Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

352. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 20, 1980, 1:03–1:31 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with Ambassador Sol Linowitz

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President
• Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member

The President began by talking with Warren Christopher (?) on the phone to ask how Cy made out—in one word! He listened and said that he would get details later.²

The President said (to the Ambassador) that Cy Vance had done well at the hearing.³ The problem concerns how we could have voted for it.

Ambassador Linowitz said that that is the key point.

The President said that Cy has been very stubborn on this. He had Zbig call him this morning, and wrote a note. In a political campaign, you can’t go for a week before you know that you shouldn’t answer all questions. You can get pinned down by hypothetical questions. He is glad to see Ambassador Linowitz, and to go over where we are. He knows that the Ambassador was a bit reluctant on the Sadat and Begin visits. But he needs to indicate the resolve of the Administration and its interest in the Middle East talks. There is an impression—reflected also in the Ambassador’s talks—that we are not supporting the talks enough. He wants to let the world know that the talks are not dead. Austria, Portugal, Greece, and to an extent Germany are reacting as though the talks are dying away, and they want to fill a vacuum. He had urgent messages from Sadat, including through Khalil and to Mrs. Carter,⁴ that Sadat wants to see him (the President) urgently. He talked with Cy and asked him to sleep on it, that he (the President) had to let Sadat come. Then he also had to see Begin. When he (the Ambassador) is in the Middle East, he should keep in the back of his mind what the major obstacles are. On Israel, he wants to be blunt with the Ambassador: he wants to come up with a position we can take, and get accepted by himself, Sadat and the majority of Israelis and its political leaders—probably with the exception of Begin, but preferably with him. He needs to bring the talks to a head, probably in June. He can’t let this thing continue through the Convention⁵ and the election period. He is prepared to resolve the issues. If this can’t be done, then our position will be clear to American Jews, to the community here, to Sadat and others. He feels there will be a repetition of past negotiations in leading to a showdown with Begin, who wanted to do nothing, and was willing to let the process breakdown. Yet Begin is constrained, first by his sense of his historical and Biblical place in Israel’s history—this is very important to him; and second by the political exigencies in Israel. Therefore he might act, reluctantly, contrary to his beliefs, and those of his party, because they would be acceptable to Israel and would keep his opponents out of power.

These are notable motivations. But until we can convince him—can lead him to understand—that both of them are true without violating his principles too much, then there will be no progress. There was an escape hatch at Camp David for Begin, when he said he couldn’t accept dismantling of the Sinai settlements without approval of the Knesset. This can help put things on the back burner. If the Israeli people see that there is a choice between seeing a breakdown and having no settlements, voting rights for people in East Jerusalem, and the like—and if they vote it down, then so be it. He will have done what he could. His sense now is that the obstacle is not the Israeli people but Begin himself. Last time, they convinced Begin to act. Labor could not have done Camp David. Maybe Peres (with a united party) could have done the Egypt-Israel treaty. So he will give Begin the benefit of the doubt on this. In the upcoming process, he believes that Begin can’t do it—though he (the President) would like to be proved wrong.

We need to keep Sadat flexible, and he would appreciate the Ambassador’s advice on how to do it. The President will study this closely, and needs the Ambassador’s thinking on what our position should be. Sadat can be resistant. He sees himself as the inheritor of the Pharaonic crown. He sees himself as a man of destiny and of courage. He takes big gambles, but it can be embarrassing if the gamble does not work. There are constraints on him. If he broke relations with Israel, then Fahd and others—whom he despises—would appear to have been right and Sadat to have been wrong. Sadat and he have a mutual affinity. If the Ambassador says there is an Israeli position we should go with (?), then he can sell it to Sadat. But once Sadat says he will not do something, then he can’t be changed. It is important to keep him on generalities. The Ambassador and he (the President) should reach a firm U.S. position, and try to get some progress in dealing with Begin. There would be a chance to succeed.

Ambassador Linowitz said he would clarify the issues, and put in some positions. He thinks that Begin knows he is weak politically (the President agreed). Burg has told the Ambassador, in total confidence, that he has sent emissaries to Peres on early elections and dealing with Labor. Ehrlich is doing the same. Yadin is also playing around a bit.

The President said Dayan and Weizman, too.

Ambassador Linowitz said that this could crumble, and Begin knows it. In his (the Ambassador’s) judgment, this has brought Begin to tough positions, instead of wanting to be a man of flexibility, in part because of his associates. (The President agreed). But Begin does also want to be the peacemaker for Israel, and to insure its security for the future. Inside this there might be a way to find a way to movement, but it will be excruciatingly tough. His sense—shared by Sam Lewis—is that Begin will give nothing to the Ambassador on this trip; anything he might give he will give to the President here. Therefore it will be useful for him (the Ambassador) to sound out Begin. But he is also having meetings with Peres, Dayan, Weizman and others.

The President said that this is good, and that the Ambassador should also use Hedley Donovan for this purpose.

Ambassador Linowitz said that it would be useful to have Hedley along. He can take soundings; he will be helpful. He (the Ambassador) hopes he can come back from this trip with a better sense of where there is room for give with Begin. Is he beyond moving? His (the Ambassador’s) guess is that Begin will want to do something—for example, the establishment of a security committee. Why? Because he (the Ambassador) had been tough with Sharon here.⁶ Sharon liked it—and had called to say so—and that they should meet alone in Israel.

There must be some masochism there. He had told Sharon that the President was personally concerned about the security issue. Sharon said that they should discuss this. The Ambassador had said that Sharon should tell Begin, and Sharon said he would. We should let Egypt know we are pressing on this.

The President asked what Egypt wants.

Ambassador Linowitz said that it has an understandable position. Israel says that everything touches on security—health, welfare (the President added “schools”). Therefore, with the lists of coordinated powers, they had agreed at the Hague⁷ that security was not in the first list of 18 transferred powers, and he had thought they (the Israelis?) were off the security kick on the first list. Khalil said he had tried to move them, and couldn’t do it. He said that we should try to get the Israelis to define their security needs and tell them, and they will try to work around it. This concerns Khalil. We may be able to get something. He (the Ambassador) had told Begin that adding to the ring of settlements around Jerusalem was an affront to the President. This shook Begin; he does not want to be in the President’s bad graces.

The President said that Begin had kicked him when he was down on this one. He was causing him the greatest hurt when he was vulnerable. But he (the President) survived!

Ambassador Linowitz said that Begin was taken aback. He had had messages from Begin that this is not what he had meant. Because of that, Begin may want to show some flexibility, but it won’t be much of substance. Therefore he would come back with appraisals and suggestions.

The President asked how long the Ambassador would be in Israel.

Ambassador Linowitz said he would be three days in Israel and three in Egypt: one and a half days for meetings and one and a half days in the plenary. In Israel, he will have lots of meetings, and wants Begin to know about it. He will see Peres and others.⁸ The issues are still there but they are solvable. He had repeated to Burg that if he is worried about security, then we are willing to be responsive (?). Sadat has said that he would be prepared to say publicly that there will be no Palestinian state.

The President said that if the Ambassador would write down items like these, that suit Ehrlich, Dayan, Weizman, etc., then this would be helpful.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had tried ideas like that; he had tried ideas like absentee ballots for East Jerusalem—which were foreign to the Israelis. But it could keep them from worrying about the Jerusalem issue. Sadat has problems, for example, the poor communications within his government.

The President said he thought that this was deliberate, except for Mubarak, who is not very much involved in this. Sadat trusts and likes Mubarak, unlike Khalil and Ghali. Sadat stays away from the nitty gritty—the President envies the Ambassador sometimes.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Sadat will talk with him on particular issues. He (the Ambassador) asks him to tell his Prime Minister, since he doesn’t accept these positions. Sadat agrees, then doesn’t do it, and Khalil takes a different position.

The President said that he had to be cautionary on this. There are times when Sadat says things he shouldn’t. If he goes to Al Baz, to ask him what the Palestinians think, Al Baz will say that they disapprove. He (the President) needs to keep Sadat flexible. Sadat doesn’t think enough of what the other Arabs think. Sometimes he (the President) has to protect Sadat. There are reasons to have positions acceptable to Saudi Arabia, Morocco and the other moderates—though not Iraq and Syria, etc. Therefore Sadat must be protected, so that he does not get too far out in front of Al Baz. Some movement, yes, but not so far out of line with the moderate Arabs.

Ambassador Linowitz agreed. Last time, Sadat had told him that settlements were not important. He said they could concentrate on Gaza and could forget the West Bank for years. This couldn’t happen. There is a troublesome dichotomy that is hard to get hold of. Khalil is on a kick—how can we get him off it? He has switched his philosophies—the Ambassador hopes this does not mean Sadat, as well. Before, Khalil said that they could transfer some powers into the first list. Now his position is that under Camp David, all powers must be transferred, and then have the Israelis negotiate some back. This Israel will never do. Camp David says that the powers should be defined.

At the Hague, the most important conversation—which he was told he could not tell Khalil or Sadat—was with Burg, and was surprising. Otherwise it was a sterile session. One idea dealt with absentee ballots for East Jerusalem residents. He (the Ambassador) does not see Burg being independent enough to talk about something like this without Begin’s interest in the idea.

The President said that Burg might be prepared to break with his boss.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Burg had said frankly that he (Burg) is dismayed by Begin’s position. Shamir in Burg’s view was worse. Burg said that he could not meet with Linowitz alone. But he (the Ambassador) believed that if he can persuade Shamir, then he could sell an idea. He is a man of integrity and speaks frankly.

The President said that the Ambassador would have to waste a lot of time teaching Shamir the issues.

Ambassador Linowitz said he wanted to tell the President how things appear. He does not have great expectations for this trip.

The President said that if issues can be clearly defined, this would be good. Begin knows what happened at Camp David, and now he will be ganged up on—not just with Sadat, but with some of his own associates. Barak was good. He would take Begin off privately and get him to change his mind in a way that was not embarrassing. Dayan was close to this, though not as good. He is not sure that Shamir, Burg or Weizman could do this. Barak is like a bookkeeper, or a personal CPA, or a lawyer friend—that is, not a peer. Begin didn’t care if Barak knew he had changed his mind, but he cared about the others. Sometimes he (the President) would work out a position with Barak, who would go off with Begin. Three hours later Barak would emerge and say what Begin had suggested! There is a need for some way for Begin to change his mind, without losing face. Begin might say that he had to let the Knesset decide.

The President said he was extremely eager to get into this. It might be unpleasant; and this is not the time (?). He thinks there will be no cutoff of the process, for example for this to be taken to the UN. Yet with Sadat this is a real prospect; he could turn to the UN without acknowledging to the world that Hussein, Assad, and Fahd had been right. He (the President) hopes to prevent this.

Ambassador Linowitz said that, on the way forward, following the meeting with Sadat here, then we may sense a value in moving the negotiations to the Wye Plantation (between Washington and Baltimore), to work intensively for two weeks, and see what happens. If there are only a couple of key issues left, then perhaps the President should meet with Begin and Sadat together.

The President said that this sounded good.

Ambassador Linowitz said that doing the negotiations here would be better. Out there, there are other responsibilities and shifting back and forth on plenary sites.

The President said this sounded good. The Plantation might be better than Blair House. He wished the Ambassador luck, and told him to call anytime during the trip.

The meeting ended at 1:31 p.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 3–4/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Another memorandum summarizing this conversation, written from Linowitz’s perspective for his files, is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Linowitz Papers, Box CL1, Government Service, Middle East, Carter, Jimmy and White House Staff 1980.
2. No record of this telephone conversation has been found, nor is the conversation noted in the President’s Daily Diary. However, Carter spoke with Vance on the telephone from 2:35 p.m. to 2:40 p.m. on March 20. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
3. On March 20, Vance appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to explain the March 1 U.S. vote on Israeli settlements. (See Document 345) In his testimony, Vance acknowledged that the U.S. vote in favor of the resolution had been made in error and accepted responsibility for the “failure of communications” which led to it. At the same time, The New York Times reported, Vance “made it clear in two hours of frequently argumentative testimony that the United States continued to regard Israeli establishment of settlements in occupied Arab territory as illegal and an obstacle to peace.” (Terence Smith, “Vance Rebuffs Call for Full Disavowal of U.N.’s Israel Move,” The New York Times, March 21, 1980, p. A1)
4. Neither of the referenced messages has been found.
5. The 1980 National Convention of the Democratic Party was held at Madison Square Garden in New York City August 11–14.
6. A summary of Linowitz’s March 13 conversation with Sharon was transmitted in telegram 71062 to Tel Aviv, March 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800136–0948)
7. See footnote 3, Document 346.
8. A report of Linowitz’s March 24 meeting with Peres was transmitted in telegram 277 from Alexandria, March 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–0437)