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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition
  4. Document 277

277. Summary of Conclusions of a Senior Level Meeting1

Washington, July 25, 1979, 3–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Middle East (U)

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Cyrus Vance (Chairman) Secretary
    • Harold Saunders Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs

  • OSD

    • Harold Brown Secretary

  • DCI

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner

  • Personal Representative of the President

    • Ambassador Robert Strauss

  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron

  • NSC

    • Robert Hunter

1. Palestinian Resolution. The meeting discussed the forthcoming UN Security Council debate on a resolution on Palestinian rights,2 in the context of which we are informed that the PLO will issue a statement accepting UNSC Resolution 242, in exchange for (as a minimum) recognition of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. (S)

It was agreed that the United States should take the lead on this issue in order to seek an outcome that will preserve the primacy of the Autonomy Talks, demonstrate our good intentions to the Palestinians (and others, like the Saudis), while minimizing the political risks with the Israelis. To this end:

—there could be a major speech, perhaps by Secretary Vance, deploring the continuing cycle of violence in the Middle East, stressing [Page 899] the importance of the peace process, indicating our desire to see the Palestinians directly involved, recognizing indications of a PLO willingness to accept 242, restating our conditions for dealing with them, and indicating our constructive approach to the UN debate; and3

—at the UN, we would introduce a short, clean resolution of our own, drawn (in exact words, if possible) from 242 and 338, the Camp David Framework, and the Aswan Formula4 (which indicates the deficiencies of 242 in only mentioning refugees). It would also indicate the primacy of the autonomy negotiations.5 (S)

Initially, we should seek to postpone the UN debate until the middle of August, while making known to the PLO the value of inhibiting terrorism as part of this process; and we should indicate in the UN process our good will in taking this approach, but also the need for the resolution not to be taken beyond it.6 (S)

2. Lebanon. The meeting discussed the immediate need to deal with notification of Congress on Israeli use of U.S. equipment in Lebanon. It was agreed that Secretary Vance would use the occasion of a complaining letter from Congressman Findley7 to write to Chairmen Zablocki and Church, saying that a violation “may have occurred,” leaving any action (not anticipated) up to Congress. There would be no threat to reduce military aid, since this would be ineffective.8 (S)

At the same time, the State Department would proceed with a series of modest steps with each of the parties (along the lines of Tab 1)9 designed to defuse the situation as much as possible, while recognizing that changing the basic situation at this time is unlikely. In addition, Ambassador Strauss should pursue the idea of a moratorium on Israeli military action with Prime Minister Begin, pursuant to their earlier discussion and exchange of letters.10 (S)

The meeting discussed a forthcoming open letter to you from President Sarkis,11 attacking Israeli actions. It was agreed that a rapid [Page 900] reply12 to his earlier letter13 to you should be dispatched, outlining in general terms the approach to Congress and some of the other steps referred to above.14 (S)

It was agreed that thought should be given to a meeting between you and President Sarkis next spring, perhaps in the context of an informal visit by him to the United States arranged by the Council on Foreign Relations.15 (C)

3. UNTSO . Secretary Vance reported that he will respond16 to Dayan’s suggestion of a tripartite meeting by inviting him and an Egyptian representative to meet with us and Waldheim (or a representative) to discuss the future of UNTSO.17 (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)—5/79–8/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The summary was found attached to an unsigned July 27 covering memorandum from Gates to Raphel, stating that Carter approved the summary and that the check marks in the margins were the President’s.↩
  2. See footnote 7, Document 276. At U.S. request, the interested delegations, including the PLO, agreed on July 30 to defer the continuation of the Security Council debate on the resolution until August 23. (Telegram 3181 from USUN, July 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–0689)↩
  3. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  4. See footnote 5, Document 3.↩
  5. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  6. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  7. Representative Paul Findley (R-Illinois).↩
  8. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  9. Attached but not printed. The document lists a series of “practical steps” that could be taken with the Israelis and Haddad, the United Nations, the Syrians, the Lebanese Government, and the contributors to UNIFIL to address the current situation in Lebanon.↩
  10. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  11. In a July 23 meeting with Dean, Sarkis stated that in light of the Israeli air attacks on Lebanese territory the day before he had decided to send an official letter regarding the situation to Carter “in the next few days.” (Telegram 4116 from Beirut, July 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2467)↩
  12. See Document 278.↩
  13. On July 4, following the June 27 Israeli-Syrian air engagement, Sarkis sent a handwritten letter to Carter, warning that if “such confrontations are repeated, they will constitute without doubt a dangerous escalation with incalculable consequences for the peace of Lebanon, for the entire region, and perhaps for the world.” Sarkis condemned the “declared policy of the Israeli Government” and the “utilization by it of American arms for offensive purposes against Lebanon, her territory and her citizens” which are a “challenge to the principles of law and morality, as well as a violation of the commitments made by Israel to the American administration.” (Telegram 3738 from Beirut, July 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2461)↩
  14. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  15. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  16. Telegram 196867 to Cairo, July 29, states that Dayan would present to the Israeli Cabinet Vance’s invitation for him to come to Washington to discuss post-UNEF arrangements in Sinai. The Department instructed Atherton to approach the Egyptians in order to invite them to send an official of a level comparable to Foreign Minister to Washington for the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1449)↩
  17. Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩