Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

109. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, October 26, 1978, 2025Z

23648. Subject: Sadat Letter for President Carter. Ref: (A) Cairo 23635,² (B) Cairo 23479.³

1. Met with PriMin Moustafa Khalil for two and a half hours this evening. On instructions, he was busy preparing a letter from President Sadat to President Carter. Khalil said the purpose of the letter is to emphasize to President Carter the importance of resolving satisfactorily the three “major” points that Sadat needs in order to sign the treaty (ref B) and to convey Sadat’s deep concern about Israeli statements on settlement expansion and East Jerusalem.⁴ The letter had first to be typed and then cleared with Sadat before it could be given to me.

2. Text of letter follows:

Quote:

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to thank you for your great personal efforts for the progress which has thus far been achieved in the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. I appreciate very much what has been done concerning solving many problems to make the signature of the peace treaty very much anticipated in the near future.

There are essentially three main points that must be met before the treaty is signed by Egypt, namely:

1—the duration of the treaty.

The nature of peace and peaceful relations may be of a lasting nature. But the specific obligations contained in the treaty of the Egyptian land should be limited in time.

Therefore, making the duration of the treaty 25 years pertains essentially to the obligations contained in the treaty.

2—Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai.

The treaty must emphasize the full sovereignty of Egypt over the Sinai. The exercise of this sovereignty will be linked to the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the two stages.

3—No preferential treatment should be accorded to Israel. Therefore no priority of obligations should be stipulated in the treaty.

I would also like to bring to your attention my deep concern about the statement made today by Minister Dayan about strengthening the settlements on the West Bank, and equally so the statement made by Prime Minister Begin about moving the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Jerusalem. These statements are not consistent with the spirit of Camp David and I know that you share my concern.

I hope that the Government of Israel can be persuaded to desist from such actions which only complicate the peace negotiations in which we are all engaged in, and which we all want to succeed.

I would like to assure you that your own efforts in securing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East are recognized by the whole world and I look forward to welcoming you to attend the signing of the peace treaty in the very near future.

Jehan joins me in extending our very best wishes to both Rossalyn and yourself.

With warmest personal regards.

Yours sincerely

Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat

Unquote.

3. With respect to the point on the duration of the obligations, Sadat asked that I convey orally rpt orally his suggestion that language to the effect that the specific treaty obligations on Egyptian land be for 25 years could be included in a paragraph at the end of the document. Khalil noted that there is at present no language on duration included in the draft treaty.

4. Khalil indicated that Sadat wanted me to get the letter out right away.

Eilts

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the document, indicating that he saw the telegram. The original signed copy of Sadat’s letter, forwarded from Tarnoff to Brzezinski under a November 16 covering memorandum, is ibid.
2. Telegram 23635 from Cairo, October 26, conveyed press reports that indicated that the Egyptian Government was considering withdrawing its delegation from the peace treaty talks in the aftermath of the Israelis’ announced plans to expand Gaza and West Bank settlements. In the telegram, Eilts also reported on an October 26 telephone conversation with Khalil in which the latter criticized this statement and a further Israeli announcement indicating an intention to move the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Jerusalem, describing the actions as “totally unhelpful to Egypt” and making “a mockery of Israeli claims to want a just and equitable peace.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780441–0279)
3. In telegram 23479 from Cairo, October 24, Eilts relayed an oral message from Sadat to Carter, through Khalil, indicating Sadat’s three main reservations with the draft treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2731) In telegram 272016 to Cairo, October 26, Vance acknowledged that Carter received Sadat’s oral message. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/23–31/78)
4. See footnote 2, Document 100. Dayan informed Viets, in a conversation at the airport before the former’s departure for Washington, that Begin was “seriously considering” moving the two Ministries to East Jerusalem. (Telegram 15650 from Tel Aviv, October 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780440–0215)