100. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State1
2892. From Saunders. Subj: Saunders Meeting With West Bank/Gaza Palestinians, October 20.
Summary: Nine West Bank/Gaza Palestinians, including the mayors of Bethlehem and Gaza, met with Saunders for four hours evening of October 20 to discuss possible Palestinian participation in peace negotiations based on Camp David Accords (CDA). Consensus was that Palestinians under occupation2 could not participate without sup [Page 365] port from Arab world (Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria) and particularly PLO. Several sought US guarantees on questions of Jerusalem, sovereignty, self-determination and settlements. Saunders reiterated US positions but said he could not guarantee that USG could bring Israel to accept Arab or even US position on all these questions and certainly not now. He could guarantee the US would be a full partner in negotiations and expressed his belief that Palestinians’ bargaining position would improve with the maturing of a self-governing authority (SGA). It was proposed that US issue statement recognizing that sovereignty lies with the people in West Bank and Gaza which could be used by moderates to convene a national assembly to draft a constructive counterproposal to CDA. Saunders did not reject idea, but urged that any counterproposal take account of political realities. ConGen urged that Palestinians rely upon themselves to act now or watch ever-increasing Israeli consolidation on their land. End summary.
1. Saunders met nine Palestinians October 20 at Consulate General in Jerusalem to discuss possible Palestinian participation in peace negotiations based on CDA.3 Present were: Rashad Shawwa, Mayor of Gaza; Mansur Shawwa, the Mayor’s son; Hatim Abu Ghazellah, a Gazan attorney; Elias Freij, Mayor of Bethlehem; Hikmat al-Masri of Nablus; lawyer Aziz Shehadeh of Ramallah; Jerusalem UNRWA Director Antranig Bakerjian; Jerusalem business man Fa’iz Abdinnur and Mahmoud Abu Zalaf, publisher of “Al Quds.” Also present along with Consul General Newlin were DPO Kruse, PolOff Hull, PAO Smith, and Embassy PolOff Blackwill, and NEA Officer Howell.
2. About an equal number of invitees from the West Bank declined to come. Some of them specifically on grounds that the CDA “ignored the (Palestinian) national movement and the PLO as its recognized leadership.”
3. Consensus of those who did attend was that, aside from deficiencies of CDA, Palestinians in West Bank/Gaza could not join negotiations because they lacked support from Arab states (Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria), and PLO.
4. “We in West Bank have no power to negotiate. . . my own experience from public meetings in the West Bank, sponsored by communists and blessed by Israelis, is that public opinion is dead. We can’t [Page 366] move an inch without the PLO, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia,” Freij said.
5. Mayor Shawwa noted that democratic principles insured rule of majority, and most people in occupied territories supported the PLO. “How could Israel force another representative on them?” he asked. He mentioned that during recent meeting with Arafat he had proposed a transition period followed by complete Israeli withdrawal and a link with Jordan. Arafat had proposed this suggestion to executive committee and gained approval, Shawwa said.
6. Saunders said he was hearing same thing but in reverse from Arab states. Saudis said they couldn’t move, but Jordan could. Jordan said it couldn’t move, but West Bankers/Gazans could. Question was who would take first step. As for PLO, a new situation had arisen. CDA clearly recognized political character of Palestinian problem. In new situation, should PLO decide it could accept 242, USG would talk with it, but, he wondered, given Israeli attitudes whether that would much advance peace.
7. Al-Masri concurred that PLO must be involved, but “with a new formula; we could be the PLO.” The important thing, al-Masri continued, was to change the CDA to stipulate an end to settlements and guarantee self-determination for Palestinians. With that, Palestinians could go to PLO and Arab countries for support.
8. Saunders said he could guarantee continued US participation as a full partner, but not the final outcome. USG would certainly consider any reasonable counterproposal from a representative group of Palestinians, but the CDA itself could not feasibly be changed. Any proposal would have to take into consideration political realities. From his experience at Camp David, Israel had gone about as far as it could for the moment. There was no way the Americans could simply dictate sweeping alterations. Palestinians, he suggested, should consider tackling their problems in a logical sequence, making progress where that was possible, e.g. on powers of SGA, and use success at one stage to open new possibilities at another. “I am amazed that you are telling me, and I shall have to report to President Carter that you prefer continued occupation to self-government,” Saunders said.
9. Abu Ghazallah protested that Saunders was thus asking an unfair question, but Bakerjian asked: “Do we all want to reject even this modest step forward?”
10. Bakerjian asked whether USG could declare that sovereignty lies with Palestinian people in West Bank/Gaza, but, for practical reasons, there would have to be a transition period and an SGA. “In situations like this where sovereignty is historically confused, the USG holds that sovereignty resides with the people on the land and that their will must be expressed through an agreed method of [Page 367] self-determination,” Saunders replied. He explained that self-determination does not mean automatically giving the Palestinians an independent state. A review of acts of self-determination shows different methods have been used to suit the unique circumstances in each case.
11. Shehadeh suggested that a national conference be convened on the basis of such a public US declaration in order to formulate a constructive response to the CDA. Freij warned that such a conference would only put a seal of rejection on it.
12. Saunders reiterated that the USG would listen to reasonable proposal, but—he cautioned—it would have to be politically astute, something which could move the Israelis.
13. The group asked Saunders what he thought would happen if CDA were finally rejected by Palestinians. He said he believed Israelis would implement some form of self-rule and Western world would find it difficult to differentiate this from Camp David Accords and to understand why this was not in the Palestinians’ interest.
14. The Consul General suggested that, as a result, the West Bank and Gaza would be isolated and Israeli colonization would continue apace. “The PLO can’t help; Syria, the Saudis and the King have their own interest; you will have to help yourselves,” he urged.
15. Saunders comment: It becomes increasingly clear that advantages of CDA are not understood and that it is politically safer to reject CDA because it does not guarantee a clear-cut outcome. Palestinians are sure from experience that they are too weak to negotiate successfully with Israelis. More fundamentally, one senses that serious dialogue is going on among them, but they need a little more time to sort out their thoughts. Apart from the political difficulty of deciding who can make decisions and represent them, the West Bankers also have some tough technical problems to talk through on the powers of SGA when they reach that stage. I will have recommendations on how we might proceed when I return.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0204. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.↩
- Saunders’s references to the status of Gaza and the West Bank provoked a “heavy and almost universally critical” reaction from the Israeli press. On October 24, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv accused Saunders of “stressing U.S. positions that are close to Arab points of view on Jerusalem and the West Bank,” with “‘blunt political declarations’” that caused “considerable anger in Israel and increased suspicions of U.S. intentions.” (Telegram 15477 from Tel Aviv, October 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780446–0987) The Los Angeles Times reported on October 27 that Saunders’s comment prompted Begin to issue statements calling for the expansion of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and the transfer of the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Jerusalem. (Dial Torgerson, “Begin Reasserts Right to Settle on West Bank,” Los Angeles Times, October 27, p. B1)↩
- Saunders also met privately with Mayor Mulhim of Halhul on October 21. The Embassy transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 2894 from Jerusalem, October 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780434–0992)↩