229. Memorandum From Willam B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Unresolved Issues (U)

1. Subphasing of withdrawal. Israel is sticking with the position of not withdrawing from the Alma field until the end of the nine-month period.2 Egypt says this is contrary to the concept of subphasing and has suspended its agreement to send an Ambassador one month after the completion of the interim withdrawal. This morning, Roy, Hal and I developed a possible compromise proposal: withdrawal from the oilfield in six months; arrangements to insure continued supply of oil to Israel until normalization of relations begins; exchange of Ambassadors on schedule. The six month figure is eminently defensible. We [Page 794] referred to the subphasing as discussed at Blair House. That means four or six months, depending on which set of talks is referred to. A message to Begin will probably be needed. (S)

2. Memorandum of Agreement on Oil. The Israelis have submitted a counterdraft3 which would include a price subsidy formula and an option to extend the guarantee almost indefinitely. (C)

3. Memorandum of Agreement on Assurances. Senator Church has said that anything more than what we have in our draft would virtually constitute a treaty and would require Senate approval. The Israelis are asking for significant changes. (C)

4. Unilateral Steps Letter. Begin wants to discuss this with the President. His initial reaction suggests that we will have problems.4 (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 1–3/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads: “ZB has seen.”
  2. When discussing the issue of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields with Lewis on March 20, Begin “articulated with great animation his resistance” to reducing the 9-month withdrawal period. “Israel, he said, does not want to activate the U.S. oil supply agreement if it is not absolutely necessary.” On the oil supply agreement, Begin added that his “only quarrel” with the present formulation “is that he prefers two distinct periods of ten and five years duration, rather than a single period of fifteen years. Begin said he strongly prefers the latter, thus allowing [the] 1975 [U.S. oil] Commitment to [former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin to fade into the history books. I [Lewis] told Begin there was absolutely no chance that we would agree to an extension to twenty years of the U.S. commitment and Begin replied he had no intention of requesting one.” (Telegram 5599 from Tel Aviv, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Pre-Signing Negotiations: Cairo, Tel Aviv, Washington & New York, 3/20–26/79)
  3. The text of the Israeli counter-draft has not been found. On March 18, the United States amended the draft text of the oil supply agreement from the originally proposed fifteen year guarantee. Under the new formulation, the agreement would become effective for a five-year period “commencing blank months following the entry into force of the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel, and shall be extended for an additional period commencing at the end of that five-year period and ending ten years later, at which time the arrangement will terminate.” (Telegram Tosec 30001/67721 to Tel Aviv, March 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2617)
  4. On March 20, Lewis presented Begin with a draft version of the letter for Khalil on unilateral actions Israel would take guaranteeing freedoms for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. In response, Begin stated that he would take up the matter with Carter in Washington and that “he wished at this time only to remind us that during his discussion with President Carter on this issue, the President had asked only about the prevailing repeat prevailing situation on the West Bank and Gaza regarding freedom of movement, freedom of political activity, etc. Begin stressed that it is the particulars of the prevailing situation—which will continue to obtain in the future—which should be conveyed on his behalf by President Carter to Sadat.” (Telegram 931 from Jerusalem, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–1318) For the final version of the letter from Carter to Khalil, signed March 26, see Document 238.