Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

404. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 18, 1980

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of Conversation: Thursday, September 18, 1980, The Pentagon, Secretary’s Conference Room

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Participants (U)

  • Hon. Harold Brown
  • Hon. Robert W. Komer, USD/P
  • Hon. David E. McGiffert, ASD/ISA
  • Hon. Robert H. Pelletreau, DASD/ISA
  • Mr. Charles Hill, Political Officer
  • American Embassy Tel Aviv
  • BG Carl Smith

• Israeli Participants (U)

  • Foreign Minister Shamir
  • Israeli Ambassador Evron
  • MG Meron, Defense Attache
  • Mr. Bar-On, Director General, MFA
  • Mr. Rubinstein, Asst Director General, MFA

Foreign Minister Shamir said he would like to discuss the strategic situation in the Middle East and its implications for the State of Israel.²

Israel, he said, had its own worries, did not rely on others and tried to take care of its own security. It was naturally interested, however, in the strategic situation in the area. In recent times, there had been many signs of free world weakness. Israel was very satisfied, however, with U.S. efforts over the past months to strengthen the position of the free world in countries surrounding it. These efforts, Shamir said, obviously affected Israel’s security. (S)

Together with Israel’s satisfaction with this effort, Shamir continued, concern had to be expressed that Israel with all its possibilities appeared to be omitted from U.S. planning. Israel knew its weaknesses and also its advantages. It had experience in the security field and a capable army. Its stability was assured by a democratic system. It was committed to free world values. With these possibilities, Israel could not understand why the U.S. was ignoring it. An additional element to be considered was that when people in the area, especially Egypt, saw that Israel was being ignored, this indicated to them that the special relationship was getting weaker. This, in turn, had an effect on the peace process. In other words, if the U.S. was building closer strategic cooperation with Egypt and Israel was not included, this meant to Egypt that Israel was not an ally of the U.S. and this perception harmed prospects for peace in the area. In short, Israel believed it was a mistake from the viewpoint of the free world to be omitted from U.S. strategic planning in the area. (S)

The Secretary noted that Minister Shamir had raised two sets of issues; one concerning Israel and its Arab neighbors and the other concerning Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. These were related but not quite the same problem. Regarding Israel and its neighbors, success in the autonomy negotiations would be critical to the area in the long term, both for Israel and for the moderate Arab states. The U.S. recognized that a precondition to this success was Israel’s understanding of the U.S. commitment by others. This commitment was evidenced not only by a great deal of unnecessary repetition and reassurance, but also by U.S. actions. Since the 1973 war over $12 billion had been provided to Israel, more than half of it during the current administration. Israeli capabilities had expanded dramatically at the same time as the threat against them had been reduced. Egypt was at peace with Israel. Despite all the assistance the U.S. was providing and would provide to Egypt, its military capabilities had decreased over the past five years and would continue to decline as its Soviet equipment deteriorated. (S)

In deciding on arms transfers to Israel’s neighbors, the Secretary continued, the U.S. consistently sought to assure that these transfers would not have a damaging affect to Israel’s military superiority. That was an important criterion. It was applied when the U.S. considered provision of F–15’s to Saudi Arabia and also when the U.S. provided equipment to Egypt and Jordan. On the other hand, in its consideration of sales to Israel, the U.S. did not ask whether this or that sale would make Israel too strong vis-a-vis its neighbors. The U.S. recognized that Israel must be able to defend itself against all its neighbors. (S)

Turning to the overall strategic situation, the Secretary noted that the collapse of Iran as a bulwark against Soviet expansion had adversely affected the strategic balance in the area. During the past ten years the U.S., Europe and Japan had become still more dependent on oil from that region. The importance of the Gulf as a Soviet objective had therefore increased. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a striking reminder of Soviet willingness to use force to obtain its objectives. These considerations taken together had caused the U.S. to begin planning, programming, creating new forces and redeploying existing forces. A new military headquarters had been created for planning and to carry out potential military operations in the area. In only six months, equipment had been prepositioned on ships in the area to support a full Marine Amphibious Brigade. Two carrier task forces were being maintained in the area—the most powerful naval force ever in the Indian Ocean. In the negotiation of access agreements with countries in the area, the U.S. had been very careful to keep its visible presence low. This was a drawback, but it was also a condition of access to those countries. A high level of U.S. visibility would risk destabilizing them and easily offset the military advantages of more permanent bases. This was true even in Egypt, though less so. The U.S. had to be very cautious politically. (S)

The Secretary said the U.S. saw real value in continuing its strategic dialogue with Israel even though the previous secret channel could not be used any more. Both General Jones and Ambassador Komer would be ready to continue the strategic dialogue during their visits. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir noted that when Israel heard of U.S. plans to develop Ras Banas³ it wondered why the U.S. was not equally planning to utilize the good airbases in Sinai and also the base at Sharm al-Shaykh. Since Sharm al-Shaykh, under the peace accords, would have a multi-national force to protect free passage in the Strait of Tiran, it could easily assume greater responsibility for defense of the Red Sea. There would be no political difficulties. (S)

The Secretary replied that the Sinai facilities would not belong to either Israel or the U.S. Moreover, the geographic considerations of a possible Soviet attack in Iran would not suggest the use of Israeli bases. Dr. Brown said that the U.S. had not looked into the nature of the multilateral force under the peace accords. There would be differing views as to whether the Israeli suggestion might complicate the issue. It went beyond supervision and enforcement of navigational freedom; it contained an active ingredient. Nevertheless, it was something which might be worthwhile looking into. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir referred to Iraq’s effort to create a nuclear capability. Israel knew that a decision had been taken by the Iraqi government to create nuclear arms. This could not be done without French and Italian help. Israel was sure this was also a concern of the U.S. and asked that the U.S. act to stop this dangerous development. (S)

The Secretary replied that the U.S. had no direct influence with Iraq, unlike with certain other Arab states where the U.S. had the leverage of being the principal arms supplier. The U.S., therefore, would have to work through its European allies. We would continue to do so, pointing out to them the dangers of nuclear capability for Iraq. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir asked the Secretary for his assessment of the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel, he said, was concerned about recent developments in Greece and Turkey and wanted to know more. (S)

The Secretary replied that the military balance in that area was somewhat precarious. It had not greatly changed by the transfer of a carrier battle group to the Indian Ocean (land based aircraft could substitute for most of that capability), but the political problems were worse than the military balance. Greece and Turkey each depended for their security on the other being an ally. This was a necessary but not sufficient condition for each country’s safety. Relations between the two, however, had been bad. There was some hope that the Turkish military government, however deplorable in terms of democratic principles, would feel freer to negotiate, and in the short run, this could help solve the problem. Thus there was some hope of improvement, but given the complicated problems of Cyprus and Greece’s military reintegration into NATO, this area would continue to be a political weak spot. (S)

The Secretary continued that Turkey was particularly vulnerable to the loss of Persian Gulf oil. It had obtained a larger fraction of oil from Iran than most countries and the military takeover could create a problem in this regard. This was another reminder of the grave problem which would face many countries, Israel included, if Persian Gulf oil were cut off or fell under Soviet political or military domination. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir said that Israel would welcome the visits of Under Secretary Komer and Chairman Jones. The success of their missions, however, would depend on the political instructions they received. Dr. Brown replied that these visits were part of the continuing dialogue between the U.S. and Israel. The Marshall talks had by agreement been low key and secret, but this channel was no longer possible. (S)

The Foreign Minister reiterated his point that there was no need for a special effort to hide the strategic dialogue. On the contrary, during his recent visit to Egypt, he had concluded that the more the Egyptians realized the closeness of US/Israeli relations, the better Egyptian relations would be with both countries. (S)

Ambassador Evron amplified by noting that the U.S. and Israel had differing assessments of the impact of some outward forms of their association. Peace became a reality only when Sadat concluded that the U.S. could help deliver Israel eventually. Israel believed that U.S. sensitivities about Arab reactions to more open strategic cooperation with Israel were a little exaggerated. If the Arabs interpreted U.S. lack of enthusiasm as the beginning of a withdrawal, that would be dangerous. The two countries could prove that this was not so by doing what many Arabs suspected them of doing anyway. Why not, therefore, make part of this strategic cooperation more open? (S)

The Secretary replied that he had been the first American Secretary of Defense to visit Israel and General Jones would be the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit Israel. This kind of talk and continual reassurance, however, was not really necessary. The U.S. did not intend to turn away from Israel; Israel knew this. In fact, the two countries were so close that some kinds of formal detailed arrangements were not really necessary. Under Secretary Komer added that actually the U.S. was doing more with Israel but because it was also doing more on the Arab side, this had changed Israel’s perception.⁴ (S)

The meeting ended cordially. (U)

1. Source: Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217B, Israel 1980 (August). Secret. Drafted by Pelletreau; cleared by Smith on September 24. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room in the Pentagon. An undated addenda to the conversation, drafted by Pelletreau, reads: “In reply to Foreign Minister Shamir’s request for closer US-Israeli strategic cooperation in Southwest Asia, Dr. Brown stated that before discussing these possibilities, it would be necessary to look at Israeli capacities. These talks were ready to proceed but it was important that they not be scenario-oriented. After the U.S. had looked at the capacity of Israeli air bases to accept U.S. forces, and after we had a better idea of what would happen if the Soviets became involved, we could consider looking beyond. Meanwhile Dr. Brown reaffirmed, the U.S. was ready to continue its strategic dialogue with Israel.” (Ibid.)
2. Shamir also discussed this issue with Muskie on September 17. A summary of their meeting is in telegram 250624 to Tel Aviv, September 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–0890)
3. See Document 395.
4. Talks designed to “revitalize” the “strategic dialogue” between the United States and Israel took place between McGiffert and Zippori December 4–5. In a December 8 briefing memorandum to Muskie summarizing the discussions, which focused primarily on developments in the Iran-Iraq war and the situation in the Gulf, Saunders wrote that the talks were “useful and friendly, and the Israelis went away clearly pleased that these talks have been resumed and regularized at a higher political level than was previously the case.” The Israelis raised the subject of joint U.S.-Israeli military contingency planning, suggesting the two countries could “cooperate in meeting potential threats to security” in the Middle East, but were told that it was not the U.S. “intention to enter into contingency planning at this time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810005–0807)