Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

389. Memorandum From Robert Hunter, Gary Sick, William Odom, and Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 16, 1980

SUBJECT

• Syria (U)

We met, today, per your request, on CIA’s Alert Memorandum (Tab I). We focussed not on the prospects for Assad’s removal from power²—that is beyond our ability to predict—but on likely consequences and steps we can take now. (S)

In our judgment, the Israeli and peace talks angles identified by the CIA are less critical than two others: the impact on Lebanon and the potential role of the Soviet Union. It is possible—but not likely—that a change in government could be peaceful. Given the Alawite dominance over the Sunni majority (and the split in the military between officers and enlisted men along these lines), a change in government (other than from a random assassin’s bullet) is likely to take both Assad and his brother from the scene (e.g. through an Alawite coup to protect a deteriorating position) or through incipient civil war involving Sunni troops. Even with an Alawite coup, the risks of civil strife would be high; and so would be the opportunities for Soviet exploitation of the situation. The Soviets are not likely to remain detached from Syrian internal strife. Should Syrian internal conflict become tangled with Lebanese and Arab-Israeli developments, the Soviets would welcome the chance to distract attention from Afghanistan and to assume a role toward Syria that gave them leverage over Syria’s internal affairs while appearing to protect against external threats. (S)

A critical scenario could involve Syrian force withdrawals from Lebanon. The risks of a chain of events leading to renewed civil war in Lebanon would then be high—including high incentives for Israeli military engagement in southern Lebanon (and—in the extreme—in Syria itself). A less likely—but still plausible—scenario could entail coincidence between Assad’s collapse and Lebanon difficulties with paralysis in the autonomy talks occasioned by the (now virtually certain) passage of the Cohen bill³ on Jerusalem and the (highly likely) movement of Begin’s office to East Jerusalem. At that point, Israel would have even less to lose through involvement in Lebanon in support of Haddad, etc. (S)

U.S. Efforts

We concluded that there is little that the U.S. can do directly to affect events in Syria. We do not have the position there now to influence events either way; and any efforts (e.g. pumping up foreign aid) would be unlikely to matter in the context of Assad’s problems. (S)

We also discarded efforts to deal with Iran, the UAE, and Kuwait on this issue. We noted, however, that if there is a Saunders mission to Iraq, that fact would be duly noted in Syria, and that could have an impact with Assad—whether or not Saunders discussed Syria in Baghdad (which would need to be considered further). (S)

Our best approach, therefore, should be threefold: 1) gain more information; 2) share our concerns with appropriate others; and 3) at some point further increase sensitivities of interested parties to the potential problems of instability in Syria:

—CIA should further refine the analysis in its alert memorandum; begin identifying possible alternatives to Assad; and give us a good analysis of the Soviet role now, Moscow’s interests and possible calculations (now and post-Assad); and the potential role of its direct involvement in Syria;

—State should do a contingency paper laying out possible scenarios, risks, alternative regimes and their impact, and possible courses of U.S. action (precautionary and reactive);

—we should compare notes with our key allies who have some involvement in Syria, about the situation and possible course of events (UK, France, FRG, Italy, Japan);

—we should go now to both Jordan and Saudi Arabia, along similar lines, but seeking to draw on their particular knowledge and concerns about Syria. With the Saudis, we should also stress the Soviet angle;

—we should also have lower key discussions with the Egyptians and Israelis on the issue—at some point stressing with the latter the need for caution during any transition beyond Assad;

—at some point later, there might be value in discussions with the Soviets on the seriousness of our concerns. This would be premature, however, until we know a lot more about the situation. (S)

When we get the results of these soundings, we will be in a better position to chart our course intelligently. This exercise would also get other countries sensitized to the serious risks involved, and could thus reduce the problems of ill-considered reaction to a change of regime in Damascus. (S)

Tab I

Alert Memorandum for the National Security Council Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, July 11, 1980.

SUBJECT

• Syria

Although not imminent, Syrian President Assad’s assassination or overthrow is significantly more likely today than it was before the 26 June assassination attempt. I believe that US policymakers need to focus sooner rather than later on the potential adverse regional consequences of Assad’s removal from the scene. The attached Alert Memorandum outlines briefly some of these regional implications. [handling restriction not declassified]

Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment

Alert Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁵

Washington, July 11, 1980

SYRIA

There is a growing likelihood that Syrian President Assad will be assassinated or ousted by a coup. Assad’s departure could signal the return of an era of chaotic instability and regional isolation that typified Syria’s first quarter century of independence. Virtually any successor regime would be initially more nationalistic and hardline, unable to propose or respond effectively to major foreign policy initiatives, particularly negotiations with Israel, until it felt confident of its hold on power. A new regime might also withdraw from Lebanon, raising the prospect of renewed civil war; seek to rally domestic support through limited clashes with Israel; and seek support from the USSR to help offset internal threats.

The recent assassination attempt against Syrian President Assad underscores his growing vulnerability and is likely to encourage further assassination attempts and increased terrorist attacks against Assad’s minority Alawite regime. Although the beleaguered Syrian President may be able to hold power for many months, his removal by a coup or assassination—with little or no warning—is becoming increasingly likely. [handling restriction not declassified]

In the event of Assad’s violent death or overthrow, Syria could easily revert to the pattern of chaotic instability that existed before his assumption of power in 1970. Alawites are in the best position to oust Assad but the absence of an obvious successor could soon generate a power struggle until a new leader consolidated his position. In any event, a new regime—whether Alawite or Sunni—would be dominated by the military. A Sunni regime might be able to strengthen its position by attaining an accommodation with Muslim Brotherhood extremists. [handling restriction not declassified]

At the outset, virtually any successor would be more unpredictable, nationalistic, and probably more radical than Assad. This situation would generate increased tension with Syria’s neighbors, especially Israel. A weak successor might seek a limited military confrontation with Israel—such as air clashes over Lebanon or artillery duels on the Golan Heights—to unite the country, but such confrontations, especially on the Golan, could escalate to wider war. [handling restriction not declassified]

A post-Assad regime might extricate itself from Lebanon even though a complete withdrawal would increase the risk of renewed civil war there. An unstable leadership probably would not sustain the steady financial drain and corrosive effect on the armed forces without substantially greater Arab financial and military support. A new regime could also fear that keeping a sizable military force outside Syria would increase the likelihood of countercoup plotting within the military. [handling restriction not declassified]

It is unlikely that a successor regime would moderate Syria’s approach to Middle East negotiations. There is no evidence that Assad’s Alawite lieutenants, the officer corps, or Syrians in general support the existing peace process. Chronic domestic instability would make it extremely difficult for Syria to moderate its stance toward Israel and to play a constructive role in reaching a comprehensive peace settlement. [handling restriction not declassified]

The Palestinians would welcome increased room for maneuver as a consequence of instability in Syria. They, and the Jordanians, however, would remain unwilling to enter peace talks under the Camp David framework and would also be unlikely to risk entering negotiations under a new framework until the policies of a successor regime in Syria had been worked out. By virtue of its central geopolitical position, any government in Syria would possess substantial capability to foil unilateral Palestinian or Jordanian peace initiatives. [handling restriction not declassified]

A change of leadership would at least temporarily increase Syria’s isolation in the region and further erode Syrian influence in inter-Arab councils. A weak regime would invite outside meddling in Syrian affairs by those who have done so in the past, notably Iraq. [handling restriction not declassified]

A new leader in Syria, uncertain of his power base, might seek additional support from the USSR in an attempt to deal with the internal threat. While most successors will want to preserve some ties to the United States in an effort to keep a balance in Syria’s relations with the superpowers, all will be compelled to maintain Syria’s military supply line to Moscow. Soviet influence in Damascus is likely to increase initially, especially if Syrian-Israeli tensions increase. A new Alawite regime is likely to seek increases in Soviet aid and closer military and security ties, but, like Assad, is probably unlikely to request the stationing of Soviet ground forces in Syria. Given Sunni hostility toward Assad’s closeness with the Soviet Union, however, a Sunni regime might begin to distance itself from the Soviets and move closer to moderate Arab states. [handling restriction not declassified]

[1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box 128, Hunter: 7/16–24/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
2. On June 26, an unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on Assad when grenades were tossed at the Syrian President when he arrived to meet President Seyne Kountcheé of Niger at the Presidential Guest House in Damascus. An account of the event was conveyed by the Embassy in Damascus in telegram 4061 from Damascus, June 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800311–0686)
3. See Document 371.
4. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Brzezinski added a handwritten notation to Hunter, Sick, Odom, and Ermarth, dated July 15, in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Pl[ea]se get together and discuss—give me your recom[mendation]s. ZB.”
5. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A notation on the first page reads: “The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of potential developments that may have serious implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level with CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR.”