409. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Egypt1

276563. Subject: October 14–15 Talks With Egypt and Israel.

1. (S-entire text)

[Page 1368]

2. Discussion during the two days of trilateral talks2 focused on procedural questions: How to describe this and coming meetings and how to define next steps in the negotiations. There had been serious, substantive bilaterals with both Israelis and Egyptians in the preceding days,3 concentrating on the draft memorandum of understand-ing (MOU) but the Ministerial level touched only lightly on these matters.

3. The Egyptians used both our restricted trilateral meetings and our one “plenary” to make strong statements reiterating their known positions on Jerusalem, settlements, and the need to draw in the Palestinians. The Israelis responded quietly but firmly on Jerusalem and settlements and were positive in their approach toward attracting the Palestinians. The most important aspect of these discussions was Egyptian agreement to defer discussion of Jerusalem and the settlements until the summit and proceed in the meantime with the other issues addressed in the MOU. The Egyptians also pressed for Israeli action on two bilateral matters: Egyptians in Israeli jails, and the control of a Coptic church in Jerusalem now in the hands of Ethiopian Copts. Burg promised to look into these questions personally. He seemed to be optimistic that more could be done with the issue of prisoner release and was less sanguine that the religious issue could be solved.

4. The principle debate was whether we were “resuming the autonomy negotiations” or “preparing for the summit” and whether the existing committee structure would be the vehicle for continuing the discussions or whether a general committee should be created to provide follow-up. The Egyptians tried to get priority for characterizing our continued talks as preparing for the summit through a general committee, but we joined the Israelis in insisting that “resumption” and “preparation” are two sides of the same coin and must be given equal weight, as they were in the September 3 statement which Sadat accepted at Alexandria. The Egyptian team left rather dissatisfied, though it is not clear that General Ali shares his subordinates’ strong feelings that Egypt came off second-best. In fact, he was somewhat ironic in his comments about all these “lawyers” who encroach on his “simple military approach” which would be to get on with the business at hand. [Page 1369] Nevertheless, Ali was clearly instructed to let himself be guided by his “lawyers.”

5. The Israelis agreed that there was no need (or benefit) to trilateral sessions until after our elections and privately expressed their preference for continuing to work with us outside of the trilateral format provided we do not highlight “bilateral consultations” since this would be seen as a step back in their relations with Egypt. They expressed concern that trilateral consideration of the MOU would be premature and could make progress more difficult. The Egyptians were relieved by this approach and we had no difficulty setting November 17 as the date of the next meeting.4 It will be in the area and will probably not be at the Ministerial level. Meanwhile we will send to both parties a revised MOU5 and will try to have bilateral discussions of this new text. The latest Egyptian draft6 is a bit better than their previous effort and the Israeli draft has promise in that, for the first time, they have given us Cabinet-cleared language on issues, notably land and water, which they have avoided treating in a formal way from the outset and which does not preclude the possibility of compromise. The Egyptians were clearly interested in Ambassador Linowitz’ characterization of the Israeli paper and the areas of agreement between the parties. In this sense the Egyptians may be a bit less negative than they were before the Oct 14–15 sessions. Privately, they asked us to pass them a copy of the Israeli paper which we, of course, refused.

Muskie
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 120, 10/15–21/80. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Jerusalem, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Sterner and Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O); approved by Linowitz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880140–0373)
  2. The talks took place in Washington.
  3. Lewis met with Burg on October 6 to discuss Israeli plans and understandings for the October 14–15 meetings and fourteen points for confidence building in the hopes of producing a Memorandum of Understanding and improving, as Lewis characterized it, the “political and psychological climate among the Palestinians and thus enhanc[ing] the now rather dreary prospects for Palestinian participation in the autonomy process.” (Telegram 18223 from Tel Aviv, October 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880140–0297) Atheron met with Boutros Ghali on October 9 to discuss Egyptian goals for the meetings. (Telegram 22566 from Cairo, October 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1752)
  4. Following Carter’s defeat in the November 4 presidential election, Ali and Boutros Ghali informed Atherton that Egypt did not wish to resume talks on November 17 unless it would lead to a late January 1981 summit and that they received indication from the incoming foreign policy team of President-elect Ronald W. Reagan that it would pursue Camp David “vigorously.” (Memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski, November 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 11–12/80) Ali stated in a November 20 Radio Cairo interview that Egypt “did not expect” a tripartite summit until after Reagan’s inauguration. (Telegram 25585 from Cairo, November 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800555–0714)
  5. For the text of the revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding, see telegram 294985 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, November 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880140–0430)
  6. Copies of the Egyptian and Israeli drafts have not been found.