Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Egypt¹

Washington, September 20, 1979, 0158Z

247541. Subject: Tripartite Talks on Security Supervision in the Sinai.

1. (Secret-entire text)

2. The talks with Egypt and Israel² on peacekeeping arrangements in Sinai ended this afternoon with an agreement, subject to approval³ of the respective governments and in the case of the US, the approval of Congress, on the following points:

—With respect to Zones A and B, we would agree to assume the supervision and observation function during the interim period to ensure compliance with the treaty terms. Both sides accepted our position that we could only consider undertaking this role if it could be performed with a contingent of civilian personnel which did not exceed the presently authorized size for SFM.

—We also agreed to increase the frequency of Olive Harvest flights to an average of one per week.⁴

—With respect to the buffer zone, both sides have agreed to work out arrangements jointly between themselves without U.S. involvement.

3. We had several exchanges with Kurt Waldheim during the day to try to work out a letter from him which would enable the Israelis to accept UNTSO as the supervising mechanism for Zone B. Unfortunately, Waldheim felt unable to make any statement in the letter indicating that UNTSO’s mandate would be to supervise the Treaty,⁵ and Dayan remained insistent that without this Israel could not accept UNTSO as having responsibility for verification in any of the zones. At the end of the day, however, Dayan indicated that he would be willing to recommend to the Cabinet that an UNTSO “presence” could be “integrated” into the peacekeeping arrangements. He and General Ali agreed that this “presence” (not spelled out in any detail) would be primarily in the buffer zone but could also extend to Zones A and B if the Egyptians agreed and we found it useful—and providing it was understood UNTSO would have no repeat no responsibility for supervision. As a first step, we are seeking clarification from Waldheim as to whether he would be willing to have UNTSO play this kind of limited role; the second step would be for Dayan to recommend this to the Israeli Cabinet as part of the overall package.

4. Dayan pressed hard for further U.S. commitments about the permanent arrangements at the end of the 3 years. He stated his position several times that Israel would not be expected to begin its withdrawal from Zone C until the multilateral force was in being. He also said he would be approaching us shortly with a proposal for the size and functions of this force. We made no commitments on these points, although we did agree to sit down with the Israelis a year before the completion of final withdrawal and begin to plan for the formation of that force.

5. Copies of memcons and associated documents will be pouched to Tel Aviv and Cairo ASAP.

6. The next few days will be a delicate period during which Dayan and Weizman will be putting this proposal to the Israeli Cabinet; Ali will be taking it to President Sadat and we will have to go through our own decision making process here, including consultation with the Congress about our own involvement. Therefore, you should not go into detail in discussing these terms with others beyond what you will have seen in the Secretary’s remarks to the press following the conclusion of our meeting today.⁶

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–1985. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared in S/S–O; approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to Jerusalem, Amman, USUN, Sinai, Jidda, Riyadh, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, and the White House.
2. The talks took place in Washington September 18–19. Memoranda of conversation for the tripartite talks have not been found. A memorandum of conversation for a September 18 bilateral meeting between the Israeli and U.S. delegations during which Vance outlined the requirements for any U.S. role in the peacekeeping arrangements in the Sinai (all U.S. personnel should be civilian and unarmed, the total number should not exceed present complement of SFM, the United States must obtain congressional approval before participation, some form of UN presence should be sought), is in the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1979 Memcons—Secretary. The Department of State produced a draft aide mémoire on Sinai peacekeeping arrangements, based upon the trilateral negotiations on September 29. See footnote 3 below.
3. The agreement was approved by the Israeli and Egyptian Cabinets on October 7 and October 13, respectively. The Israelis, however, insisted that the United States forge a multinational peacekeeping force at least a year before the IDF withdrawal reached its final completion in 1982. (David K. Shipler, “Israeli Cabinet Approves Temporary Plan for Monitoring Treaty in Sinai Without U.N.,” The New York Times, October 8, 1979, p. A8; “Egypt OKs Agreement to Monitor Israeli Pullout,” Los Angeles Times, October 14, 1979, p. A15) In response to the U.S. draft aide mémoire, the Israeli Foreign Ministry produced a counter-draft on October 9. Further minor revisions were agreed on October 18 in a meeting held in Washington among Evron, Sterner, Saunders, and Vance. Summarizing the meeting in an October 19 briefing memorandum for Vance, Sterner wrote: “Evron tried hard to get us to put language in the Aide Memoire to make it clear that UNTSO would not have an independent role, and that it should be there exclusively to support us.” Sterner added that United Nations Under Secretary General Brian Urquhart had “asked specifically” that the United States avoid such language in the aide mémoire. He concluded that the new U.S. draft aide mémoire, dated October 19, “meets Israel’s needs and that, together with the language in the previous aide mémoire, it fully reflects what was agreed to in Washington.” Sterner’s memorandum, along with all three draft aide mémoires, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–1380.
4. Previously, the U.S. Air Force reconnaissance flights undertaken under Operation Olive Harvest (see footnote 2, Document 122) numbered two per month. (David K. Shipler, “Israeli Cabinet Approves Temporary Plan for Monitoring Treaty in Sinai Without U.N.,” The New York Times, October 7, 1979, p. A8)
5. The U.S. Mission to the United Nations clarified this point in telegram 3871 from USUN, September 20, pointing out that Waldheim was “most willing” to “accommodate” the United States by making UNTSO available and to provide “written assurances that UNTSO could be expanded and its functions altered in consultation with Israel and Egypt.” What Waldheim could not commit to in writing “was an explicit reference to the treaty because by doing so he would invite a Soviet-Arab reaction which would make UNTSO’s continued participation impossible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–2342)
6. The text of Vance’s remarks was not found. The text of the Department’s daily press briefing for September 20, during which the talks were discussed, was transmitted in telegram 247721 to multiple posts, September 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790431–0946)