Office of the Historian

273. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, July 17, 1979

SUBJECT

  • UN Resolution on Settlements (U)

This week, the UN Security Council will vote on a resolution derived from the report of the Three-nation Commission on Settlements.2 The first draft (with State’s technical suggestions) is at Tab I.3 (U)

The issue: Should we vote for a “good” resolution (close to the draft) and incur the wrath of the Israelis (and possibly sidetrack the process of questioning the settlements in Israel)? Or should we abstain, while making a strong speech on settlements, thus minimizing the political damage? (There is agreement that we stand to gain little from the Arabs [Page 889] on this vote.) Of course, if the draft resolution is amended by the Arabs to be totally unacceptable, we should consider vetoing it. (S)

Strauss, Saunders, and I met on this today. Strauss’ recommendation (which he discussed and agreed with Vance) is as follows:

1) We should trail, not lead, on this issue;

2) Strauss will find an occasion to discuss “options” with Evron, and will “complain” that Israel’s settlements policy has led to the difficulties posed by this resolution, thus complicating Strauss’ job;

3) If the resolution is “good”, we should probably vote for it, or perhaps abstain. In either case, our man at the UN should make a statement giving the opposite spin;

4) If we are forced to veto, Strauss would send messages to Hussein and Fahd explaining that their Arab colleagues made this necessary;

5) We should hope that the draft is awful. (S)

One consideration in this scenario, of course, is the likelihood that the President would support our voting “yes.” (Otherwise, the generally preferred course of action would be to abstain—without being pushed—and gain credit with the Israelis on an issue that has little “plus” side.) (S)

Ed Sanders has urged abstention, with a strong anti-settlements statement (Tab II).4 (S)

If you concur with the scenario (above), no further decisions are required until we see the outcome of consultations at the UN. (U)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 23, United Nations (UN), 1–7/79. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.” Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “RG Fri. breakfast issue. ZB.”↩
  2. The United Nations Security Council Commission, established by Resolution 446 on March 22 and charged with examining the situation relating to Israeli settlements in Arab territories, including Jerusalem, occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, released the report on July 12. The report recommended that the Security Council launch a “pressing appeal” to the Israeli Government “re-emphasizing the disastrous consequences which the settlement policy was bound to have on any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East” and to call upon the Israelis to “cease establishing and planning settlements in the occupied territories.” (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 387–388)↩
  3. Attached but not printed.↩
  4. Sanders’s July 17 memorandum to Newsom is attached but not printed.↩