201. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to Secretary of Defense Brown1
- Possible Security Measures for Israel
Listed below are possible security measures (most of which don’t rise to the level of “guarantees”) which the President might offer (or might authorize you to offer) the Israelis should that seem appropriate in the course of the peace process. These measures would be additional to current United States commitments (see Tab A),2 deriving largely from the Sinai II agreement, to:
(1) provide oil to Israel if it cannot secure its oil needs (applicable for five years after signing of Sinai II, with a one year termination provision thereafter);
(2) conclude a contingency plan for a military support operation to Israel in an emergency situation (not yet accomplished)
(3) maintain Israeli defense strength through the supply of advanced equipment such as the F–16s; and
[Page 686](4) submit annually for approval to Congress a request for military and economic assistance.
The possible additional measures include:
(1) joint planning with Israelis for US logistical support without European bases being available, thereby implementing Sinai II commitment
(2) a commitment to follow-through on such plan in an emergency
(3) creation of Israel WRM
—earmark items in US inventory: for example, from CONUS equipment of POMCUsed divisions
—alternative: build up general stocks
(4) put in President’s budget an item called “Israeli contingency fund” to use if requirement—which could be a war or something less—arose.
(5) pre-position some US materiel in Israel which could be diverted to Israel if appropriate.
(6) extend Sinai II oil guarantee3 for additional definite period.
(7) commitment to expansion and/or modernization of Israeli forces
(8) cut off supplies to countries opposing Israeli in war
—variant: to “aggressors” against Israel (raises question of what happens if Israel preempts).
(9) Change Israel’s PD–134 status
—equal to NATO
(10) US maritime exercises in Israeli waters.
(11) US exertion of maritime rights in international waters relevant to Israel, e.g., Suez.
[Page 687](12) US/Israeli joint maritime exercises (e.g., as with South American countries)
(13) US air exercises with Israeli’s
—with US aircraft from carrier
—with USAF fly-in (fly-in need not include exercise)
(14) US joint ground exercise with Israelis (as with Koreans)
—need not include US troops although it could, but could be limited to logistical support/air support
(15) conduct overflights on Israel’s behalf
—e.g. like SR–71 flights over Cuba
(16) provide Israelis training in US
—e.g., vs. Red Flag squadron
(17) provide Israel US reconnaissance/early warning support (either in war and/or peace)
—could have Israeli member in crew
(18) home port US ship in Israel port
(19) establish maintenance facility for US forces in Israel
(20) US base in Israel
(21) Initiatives to reduce Israeli isolation
—support in US, including initiatives to keep/put back Israeli in US organizations
—initiatives to increase number of countries recognizing Israel
National Disclosure Policy
(22) Increase Israel status in National Disclosure Policy (from CONFIDENTIAL to SECRET or TOP SECRET)
- Source: Washington National Records Center, Old Files, FRC 330–81–0447, Box 2, unlabeled folder. Top Secret.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- In the
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the
United States, signed in Jerusalem on September 1, 1975, the United
States pledged to “promptly make oil available for purchase by
Israel” to meet all its domestic oil needs should Israel be unable
to meet all its “normal requirements” for domestic consumption.
Foreign Relations,1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 227)↩
- The text of
Presidential Directive 13 on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,
signed by Carter on May 13,
1977, is scheduled for publication in
Foreign Relations,1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control.↩