198. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance 1
619. From: Brzezinski, Cairo 619 part 1 of 2. To: The White House, for the President and Secretary Vance only. To be handled directly by the Senior Duty Officer in Situation Room White House.
1. I met for two hours today with President Sadat, on a one-on-one basis, from 5:30 to 7:30 pm. Before providing a more detailed readout, let me summarize my central impressions:
2. First, Sadat is extraordinarily eager to make your visit a massive success. He stressed this over and over again.
3. Secondly, he wishes to use your visit here and to Israel to bring the peace process to a rapid conclusion. He asked me explicitly whether [Page 678] the President is prepared to insist that Begin sign a peace treaty in the course of his visit. In response to my query, he indicated that he would not be prepared to go to Jerusalem but would welcome the President and Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia in order to sign the agreement. I pointed out to Sadat the psychological importance of inviting Begin to Cairo and, after some exchanges, he conceded that this was psychologically important and said that he would be willing to invite Begin here, immediately after the President’s visit to Jerusalem.
4. Third, with regards to our specific language, Sadat made only indirect comments which seem to indicate that he himself was not raising any objections and was prepared to accept it. He went on to raise additional issues, such as oil, indicating a willingness to be accommodating. My impression is that you will have his support on our new formulations unless tomorrow his colleagues talk him out of it.
5. Fourth, Sadat was extraordinarily delighted by your willingness to consider the issue in a wider security context. He interrupted me several times with exclamations to the effect that this is “marvellous, marvellous” and that it represents his own thinking exactly. In fact, he told me that to him the regional security issue is now the more important one.
6. You will note in the more detailed account which follows that he is anxious to give us some “secret weapons” to take to Jerusalem, though the issue of ambassadors still gives him difficulty. Having noted his uneasiness over that issue, I did not probe any further but merely registered the point that you will discuss it with him in greater detail. The most important “secret weapon” he wishes to offer, but please note that it is only to you and that it is not to be incorporated in any formal agreement, is the willingness to build an oil pipeline from the Sinai to Israel.
7. Insofar as the conversation itself is concerned, I started by covering all of the points that you asked me to make. Sadat listened very attentively, interrupting only to express agreement regarding my characterization of Begin’s motives, regarding the impact on U.S. domestic politics of the Middle Eastern crisis, and particularly regarding the point that the U.S. wishes to see a strong Egypt. At that moment he interjected with a number of comments, expressing enthusiastic approval of your approach, stressing the positive results for the U.S. of a friendship with a militarily and economically strong Egypt.
8. After I handed him our proposed new language, Sadat read extremely carefully and out loud. With respect to Article VI, he simply said “ah-ha, you made it neutral,” and then asked Roy Atherton to come in in order to make certain whether that would or would not be part of the treaty or would be a side letter (and Roy told him that it would be attached to the treaty). Regarding the target date language [Page 679] Sadat said “believe me, they are idiots. I gave them a better proposal on Gaza, and they will come to regret the fact that they did not accept it.” After finishing reading the proposed U.S. language, Sadat turned to me and asked “what if I accept? Why doesn’t the President plan to sign the treaty during the trip?” I told Sadat that you had that eventuality in mind if things go well, and he expressed the strongest support for such an approach.
9. He then went on to say that he wishes me to convey to you his “two directives”. The first is his directive to all of his associates to make your visit to Egypt “A devastating and unprecedented success, at whatever cost.” The second is that the U.S. and Egypt should join in a partnership and go forth together, whether Begin agrees to a settlement or whether he doesn’t.
10. It was at this stage that I told Sadat of Begin’s desire to visit Cairo and that it would be a mistake to shunt him aside to Ismailia. After some exchanges, Sadat smiled and said that I might well be right for psychological reasons, and that he will give you an invitation to convey to Begin, if things go well, to visit Cairo. He would propose that the three of you stay at the Mena House at the foot of the pyramids, and that by pre-arrangement a day or so be spent on “bargaining” so that Begin can protect himself at home, following which the peace treaty would be signed.
11. Sadat kept reiterating the importance of success in this venture and asked me what are the things you might need “to hammer Begin.” It was at this point that I ventured that you might need some help from him on oil and on the ambassadors. He then made the aforementioned proposition on oil, which he will authorize you to take with you to Israel. On ambassadors, he said he might be willing to do it immediately after the first phase of withdrawals is completed, but he added that he needs to discuss this with you. I stressed to him the symbolic significance of this issue to the Israelis and how it could prove to be a decisive element in making it impossible for Begin “to stall”, a tactic which Sadat fears Begin will employ.
12. The foregoing essentially completed the bilateral part of the discussions, with Sadat being deeply touched by your letter and expressing, in a manner which impressed me as very genuine, his warmest feelings for you. He was particularly responsive to my frank discussion of our domestic political aspect of the problem.
13. The second part of the discussion involved a geopolitical review. Sadat had a globe brought out into the room and he gave me an overview of the regional situation as he sees it. Its essentials can be reduced to the following points: he described Saudi Arabia as a scarecrow and a U.S. protectorate, to which we attach excessive importance. He indicated that he could give additional assistance militarily to Saudi [Page 680] Arabia through planes and pilots, but it is important for the U.S. not to exaggerate the Saudi role. The Saudis are indecisive and incapable of action.
14. With regard to Syria, he sees the internal situation as rapidly deteriorating, and he expects a major and violent change this year. He believes that the Syrians would be interested in discreet arrangements with the U.S.
15. With regard to Iraq, he reiterated the point that discreet arrangements with the U.S. are timely and that the U.S. has much more in common with Iraq than Iraq has with the Soviet Union. He encouraged us to move towards a relationship.
16. He was scathing and contempuous of King Hussein. He accused him of already now trying to undermine the Camp David Accords, and he urged that we dismiss him altogether. He emphasized the strong position he has in Egypt, which he believes is based on the fact that the Egyptian people no longer have a complex over Israel. That complex was shed during the 1973 war.
17. In talking of the Arabian Gulf, he stressed that he enjoys a great deal of support in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Oman. That support cannot be openly expressed but the fact is that there is sympathy for his policies. Turning to other regions, he asserted that he will shortly be transferring 200 tanks to Somalia, and he would wish them replaced by us. He expressed the view that the situation is deteriorating in Libya and may soon get out of hand. In his view Algeria will henceforth pursue more genuinely neutral policies, and considers that to our collective advantage.
18. Finally, at the very end of the conversation he floated the idea that Egypt might propose, after the Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai have been completed, that U.S. forces be made part of the UN Sinai force. He thought that this might provide an international cover for the introduction of an U.S. military presence in the Sinai. At the same time, he expressed reservation regarding Begin’s idea that Etzion be made into an U.S. airbase.
19. Throughout the discussion he emphasized his desire to work closely with you either in reaching accommodation with Begin or in working together in spite of him. He also responded favorably to my strategic overview of your policies.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter’s Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2–4/79. Top Secret; Flash. Sent via privacy channels for Carter and Vance only. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the message, indicating that he saw the document.↩