Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

302. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 18, 1979

SUBJECT

• Letter from Begin on Oil Negotiations with Egypt (C)

At last Friday’s breakfast,² you decided that we should not get involved in mediating on oil prices between Israel and Egypt, in response to Begin’s request (Tab B).³ (S)

Subsequently, Dayan has come to us with a renewed plea for a positive response.⁴ Bob Strauss has suggested—and Cy and I concur—that we try a middle course that is still designed to keep us at a distance, without making your response a flat turndown. This would be to suggest a list of internationally-respected experts in the field, from which Begin and Sadat could choose one or more to help. Begin would have the responsibility for selling Sadat on the idea. (S)

This approach would put the ball back in Begin’s court; though we should be under no illusions about the stakes involved, and the possibility that Begin will come back to us again in an effort to get us to assume responsibility. (S)

At Tab A is a message to Begin. The key element (paragraph 3) was drafted by Bob Strauss.⁵ The rest is a State draft. The speechwriters have cleared. (The cable will include talking points on our skepticism that this sort of mediation can work.) (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Begin at Tab A.⁶ (U)

Tab A

Draft Letter From President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Begin⁷

Washington, undated

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of October 8 about negotiations with Egypt on oil prices after the transfer of the Alma Field in November. I understand completely the importance of this issue and the heavy burden oil costs represent for Israel. I also understand the concern of the Government of Egypt to avoid losses which would result from charging Israel a price for oil lower than it does other customers.

As you know, the term “world market price,” as used in my letter of March 26,⁸ reflected my understanding of the language used by President Sadat and you at the meeting on March 26.⁹ It is subject to many different interpretations and is a matter on which honest people can disagree.

I have discussed this matter with Cy Vance,¹⁰ Bob Strauss, and other members of my Administration. We believe that the most useful step would be for us to suggest a half dozen or so internationally-respected, private experts in this field. You and President Sadat might then agree on one or more of these experts to assist you, as the two of you deem appropriate, on setting criteria for the world market price. I will also make known to President Sadat the concern of the United States, as a good friend of both Israel and Egypt, that this matter be settled amicably and equitably.

Meanwhile I suggest that Ministers Modai and Hillal pursue their talks on this issue. I realize that it will not be easy to resolve. But I am confident that, if Israel and Egypt continue their efforts in the spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation that characterizes their new relationship, a satisfactory agreement can be reached.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter¹¹

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 10/79. Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter initialed “C,” indicating that he saw the document.
2. No memorandum of conversation for this October 12 breakfast meeting has been found. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting, involving Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Jordan, Cutler, and Donovan, took place from 7:30 a.m. to 9:05 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
3. See Document 300.
4. Not further identified.
5. Brzezinski inserted a handwritten footnote at the end of this sentence that reads: “I added Vance’s name.”
6. Carter approved the recommendation.
7. Secret. The draft letter was found under an October 18 covering memorandum from Dodson to Tarnoff (Ibid.)
8. See Document 241.
9. No memorandum of conversation of a March 26 meeting among Carter, Sadat, and Begin has been found. See Document 233.
10. Brzezinski inserted “Cy Vance” into the text.
11. In place of his signature, Carter wrote: “OK. JC.” The Department of State transmitted the letter in telegram 273228 to Tel Aviv, October 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–2165) The list of oil experts was sent in telegram 274041 to Tel Aviv, October 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790480–0265)