulfill its responsibilities. While some differences remain on this issue, the parties have made significant progress and both agree that the SGA (AC) must be empowered to promulgate such measures as are necessary to the proper fulfillment of its responsibilities. The exercise of power would have to be limited to the defined responsibilities, could not impinge on issues reserved for resolution in the final status negotiations, and must be consistent with the transitional nature of the arrangement and all security provisions and mechanisms called for by the Framework.

In reaching agreement on the above powers and responsibilities, it has been understood that coordination between the SGA (AC) and Israel will be necessary in some specifically defined areas and the parties have agreed that mechanisms to achieve this end will be worked out in the course of the negotiations.

In connection with the issue of land, we can anticipate that lawful private ownership of land in the territories will be protected during the transitional period, based on the principle of equal protection under the law. As to public lands, determination of their ultimate status and uses will be addressed in the final status negotiations. While extensive negotiations will still be required, proposals have recently been made by the parties which may offer a basis for resolving the problem of public land and Israeli settlements during the transitional period.

As to water, final arrangements will be determined in the course of the final status negotiations. For the transitional period, Israel has proposed that new developments and uses of water should be worked out jointly between the SGA (AC) and Israel. For its part, Egypt has believed that the SGA (AC) must control its own water resources but has recognized that development of water resources which underlie both Israel and the territories will require substantial coordination between the two. Both parties appear to favor the establishment of a regional [Page 1382] body representing the various peoples of the area in order to develop and use the water resources for the benefit of all those peoples.

In connection with security, it is agreed that the inhabitants of both the territories and Israel require assured internal security and public order during the transitional period. Accordingly, it is recognized that the strong local police force, to be constituted by the SGA (AC), must help provide such security. Specific arrangements for liaison between the local police and Israeli security authorities on such security issues, as called for in the Camp David Framework, will be worked out in the course of the negotiations and will be implemented in such a way as to ensure that security is preserved.

To assure external security, and in the absence of Jordanian participation as envisioned in the Camp David Framework, the responsibilities for external security set forth in the Framework must be borne by Israel. The precise arrangements remain to be specified and further discussion will be required on how to enable Israel to fulfill fully its responsibilities while minimizing the impact on the inhabitants.

The parties plan the establishment of a Continuing Committee with Egypt, Israel and the SGA (AC) as members (Jordan has, of course, the option of joining under the provisions of the Framework), and with the United States also invited to participate. The Committee would decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced in 1967, together with measures necessary to prevent disruption and disorder. The Committee would also deal with other matters of common concern, such as economic cooperation. The Committee would operate on the basis of unanimity unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

As you know so well, troublesome problems still remain to be resolved and difficult negotiations still lie ahead. It is significant, however, that on December 18, 1980, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin together issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to the Camp David peace process as “the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East today.”

With the determined efforts of both parties and with continued active participation on the part of the United States, I firmly believe that the negotiations can be successfully concluded.

Respectfully submitted,

Sol M. Linowitz6
Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations
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Attachment

Report Prepared by the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)7

PROGRESS IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NORMALIZATION ARRANGEMENTS

Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the exchange of instruments of ratification on April 25, 1979, Israel has completed on schedule its withdrawal from the Sinai to the interim line specified in the Treaty, including turning over to Egypt the Sinai oil fields. Similarly, Egypt has scrupulously adhered to its commitments under the Treaty.

After the parties established normal and friendly relations on January 25, 1980, they exchanged resident Ambassadors one month later and then began negotiations on the normalization measures called for in the Treaty. In March 1980, they signed three major agreements for cultural relations, civil aviation, and trade and commerce. In addition, the Israelis and Egyptians concluded five memoranda of understanding covering communications and postal services, tourism, agriculture, land and sea transport, and arrangements for the travel of Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt.

Flights between Israel and Egypt began immediately and are now being expanded to six times a week. Telephone and postal links have been established between the countries, and the newspapers and periodicals of one appear in the streets of the other.

Tourists are free to travel from one country to the other and the number of official delegations exchanging visits has been increasing. Teams have been exchanged by the respective Ministries of Agriculture, and they are coordinating their activities to prevent the spread of animal diseases such as Rift Valley fever.

Israeli agricultural products including eggs, poultry, seeds and agricultural machinery are beginning to appear in Egyptian markets and an agreement has been reached to exchange agricultural and industrial exhibits to promote trade. President Sadat has recently agreed to the overland transit of goods through El-Arish to supplement the previously agreed access by vessels of each country to the ports of the other.

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Following President Navon’s state visit to Cairo in October, 1980, Egypt and Israel decided to establish a “peace task force” drawn primarily from the private sector to improve mutual understanding. The two countries are now considering proposals to open consulates and cultural centers to support their diplomatic missions.

Both Egypt and Israel have continued to monitor the progress of the normalization of relations, and when problems have developed they have quickly resolved the problems through normal diplomatic channels.

This record of achievement and progress stands out as a dramatic example to all the countries and peoples of the Middle East of the benefits of genuine peace.

Respectfully submitted,

Sol M. Linowitz8
Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations
  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Linowitz Papers, Box CL2, Government Service, Middle East, Reports to the President 1979–1981. No classification marking.
  2. Linowitz visited Egypt and Israel December 15–17 for meetings with Sadat and Begin. Meeting with Sadat on December 15, Linowitz conveyed to the Egyptian President a message from President-elect Ronald W. Reagan stating that he would support the Camp David process. Sadat, Linowitz noted, gave the impression that he remained “fully committed” to the process and was “most concerned that the new administration understand it is critical for the United States to remain a full partner in the negotiations.” However, Sadat also gave the impression that he was “suspicious of the Saudis”and “opposed to any role for Hussein until autonomy agreement has been reached,” and that Egypt “will take no initiatives at this juncture.” (Telegram 27630 from Cairo, December 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2029) Linowitz met twice with Begin December 16–17, during which Linowitz briefed him on his conversations with Sadat and conveyed a message from Carter stating that this was a “decisive moment” for the Camp David negotiations as it was necessary to demonstrate to Reagan that the peace process was an “active and viable one.” These meetings are summarized in telegram 22588 from Tel Aviv, December 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880139–2142)
  3. On December 18, Sadat and Begin issued a joint statement affirming their continued commitment to the Camp David process. For the full text of this statement, see telegram 3917 from Jerusalem, December 17 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800600–0668)
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  5. Secret.
  6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  7. No classification marking.
  8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.