314. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
25310. For DAS Draper from Amb. Lewis. Subject: Lebanon After the Arab Summit. Ref: A. Tel Aviv 25017,2 B. State 308393.3
1. (S-entire text)
2. It seems to me that, in the wake of the Tunis Summit,4 some high level U.S. contact with the GOL is needed concerning where the “initiative” can go from here; without such contact, the U.S. risks being seen as abandoning its effort to help the GOL move toward a stable peace. A visit by Phil to Beirut following his Pakistan trip thus has my support.5 [Page 1029] Should a visit to Beirut eventuate I also think that Phil should come here—to do otherwise would feed Israeli suspicions that we are cooking up something behind their backs. In addition, while Israeli restraint in the aftermath of the November 18 Palestinian seaborne attack6 indicates that the lid Weizman put on the IDF is still firmly in place, Phil’s presence here could only be helpful in reinforcing the current Israeli policy of “not hitting until hit.”
3. This being said, however, such a visit would need to be handled carefully, and keyed just about as low as possible. As in the case of Phil’s late October visit here,7 it will be difficult at first to turn the GOI—and contain the Israeli media—from the suspicion that the purpose of the visit is not “fact-finding”, but to advance a substantive U.S. initiative. And those we do convince will again be likely to scorn our effort as bereft of accomplishment or solid prospects for progress in any way that can benefit Israel’s security. Although the Israelis are not yet as informed as we about the events or outcome at Tunis, they have digested enough of its product to have concluded that, at the least, the PLO gave up nothing while GOL hopes to bolster its integrity and authority were rebuffed. While it may be useful to explore with the GOL whether there is anything positive that can be built upon the “few elements” cited in ref A, I believe we should be very circumspect about presenting these to the Israelis as causes for even slight optimism. From what we now know of the Arab Summit’s handling of the Lebanon problem it does not appear even remotely in line with the four foundation-stones of “the Lebanon initiative” as understood by the Israelis: an evolution from cease-fire to truce; removal of PLO and unauthorized fighting elements from UNIFIL’s AO; a measured expansion of GOL authority; and no impingement on Haddad’s area for the time being. An illustrative footnote to the Israeli attitude is the statement which Ciechanover and others made during Phil’s last trip: that it would help if the PLO in Beirut would cease taking credit for terrorist attacks initiated inside Israel. This idea was put forward as something that would, in the context of an initiative such as that sketched above, help Israel maintain the ceasefire as part of an overall movement toward a truce.
In context of the negative Tunis Summit outcome, how[Page 1030]ever, PLO acceptance of this point looks more like public relations one-upsmanship and is being seen by Israelis as a way for the PLO to heighten international criticism of future Israeli retaliation against such terrorist attacks.
4. All in all, then, it seems from here to be a good idea for Phil to proceed to the Middle East after Pakistan. If this is the decision, I definitely feel he should come—at the end of whatever itinerary is chosen—to Israel. But we should be most careful in my opinion not to characterize this swing as an attempt to build upon the Arab summit, but rather as an opportunity for Phil to be briefed by those who participated at Tunis and get the reactions of those affected by the outcome as it pertains to the Lebanon problem.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–1796; N790009–0444. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, USUN, and the White House.↩
- In telegram 25017 from Tel Aviv, November 26, Lewis pointed out that despite the three Lebanese objectives for the Tunis Summit (see footnote 3, Document 309), the outcome of the Summit “as it now appears from here is that Palestinian positions south of the Litani will remain, with no undertaking to curtail infiltration into the UNIFIL AO nor to refrain from launching the major external threat to Israel: seaborne attacks.” Moreover, while a “statement of support for GOL sovereignty and LAF deployment emerged, so did an assertion of the Palestinian’s ‘right of resistance’ against Israel on all fronts, and a statement blaming Israel for the problems of South Lebanon.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790544–0535)↩
- Telegram 308393 to Beirut, November 29, concluded that the outcome of the Tunis Summit provided “a few elements which, if effectively implemented, could be basis for some further progress in South Lebanon” and suggested that Habib could be made available to return to the Middle East following a scheduled visit to Pakistan on December 9–12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163-2222)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 309.↩
- Dean raised the possibility of Habib’s return with Sarkis on November 28. Sarkis replied that “GOL would first have to see for itself what action could be taken to implement Tunis resolution on South Lebanon.” (Telegram 6682 from Beirut, November 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2545) Dean confirmed Sarkis’s response in a December 8 meeting with Boutros. (Telegram 6854 from Beirut, December 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790566–0926) Telegram 319229 to Beirut, December 11, confirmed that that any Habib trip would be postponed pending “indication” from the Lebanese “that such a trip would be useful.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790570–0246)↩
- On the night of November 18–19, an Israeli patrol boat intercepted a rubber boat piloted by Palestinian infiltrators off the Israeli coast near Nahariyya. In the exchange of fire which followed, two Palestinians were reportedly killed and two captured. (Telegram 24566 from Tel Aviv, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790532–0996)↩
- For a summary of Habib’s October 24–November 1 visit to the region, see Document 306.↩