1. Attached for your information is a report [1 line
not declassified] concerning Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s observations of the
Camp David Summit in which he has expressed hope for the attainment of
two separate but related achievements.
2. This information, [less than 1 line not
declassified], is a raw report, not finally evaluated
intelligence. The report is also being made available to the Secretary
of State.
Attachment
Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency2
SUBJECT
- Egyptian President Anwar
al-Sadat’s Perceptions of the Camp David Summit
as of 18 August 1978
1. [less than 1 line not declassified],
Egyptian President Anwar
al-Sadat told [less than 1 line not
declassified] that despite anticipated difficulties, he has
hopes for the success of the Camp David Summit. He stated that the
participation of President Jimmy
Carter in the peace process makes possible, if not
probable, the attainment of two separate but related achievements.
The first achievement would be a two-part publicly announced
agreement to include the acceptance of principles, based on UN Resolution 242, coupled with an
agreement on the Pales
[Page 38]
tinian
question based on the Aswan Formula announced by President Carter at Aswan, Egypt in January
1978.3
2. The second achievement, to be won through hard bargaining, would
be a precisely written secret agreement on the framework for a
Middle East peace settlement. This secret agreement would be signed
by both President Sadat and
Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin with a witnessing signature by President
Carter. The reason
President Sadat would insist
on a written document witnessed by President Carter is to prevent subsequent
statements by the two parties—either inadvertently or
deliberately—misinterpreting the understanding reached between the
leaders of Egypt and Israel.
3. In defining what he meant by a precise agreement on the framework
for a Middle East peace, President Sadat stated that both he and Prime Minister
Begin had to agree on a
clear definition of all the major aspects of a Middle East
settlement. Following the acceptance of this major, overall
framework of agreement, details would then be worked out by
committees, hopefully to include the participation of other Arab
nations also.
4. President Sadat’s own basic
tenet for a framework of an agreement allows for considerable
flexibility on details, but no compromise on sovereignty or
territory—except for minor adjustments on the West Bank.
5. President Sadat proposed
the Palestinian question as one example of the need for both a
public and a secret agreement. Whereas the public statement could
announce an agreement on the Aswan Formula as a basis for the
Palestinian issue, secret negotiations would need to address Israeli
concerns regarding which Palestinians would be the future leaders of
a Palestinian West Bank.
6. President Sadat stated that
President Carter’s
participation is essential because he (President Sadat) has lost the trust and
confidence which he had in Prime Minister Begin, and now he must fall back on
his trust in President Carter’s sincerity and fairness. President Sadat felt that if he and Prime
Minister Begin reached a
precise written understanding and if President Carter witnessed that written
understanding, then the peace process could indeed take a major step
forward.
