391. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Muskie 1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Response to Begin’s Moving his Office to East Jerusalem
The Problem
Sam Lewis reports2 that Begin is determined to go through with moving his office to East Jerusalem, despite our representations. There are now indications that the move may take place by early August. We need to devise a measured but firm U.S. response which will show both Arabs and Israelis that we stand by our position on Jerusalem. At the same time it will be in our interest to avoid pushing matters to the point where Begin would be given an issue he could use to bolster his failing position at home and use against the Administration.
Background
Begin has been thinking about moving his office to East Jerusalem for some time. Sam Lewis has had several talks with him about it, most recently on June 25,3 but all attempts to dissuade Begin have been unavailing, as have our talks here with Ambassador Evron and Interior Minister Burg. Sam believes that there is virtually no chance that Begin or his advisors will be swayed by a senior level appeal from the United States. His estimate is that a message from the President would at best meet with a polite rebuff.
Begin’s reasons for wanting to make the move appear to be:
—The move is necessary to prove to the world that Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem is irreversible and that efforts by the world community, in particular the UN, will have no effect.
—Concern to make the move while he still has enough time as Prime Minister to carry it through and make it permanent. (Begin knows that the Labor Party will not make the move if it comes to office but apparently believes that he can face it with a fait accompli which it will be unwilling or unable to reverse.)
[Page 1315]—Hope that the Israeli public will rally around him in the face of expected international criticism, and that his domestic popularity and political support will be strengthened.
Very likely a further consideration is that Begin sees the next few weeks as a period when it will be difficult for the Administration to react firmly.
Considerations
Begin’s moving his office to East Jerusalem will put our credibility on the line in a way that few other actions could at this time. We are publicly committed to the position that we do not recognize Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and that we do not accept unilateral actions concerning Jerusalem by any of the parties. Our response will have to make clear that we continue to hold firmly to that position. Even then we can expect a very sharp response from the Arab bloc supported more broadly by non-Arab Islamic states, with demands that we force Begin to back off. If our response is merely one of verbal disapproval, with no action to back it up, it will be seen by the Arabs as U.S. acquiescence. We can expect that the Arabs will immediately call a Security Council meeting and put forward a resolution condemning Israel’s action.
If we are seen to be wavering on our long established position on Jerusalem, reactions from the Arab side could be damaging. The Saudis would be particularly upset by a feeble U.S. response. Because of his close association with us, Sadat could be seriously hurt were we to fail to make clear our opposition to Begin’s move, and he might feel obliged to take some action to put a distance between himself and us. We expect Sadat would in any case withdraw his Ambassador from Israel, but if he felt our response were feeble he might go further and break off diplomatic relations with Israel entirely or again suspend the autonomy negotiations.
In any event, it is important that Sadat and we ourselves not take totally different tacks in reacting to Begin’s move. When we decide what we intend to do, we should have Ambassador Atherton consult with Sadat to sound out his views.
At the same time we want to avoid being carried beyond our previous positions into statements or actions which would be interpreted by the Israelis and their supporters in this country as denying even Israel’s right to be in West Jerusalem, somehow implying that we intend to divide the city again, or threatening a cutoff of U.S. military or economic assistance. We are faced with the probability that they will interpret any opposition at all as evidence of one of these positions.
Options and Proposed Action
Within these limits there are essentially two steps we can consider:
[Page 1316]1. A statement4 making clear that we consider the move detrimental to the peace negotiations, reiterating our position on Jerusalem, and calling on the Government not to implement the decision.
2. A determination that neither our Ambassador nor visiting Administration officials will call at Begin’s East Jerusalem office.
In evaluating these steps, we need to consider carefully our basic alternatives in handling this situation.
—It may be difficult over the long run to sustain a position that U.S. officials will not call on the Prime Minister in East Jerusalem. Certainly there will be many Congressional delegations that would not feel bound to comply with such a restriction. Moreover, the Israelis would be able to mount a strong argument—one that would receive sympathetic resonance in some quarters in the U.S.—that such a posture was inconsistent with our policy of not seeking to redivide the city. If we decide these considerations have the most weight, it may make sense to keep our response low key and try to get the issue behind us as quickly as possible.
—The alternative is to decide that to do less than this would do unacceptable damage to the credibility of our policy on Jerusalem—in terms of our relations with the Arab states, the stake we have in eventually persuading the Palestinians to engage in the negotiations, the difficult position in which we would place Sadat, and our own image of consistent and firm policy.
We believe that while the former considerations are important and must be seriously taken into account, they are outweighed by the latter arguments. We therefore recommend that if Begin goes through with his move, we be prepared to issue a statement along the lines of the attached draft, which would restate our policy on Jerusalem and have the Spokesman say, in answers to a question, that no U.S. official will meet with Begin in his East Jerusalem office.
Ambassador Lewis reports5 that all the Western European Ambassadors in Israel have received instructions that they will not be permitted to call on the Prime Minister in East Jerusalem. Ambassador Lewis has several times (most recently on June 25) told Begin that he would expect to be instructed not to call in East Jerusalem if Begin moves his office there; some time back Begin alluded to this publicly, remarking that he and the Ambassador “would do business by mail” in that case.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 51, Israel: 7/80. Secret. The memorandum was attached to a July 23 memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski, describing it as a “bootleg” copy.↩
- See telegram 13390 from Tel Aviv, July 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800352–0101)↩
- See footnote 5, Document 388.↩
- A draft statement, drafted by Korn on July 22, is attached but not printed.↩
- Lewis’s report is not further identified.↩