Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

124. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 3, 1978

SUBJECT

• Status Report on Egypt-Israel Negotiations

As you know, Boutros Ghali and Usama [al Baz] have left for Cairo² and will probably not return until Tuesday.³ Weizman is meanwhile in Israel trying to get support for his proposal on withdrawal in phases to the interim line.

In our talks with Dayan today,⁴ he stuck to a tough line, even reopening some issues, perhaps in anticipation that the Egyptians will do likewise after they return from Cairo. At present, several issues are still not resolved.

1. Serious Issues:

—Preamble. Israel wants to delete language that notes that the Camp David framework constitutes a basis for peace between Israel and each of its neighbors. Dayan implied that the only way Israel could agree to this language would be if we were to write a letter stating that there is “no legal linkage” between the Treaty and the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. We have said this is not necessary and that the preamble cannot now be changed.

—Gaza. Israel will not accept our suggested language (originally proposed by Barak) on “the issue of the status of Gaza.” Egypt will not accept the Israeli draft. They are both adamant. We have said we will stick with our draft.

—Letter on West Bank/Gaza. Israel does not want a joint letter, does not want to refer to a target date for elections, and does not want to annex the Camp David Framework to the letter. Egypt insists on a joint letter, wants to set a target date, and wants to annex the Framework. Otherwise Sadat will want to include arrangements for Gaza in the treaty itself, which his delegation realizes is a non-starter.

—Oil. The two sides are far apart.⁵ The Egyptians have just received new instructions which move away from our compromise draft. They do not want to give Israel “right of first refusal” on oil purchases.

2. Medium Issues.

—Termination of Security Arrangements. Sadat wants to set a specific date by which the security arrangements in Sinai will come to an end. His delegation realizes that the Israelis will not accept this, and will try to stick with a general review clause as is now in the draft.

—Navigation. The Israelis reopened this issue and suggested some new language. The Egyptians have it under consideration.

—Obligations. The Israelis want to title this article “Priority of Obligations”. The Israelis [Egyptians?] refuse. We suggested dropping the title.

Finally, we still have a series of bilateral questions to work through with the Israelis. On the whole, virtually no progress was made today except on the military annex. There will be some talks over the weekend, but we cannot expect much real progress until after the Israeli Cabinet meets on Sunday and the Egyptian delegation returns.

Footnote: Dayan repeated today that the negotiations for the West Bank/Gaza would be “ten times” as difficult as the Egypt-Israel peace treaty talks. This is especially true, in his view, now that we are insisting that the powers and responsibilities of the “self-governing authority” should be defined before the elections (is provided for in the Camp David Framework).

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information.
2. On November 3, Boutros Ghali and al-Baz received instructions to return to Egypt for consultations with Sadat. (Telegram 280946 to Cairo, November 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2376)
3. November 7.
4. No other record of these talks has been found.
5. Among a number of issues, the question of the timing of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields divided the Israeli and Egyptian oil negotiation teams. On November 4, Atherton met with the Israeli Minister for Oil Yitzhak Modai and the Israeli oil delegation. In the course of the conversation, it emerged that Egyptian resistance to Israel’s original proposal for a continued role in Sinai oil operations after the implementation of the peace treaty stemmed largely from concerns that this infringed on Egyptian sovereignty. Atherton affirmed the U.S. belief that “there is no basis in international law for continuing exploitation of Egyptian resources” after the treaty came into force. Furthermore, Atherton noted, supply to Israel would be assured in that the treaty would include provision for non-discrimination in trade. (Memorandum for the Record, November 4; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Oil)