Office of the Historian

305. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat and Saudi Crown Prince Fahd1

Washington, November 1, 1979

I am writing the same letter to both of you because you must act together if you decide to honor a very important request from me.

One of my most serious problems as President is the lack of understanding and harmony between you, the leaders of Egypt and Saudi

[Page 994]

Arabia.2 This situation is very damaging to me politically and also creates a major obstacle in the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We should be acting in concert, but instead we are divided.

I realize that some sharp differences will remain between you regarding what should be done immediately to make progress, but there is no doubt that we share common goals and purposes. My hope and prayer is that, either directly though your own emissaries or through me, you will explore every possible way to minimize the adverse consequences of those differences and to restore the mutual respect, consultation and understanding which should exist among the three of us.3

You have my personal best wishes and my standing offer to help in any way possible to resolve this most serious matter.4

Your friend,

Jimmy Carter

P.S. Give my love to Jehan and your family.

  1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81. No classification marking. The handwritten letter was found attached to a handwritten note which reads: “Personal to President Sadat.”↩
  2. On October 18, the Embassy in Cairo reported, “There seems to be no longer any effort by either Egypt or Saudi Arabia to carry out the moratorium on press criticism that Ambassador Eilts worked out last spring.” (See footnote 5, Document 253) “Fueled by press charges and countercharges, the animosity between Sadat and Fahd seems to have reached a new level of intensity. Unless the lid can be put on the public rhetoric, the situation could get out of hand, with serious implications for our Middle East policy.” (Telegram 21546 from Cairo, October 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790478–0028) Among the accusations leveled by Sadat were Saudi efforts to “‘starve’ the Egyptian people” and an alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iraq directed against his country. (Telegram 6781 from Jidda, September 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790439–0066) The Saudis also protested Sadat’s assertion that the Saudis were “working with Kennedy forces to unseat President Carter.” (Telegram 1574 from Riyadh, October 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790463–0979)↩
  3. On October 28, Atherton reported that Mubarak informed him of Sadat’s desire to reinstate the moratorium on public attacks against the Saudis and sought U.S. intercession in persuading the Saudis to reactivate the “personal intelligence channel” between Egypt and Saudi Arabia “as a means of checking out the allegations against each other.” (Telegram 22143 from Cairo, October 28; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 10/79) In a November 7 conversation with West, Turki confirmed that the intelligence channel with Egypt was “open and has in reality never closed.” The Saudi Deputy Minister for Political Affairs in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abd al-Rahman Mansuri welcomed the Egyptian moratorium, but added that the Saudi Government would “remain passive and will only respond in a measured way to signals from Cairo—whether positive or negative.” (Telegram 7788 from Jidda, November 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2298)↩
  4. Fahd’s response to Carter’s letter, emphasizing the centrality of addressing the Palestinian issue to any peace settlement and rejecting the usefulness of a suggested meeting with Mubarak proposed by Sadat is in telegram 8618 from Jidda, December 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2446.↩