Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, August 6, 1979, 1154Z

16882. Subject: (S) The U.S.-Israel Relationship and U.S. Support for the UNSC Resolution on Palestinian Rights: The Price. Ref: USUN 3187² and previous.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: As the proposed UNSC Resolution on Palestinian Rights comes to the top of the agenda, Israeli suspicion and anxiety over U.S. Middle East policy and goals—ever-present beneath the surface of our bilateral relationship with Israel—is building towards a climax. We recognize that a broad range of U.S. national interests will be considered and weighed by Washington³ in its deliberations on this resolution and we are not recommending a vote for or against. However, we do want to alert the Department to the impact on this society and on U.S.-Israeli relations of the various options we may select.

—As long as we do not give the GOI assurances that we will veto a Palestinian rights resolution, as Israelis insist we are committed to doing, the GOI will accuse us of being prepared to violate our solemn commitments as it becomes, in an ironic and cynical exchange of roles, the defender of the sanctity of Resolution 242.

—Israeli reaction to a U.S. vote for or abstension on any repeat any Palestinian rights resolution will be strident, but so long as the U.S. stopped short of endorsing a Palestinian state explicitly or implicitly, we believe Israel would hold back from the most provocative actions which we expect would follow passage of a “maximal” resolution. However, even in the former instance, the damage to U.S. credibility would still be serious and we should not expect a quick return to business as usual. There is little we can do to soften the blow in Israel should a Palestinian rights resolution be adopted. Although the purpose of the exercise might be to broaden and quicken the peace process by bringing the PLO into it, few Israelis really want negotiations with the PLO under any circumstances. They would not be persuaded that we have enhanced the chances for a comprehensive peace. Our going along with a resolution which would be seen as “amending” 242 by specifying Palestinian rights—whether “national” or “legitimate”—an exercise which we have assiduously avoided until now, would galvanize a vocal national consensus which the GOI, carried along by its most hawkish elements, would manipulate to the hilt. Regardless of the policy we decide to follow, there are steps we should take to reduce Israeli suspicions over the period ahead as we grapple with the Palestinian rights resolution problem. It is in our interest to maintain a dialogue on this question with the Israelis as intensively as possible over the days ahead, in order to achieve the dual purpose of allaying as much as we can Israeli fears that we are up to a double game and pre-empting charges that we are violating our commitment to consult with them. Should we begin negotiations on the text of a draft resolution, we should provide drafts to the Israelis on a timely basis and brief them in as much detail

as practical on the signals we are receiving and on the American position as it emerges. Such steps, however, will not prevent the storm of vituperation, possibly backed by provocative actions destructive of the peace process, which our support of a Palestinian rights resolution—or even lingering suspicion as to our intentions between now and August 24—would bring on. End summary.

3. Israeli suspicion and anxiety over U.S. Middle East policy and goals—ever-present beneath the surface of our bilateral relationship with Israel—has been mounting steadily in the wake of the UNEF/

UNTSO flap,⁴ a more activist U.S. role in the autonomy negotiation, and new proposed U.S. arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Against this background, U.S. involvement in the postponement of the UNSC vote on the Palestinian rights resolution and what is seen here as the latest U.S. effort to draw the PLO into the peace process and establish a U.S.–PLO dialogue have set off a wave of emotional questioning of American constancy. The chain reaction has been given momentum by the ominous local interpretation of President Carter’s August 1 comments⁵ to the New York Times on the plight of the Palestinians (“Carter Equates PLO, U.S. Civil Rights Groups”, as one Israeli newspaper tendentiously headlined its report). Israelis now believe that the U.S. is moving in the direction of supporting or at least acquiescing in a Palestinian rights resolution which will supersede and, to use the Israeli phrase, “empty Resolution 242 of all meaning.” Hodding Carter’s statement⁶ the same day that the U.S. is willing to “build upon” Resolution

242 only heightened these fears. Coming all at once, these perceptions of sharp turns in U.S. policy generate growing doubts about U.S. willingness to honor its commitments to Israel—as defined by the GOI. Emotion is rising to a crescendo, and only a U.S. pledge to veto the Palestinian resolution in the SC will calm the Israelis.

4. Of all their many concerns, Israelis are perhaps most obsessed by the prospect of an international consensus on a solution to the Palestinian problem sharply diverging from Israeli requirements. Thus, failure of the U.S. to block the passage of a Palestinian rights resolution would result in an Israeli reaction that could have profound consequences for U.S.-Israeli ties and the Middle East peace process. We recognize that a broad range of U.S. interests will be weighed and considered by Washington in its deliberations on this resolution and we are not recommending a vote for or against, acknowledging the limitation imposed on our judgment by our special vantage point. This message is only intended to alert the Department to the impact of the various options we may select on this society and our relations with it.

5. Cabinet dynamics. As we have seen over the past few weeks, Begin’s hospitalization has not inhibited—and perhaps has even contributed to—the clashes we have had with the Israelis on a number of issues. The GOI’s normal combativeness has been enhanced by the internal maneuvering of various Ministers who have been exploiting Begin’s absence in order to expand their influence in key foreign policy/security issues. Unfortunately, the best way to win popularity points in this Cabinet and to a certain extent with the Israeli public is through rigid adherence to “principle” and uncompromising toughness in response to perceived “violations” of commitments. Thus, while any Israeli Government would go all-out to keep the U.S. from embracing a Palestinian rights resolution, many Ministers of this Cabinet are waiting—in some cases eagerly—for confrontations which can be turned to their personal political advantage.

6. The GOI and U.S. commitments on Resolution 242. As long as we do not give the GOI assurances that we will veto a Palestinian rights resolution, as Israelis insist we are committed to doing, the GOI will accuse us of being prepared to violate our solemn commitments as it becomes, in an ironic and cynical exchange of roles, the defender of the sanctity of Resolution 242. Indeed, the press reports Begin’s personal advisor, Yehiel Kadishai, as saying that U.S. credibility has already been shattered by its failure to adhere to its commitments. We will be accused specifically of violating our commitment under the 1975 memorandum of understanding⁷ to oppose any attempt in the UNSC to change Res. 242 and 338 in ways “incompatible with their original purpose.” The Israelis would no doubt claim, in addition to their other criticisms of a Palestinians rights resolution, that a new text treating the Palestinian issue as other than a refugee problem would be incompatible with the original purpose of 242—and therefore “changed”—even though the GOI committed itself to a much broader interpretation at Camp David.

7. The GOI and U.S. commitments on the PLO. The Israelis recognize that the immediate purpose of a new Palestinian rights resolution is to clear the way for the initiation of a direct U.S.–PLO dialogue. The GOI would without doubt view PLO acceptance of a Palestinian rights resolution, even if it included within it references to Res. 242 and 338, as insufficient to meet the U.S. commitment under the 1975 memorandum of understanding.⁸ The Israelis would call “foul”, assert that these two Resolutions stand on their own, and reject our acceptance of this “package deal” instead of explicit and unencumbered PLO acceptance of Res. 242 and 338 and Israel’s right to exist.

8. A “maximal” resolution. Israeli reaction to failure of the U.S. to veto any Palestinian rights resolution will be strident, but U.S. acceptance (even by abstention in a SC veto) of a “maximal” resolution (one postulating Palestinian national rights) would probably elicit sharp retaliatory measures and touch off a major crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. There is not a paragraph in either the preambular or operative parts of the present draft text in reftel which does not contain language the Israelis will find unacceptable. The worst in Israeli eyes is, of course, operative para. 1, which “affirms that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national rights of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine.” Even if the explicit reference to a Palestinian state were dropped, any text using such euphemisms as “right to political independence” or even “self-determination” would be totally unacceptable. Failure of the U.S. to veto such a resolution would be considered by the Israelis as an outright violation of our 1975 commitment. It would also be seen as a negation of the Camp David Accords, in that it prejudged the outcome of the autonomy and final-status negotiations, and would be cited as proof of the dishonesty of President Carter’s statement that the U.S. did not favor a Palestinian state.

9. The Cabinet, with or without Begin, would react violently and punitively. It is important to remember that there are those in the Cabinet who are seeking to transform current GOI positions in a number of areas into “red lines.” Within the range of possible Israeli responses are the following kinds of retaliatory actions:

—an outright freeze on the autonomy negotiations;

—public announcement of an extreme, “final” Israeli position on autonomy which would torpedo the negotiations;

—a rash of new settlements in sensitive areas;

—measures which would further tighten the Israeli hold on East Jerusalem, such as the transfer there of more GOI offices;

—a law providing for the blanket acquisition of land when needed for settlement in the territories;

—approval of the right of Israelis to purchase land in the territories;

—additional moves toward the annexation of the Golan.

10. We cannot assume that concern over Israel’s relationship with Egypt will necessarily inhibit such GOI moves. Those Cabinet members who would advocate this kind of sharp Israeli riposte believe that Egypt’s own interests dictate continued adherence to the peace process. The issue would be played as U.S. support for a Palestinian state and a threat to Israeli security; it would be argued that any resultant damage in the Egypt-Israel relationship could in any case be contained. For its part, the Labor opposition is unlikely to have a moderating effect on the Israeli reaction. It has already expressed its concern over the new U.S. approach to Res. 242, although it has placed responsibility on the Likud for mishandling the issue, damaging both the U.S.-Israeli relationship and Israel’s political position.

11. A “minimal” resolution. We do not know if a resolution that uses Camp David-style language such as “legitimate rights” or “participation in determination of their own future” and does not posit Palestinian national rights would be acceptable to the Arabs. As far as the Israelis are concerned, such a resolution would not be seen as much better than the maximal language. The initial reaction is likely to be not much different than that to a “maximal” resolution, but as long as the U.S. stopped short of endorsing a Palestinian state explicitly or implicitly, we believe Israel would be inclined to refrain from the most provocative actions. Still, our support of or failure to block even a “minimal” resolution would have a traumatic effect on Israelis and seriously damage U.S. credibility. The wound on the Israeli psyche would be a long time healing.

12. Softening the blow. There is little we can do to soften the blow in Israel should we either endorse or abstain on a Palestinian rights resolution. There is no way we will avoid a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Aside from a few cheers from the ultra-dovish side of the Israeli political spectrum, our bringing the PLO into the peace process will not be seen as a constructive act by the Israeli Government or public. Indeed, it is this eventuality that they most fear. And even if they recognized it as a silver lining, few Israeli politicians would wish to publicize such perspicacity. Few would be persuaded that we have enhanced the chances for a comprehensive peace. Our going along with a resolution which would be seen as “amending” 242 by specifying Palestinian rights—either “national” or just “legitimate”—would create a vocal national consensus which the GOI, carried along by its most hawkish elements, would manipulate to the hilt.

13. There are steps which we should take to reduce Israeli suspicions over the period ahead as we grapple with a Palestinian rights resolution and the difficult choices involved, regardless of our final decision on U.S. policy.

—It is in our interest to maintain a dialogue⁹ on this question with the Israelis as intensively as possible over the days ahead in order to achieve the dual purpose of allaying as much as possible Israeli fears that we are up to a double game, and pre-empting charges that we are violating our commitments.

—Should we begin negotiations on the text of a Palestinian rights resolution, we should provide drafts to the Israelis on a timely basis and brief them in as much detail as practicable on the signals we are receiving and on the American position as it emerges.

—Such steps, however, will in no way avert the inevitable storm of vituperation, possibly backed by provocative actions destructive of the peace process, which adoption by the Security Council of such a resolution would bring on.

Viets

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840090–2491. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Telegram 3187 from USUN, July 31, conveyed the current version of the Arab draft of the resolution on Palestinian rights. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790349–0177)
3. In an undated briefing memorandum to Vance and Strauss, produced shortly after the Israeli Cabinet’s August 5 statement rejecting the Palestinian rights resolution, Saunders analyzed whether the United States could seek a further delay in the planned August 23–24 resumption of the UN Security Council debate on the resolution. Among the considerations for U.S. policymakers, Saunders posed, was the “high state of tension” in U.S.-Israeli relations, the upcoming meeting between Sadat and Begin in Haifa, prospects for progress in the autonomy talks, and continued U.S. “credibility on the Palestinian issue.” Saunders included an alternate draft resolution attached to the briefing “that would produce a more positive attitude among Palestinian and other Arabs toward the negotiations while remaining consistent with our past commitments.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 75, Palestinians: 8/79–12/80)
4. The Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv reported comments made by Dayan on July 30 “refuting US allegations that UNTSO substitution was discussed with the GOI. Dayan said that ‘The US had no reason to assume that Israel would agree to the idea of observers.’” On May 30, Dayan continued, “‘Begin told an authorized American representative that Israel would agree to the stationing of a multinational force in the event that the Security Council did not approve the continued presence of the existing international emergency force. But beyond this the Prime Minister did not agree to any other idea.’” (Telegram 16275 from Tel Aviv, July 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346–1183) The following day, Bar-On protested to the Embassy in Tel Aviv an “alleged statement by an unnamed USG official” that Dayan was “making such a fuss over UNTSO” because he was “envious of Burg’s role in the autonomy talks.” (Telegram 16467 from Tel Aviv, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790348–0020)
5. On August 1, The New York Times reported that Carter had, in a conversation with a “visitor to the White House” on July 31, “likened” the Palestinian issue to the “‘civil rights movement here in the United States.’” The article continued, “If the Israelis permitted Palestinians to come back to the West Bank, Mr. Carter said, they would be satisfied with ‘just the right to do it,’ but relatively limited numbers scattered throughout the Arab world would want to return to the poverty of that area. On the other side, he believes that the Palestinian Arabs would be willing to accept the physical presence of Israeli military units as a safeguard of their national security. He maintains that a sizable majority of the Israeli people, based on polls he has seen, favor a generous settlement with the Palestinians, based on United Nations Resolution 242, as modified by the Camp David agreements.” Lastly, Carter said, “the other Arab states did not want a new Palestinian state that he suggested would be a source of continuing instability and a radical threat even to themselves.” (Leonard Silk, “Carter Expects Rise in Joblessness; Believes G.O.P. Will Pick Reagan,” The New York Times, August 1, 1979, p. A1)
6. Reference is to the July 31 daily press briefing. In response to a question whether the United States would not be “rigid” on Resolutions 242 and 338 and “participate in a search for a new formula,” Hodding Carter stated, “No. I don’t want to say that at all. We believe that the Resolutions are central, are the linchpin to the whole structure that we have participated in creating in the Middle East peace process and that to abandon those two would be a mistake. And I would simply keep the imagery of building blocks and linchpins and suggest to you that you build upon them. You don’t remove them. Now, what else might be feasible in the construction of a building large enough to encompass all of the views in the Middle East, that is the question that we are seeking to find an answer to.” (Telegram 198880 to multiple posts, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–0046)
7. See footnote 5, Document 97.
8. See footnote 7 above.
9. On August 8, Carter held a luncheon meeting with Evron. The meeting, Brzezinski wrote in a August 7 memorandum to Carter, was designed to “clear the air” between the United States and Israel. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 5–11/79) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 12:30 to 1:55 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) Although no memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found, Carter’s personal handwritten notes related to it are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81.