Office of the Historian

340. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, February 14, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Autonomy Talks: The Way Forward (U)

I must say I share the President’s reservations about the course outlined at the breakfast,2 yesterday—in terms of what will be required down the road—although it was a useful discussion that should be repeated frequently. (S)

Two particular ingredients seemed to be underplayed:

—the “wild card” possibilities as the final weeks approach. This includes a very high level of anxiety in Israel, fissures in Egypt as the lower levels press Sadat for significant pressure on Israel, a likely increase of PLO activity (which could include terrorism or even a major flare-up in Lebanon—both developments now building up steam), and some increased pressure on us by the other Arabs; and

—increased pressure for the President to become directly involved: either at the low end of the scale to provide the political excuse [Page 1098] for deal-cutting, or at the high end by putting into the crucible his past achievements in Middle East peacemaking. Unless attention is distracted elsewhere, I expect the U.S. media to make quite a thing of the end-game, and the President’s involvement or lack thereof. (The Egypt-Israel treaty did go beyond the deadline; but the parallel is inexact—that one the Arab world did not want completed; this one it does, or at least will use the occasion of a missed deadline to make a real fuss). (S)

Thus while the “time buying” approach is fine for now—particularly your suggestion about the appearance of progress—I believe the time is fast approaching for serious consideration of what might be required to give a real “college try” at getting a basic agreement buttoned up by the end of May. Some basic questions for consideration on a close-hold basis:

—what should be the minimum prior agreement to justify Presidential involvement at some point, and what form could this involvement take? How should the risks and possible benefits be weighed?

—how should we calibrate our approach with the Egyptians as the end game approaches?

—is there a fallback that can include a Jordanian dimension?

—what U.S. carrots should we consider? E.G. security guarantee; no-Palestinian-State guarantee; aid sweetener; U.S. regional-security-relationship-with-Israel sweetener.

—how should we work with the Jewish community here on shaping approaches to Israel? (S)

In short, how do we shift from the negotiating process to the political process—and maintain good control? (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 2/13–29/80. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “You are right—we need to answer your questions. How about a 3–4 pp. paper + discussion? ZB.”↩
  2. Reference is presumably to the February 12 Senior Level Group meeting, printed as Document 339.↩