Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

402. Summary of a Telephone Conversation Among the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz), Vice President Mondale, and President Carter¹

Washington, September 3, 1980, 9:25–9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Telephone Conversation with Ambassador Sol Linowitz in Cairo

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Vice President Walter Mondale
• Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for Middle East Peace Negotiations

Ambassador Linowitz said he had just left President Sadat.² They had met with the press and had read a statement which made three points (text attached):³

1. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the Camp David process as the only viable path to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and they intend to see the process through.

2. The parties recognize that the negotiations must rest on a foundation of mutual trust and friendship.

3. The parties agree to resume the autonomy negotiations and to consult on a summit meeting, with times and places to be determined.

The President said that this result made Ambassador Linowitz’ trip worthwhile.

Ambassador Linowitz agreed and said he had gotten much more than he had expected. They had intentionally left open the dates for resumption of the autonomy talks and the summit. Sadat wants the talks to resume in mid-October, with the summit to take place in November after the elections. He said Begin had been tough as hell on the first day,⁴ and there had been a real fight. Perhaps for that reason, or his subsequent meetings with a number of Members of the Knesset, Begin was Mr. Nice Guy on the second day of the talks.⁵ Originally, Begin had wanted an agreement to go back to the table immediately. Linowitz had said that was impossible and he would not agree. Begin had also rejected the idea of a summit initially, then went along on the second day. Linowitz said he had talked very tough to Begin on the questions of moving his office to Jerusalem and on annexation of the Golan Heights.⁶ He felt he had received pretty good assurances on the Golan.

The President interjected that that was the best news he had had.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had left Begin in a troubled mood, which was just right. Begin has a good sense that we will be quite demanding with regard to what Begin may do with respect to the Jerusalem move and the Golan annexation. Linowitz had also gone over with Begin in enormous detail the draft (on the autonomy talks?). It was a process he did not recommend, as the President would appreciate.

The President commented that he understood Linowitz had spent five hours with Begin.

Ambassador Linowitz said Sadat did not want to take the draft, but he would give it to Ali tomorrow. After their meeting, Sadat had agreed with his proposal and took Linowitz out directly to talk to the press and announce agreement.

The President said he was glad both leaders were constructive.

The Vice President congratulated Ambassador Linowitz on his efforts.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 8/29/80–9/5/80 Linowitz Trip to Middle East: 8–9/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter and Mondale were in the Oval Office; Linowitz was in Cairo.
2. Linowitz met with Sadat in Alexandria on September 3, near the end of his Middle East trip which began on August 29. On the meeting, Linowitz recounted for Carter in a cabled summary that Sadat’s “principal concern was to make certain that he was not being asked to agree to an immediate resumption of the negotiations.” Moreover, Linowitz reported, “it is also clear that Sadat’s desire to be helpful to you was an important factor” in his decision.” (Telegram 5 from USDEL AMVIP, September 4; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 9–10/80)
3. The text of the statement is attached but not printed.
4. Of this first meeting with Begin on September 1, Linowitz reported “Begin was not prepared to do anything now to help restart the negotiations. During our three-hour meeting, he seemed resigned and ready to accept, if necessary, the need to stand against the outside world. He was determined in his insistence that he will not pay ‘any price’—public or private—to Sadat for a resumption of negotiations.” Linowitz’s summary of their conversation was conveyed to Carter and Muskie in telegram 19407 from Cairo, September 3. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 8/29/80–9/5/80 Linowitz Trip to Middle East: 8–9/80)
5. Summarizing their September 2 meeting, Linowitz stated that while Begin “clearly had been moved—at least in his attitude—by the tough line I took with him the day before,” there “appears to have been a great deal of political ferment in Israel these past two days, and the combined impact of seriousness of the situation, active efforts at persuasion by some of his Cabinet colleagues, and my own long talks with him the day before, led Begin to try to be helpful.” Linowitz continued: “Begin did not go very far on the issues of greatest concern to Sadat”—the move of the Prime Minister’s office to East Jerusalem and settlements—but agreed to a statement to restart the talks that Linowitz could take to Sadat. (Telegram 19408, from Cairo, September 3; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 8/29/80–9/5/80 Linowitz Trip to Middle East: 8–9/80) During his visit to Israel, Linowitz also met with Shamir on September 1. A summary of their conversation is in telegram 238780 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, September 9. (Ibid.) Linowitz also met with a group of Israeli Cabinet Ministers, including Burg, Shamir, and Sharon, on September 2, to discuss the state of U.S.-Israeli relations. A summary is in telegram 238741 to Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv, September 9. (Ibid.)
6. Although a formal bill calling for the annexation of the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since the June 1967 war, was not to be brought to the Knesset until October, reports indicated that support for annexation was growing. (Dial Torgerson, “Israelis Working to Annex Golan Heights,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1980, p. B14) The bill was ultimately defeated in a Knesset vote on December 22.