96. Letter From the Ambassador to Lebanon (Parker) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton)1
The following is a summary of some points in the notes Ed Sheehan2 took of his four and a half hour conversation with Yassir Arafat on August 18. Sheehan asked that a copy be sent to you and to Bill Quandt by letter and not by telegram, because Arafat is worried about leaks. Arafat also made another point which Sheehan is to report personally.3 It concerns details of a deal the PLO is prepared to offer.
In general Sheehan found that Arafat was open to a deal but not on the basis of President Carter’s most recent proposal.4 Arafat was also disappointed in the results of the Vance visit and found our proposals for an eight year condominium on the West Bank laughable. Nevertheless, he still wants a deal.
There was also, however, an undercurrent suggesting that the PLO would not be responsible any longer if things did not work out over the next few months. The following are taken from my rough notes and I dictate them as they are:
Arafat discussed the forces in the area. He said it was unfortunate we (PLO) know so much about the importance of oil, the strategic role of Syria, the Suez Canal, etc. It is enough, for instance, if there was a change in the Sudan. It would change the balance of power in the entire area.
In the past the Palestinians paid for the catastrophes in the area. Now they have nothing left to pay. This time the moderates will pay. Do you think Sadat will keep his balance if there is nothing for the Palestinians? There is a limit to my moderation. Please tell Atherton and Quandt I have a red line. Believe me, I am not trying to trick you. People call me a politician, but I am a revolutionary—a realist who believes in facts. Maybe Carter can solve the problem. The Arab states [Page 482] may want to solve it because they have their own interests at stake. Maybe they will be obliged to settle, but settling the problem without the Palestinians is like cooking something without leaving it to stew. (I think there was a linguistic problem there.)
Arafat said he had full transcripts of Vance’s conversations with the Saudis and the Syrians. He said Sadat was giving too much but that when he reaches a dead end, he will turn around. With regard to the eight year condominium proposal for the West Bank, if the Americans can do it let them try. There cannot be a settlement without the Palestinians.
The Palestinians were just trying to solve the whole problem. They are not crying for the moon. Arafat advanced as evidence of his moderation the fact that the Palestinians have already agreed to establish their national authority on a small piece of land—23 per cent of Palestine. “Congressman Hamilton had asked about guarantees that there would be no fighting if we got 23 per cent. I told him we could not commit future generations. The Israelis have the atom bomb. They have at least ten. We know this from our own sources. And yet they are asking us for guarantees not to continue fighting. I need the guarantees for at least ten to fifteen years to protect us. Israel is a huge power and might look for a pretext. All this noise about a covenant. What about the Zionist ones at Basle and the Biltmore?5 The charter or covenant is a PLO charter. When we become a state we will have a constitution. A revolutionary charter is not suitable for a state. Therefore, the guarantees we are requested to give is a big lie. The opposite is true. It is we who need guarantees.”
Arafat then gave a long justification of PLO legitimacy, stating that 115 states had recognized it,6 it had observer status at the UN, Rabat Conference etc. He talked about Palestinian superiority in education as compared to the other Arabs.
Arafat said if a settlement is in your interest, it is also in our interest. We need a settlement. We are not communists. The map in the January New York Times article (by Sheehan)7 is just what we want. The road link from the West Bank to Gaza should be two to five kilometers [Page 483] wide and controlled by the UN, maybe with a flying bridge like in the Johnson plan (sic).8
Are the Americans prepared to deal with the Palestinians not on the basis of human rights and sympathy but on the basis of reality and interest? If not, he could go to Peking and characterize what is going on as a betrayal and rouse the whole Arab world. Today we are trying to help in getting a settlement in the area while the Vance visit tends to demolish it.
The Saudis on the third of August told us to accept Resolution 242 with positive reservations, for which there would be U.S. recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians plus a dialogue with the USG and an invitation to Geneva as a separate delegation. Later Vance said no on the latter point.
What matters is not a separate delegation but a separate invitation. The delegation does not matter. A united Arab delegation may be in our interest. After Vance’s visit to Taif August 8,9 however, the Saudis said no—the only advantage will be a dialogue with the USG.
Why take this risk for a dialogue which may not work out?
We have many mediators, from Gromyko to Sheehan. We even get messages from Israel. Forty-five per cent of our people are under Israeli rule. (The implication was that they provide the mechanism for communication.)
Sheehan asked about the formula for positive reservations on Resolution 242. Arafat said they could say that if Res. 242 dealt with the problem of the Palestinians as a people with national rights and aspirations and not as refugees, the PLO would accept the resolution.
Arafat alleged that Carter had promised one of the Arab leaders he hoped to change the resolution to cover Palestinian interests. Legally 242 was looked upon with suspicion. The UK had attempted to modify it, but the US had blocked it.
Arafat said he had a private message elaborating on his thesis and containing proposals for a deal. He said it covered everything. Sheehan could not pass it on except to ALA10 and Quandt. Arafat said he was not even telling the other Arabs. He was afraid of a leak. In any event he would not accept Res. 242 in exchange for a dialogue only. This is one of the most precious cards in his hand. Let the U.S. veto a new resolu [Page 484] tion on 242. How many U.S. vetoes can Sadat and the Saudis accept? Why throw away his cards for nothing. Why burn himself personally? Why betray his people? “If I despair, I will step up the fighting and resort to my people.”
Arafat then returned to the moderate action theme, saying the PLO had taken the following steps without response:
1. He had said he trusted Carter,
2. The resolution of the Palestinian National Conference regarding a state on any piece of territory,
3. PLO willingness to have a dialogue with liberal Israelis,
4. Willingness to participate in all conferences which will discuss Palestine on the basis of all resolutions and especially 3236 under which the Palestinians accept international legality and eventually Israel’s legality if Palestinian rights are satisfied.11
Basil Akl12 who was also present said Arafat could mold Palestinian opinion in a pro-American way. What did this mean to the U.S.?
Arafat said Kissinger knew we protected him on his various trips to the Middle East against Palestinians and other Arab elements. We have protected Vance on both his trips. We have taken measures against Palestinian and Arab elements. (It is not clear from my notes whether he was advancing this as evidence of moderation or as a threat that if the PLO did not get satisfaction he would no longer perform this service.) END OF SUMMARY.
Sheehan wanted me to tell you he was not planning to publish any of this, although Arafat told him he could. I do not understand how that last statement can be reconciled with Arafat’s fear of leaks, but there you are.
I am sorry that I am not able to give you a more refined transcript, but I have done this in a great hurry before running off to see Walid Khalidi for lunch and then to Damascus. I am trying to get it in the weekend pouch.
Sincerely,
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 74, Palestinians: 8/77. Secret.↩
- Edward Sheehan was a freelance journalist and author who covered the Middle East, Africa, and Central America. In 1976, he published a book entitled The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger, which examined Kissinger’s Middle East shuttle diplomacy missions in 1974 and 1975.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- In his August 15 message to Sadat, Carter insisted that the PLO needed to clearly state its acceptance of Resolution 242 in order for there to be any dialogue between the United States and the PLO. See Document 92.↩
- In 1897, the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, founded the World Zionist Organization. From May 6 to 11, 1942, both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish organizations met at the Biltmore Conference, held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. The conference urged unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. This became the platform for the World Zionist Organization.↩
- An unknown hand changed the number from 105 to 115.↩
- The map, which shows a 40-mile highway connecting Gaza to the West Bank, is featured in the New York Times article, “A Proposal for a Palestinian State.” (January 30, 1977, p. SM5)↩
- Apparently a reference to Joseph Johnson, the Special Representative of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, and his plan to solve the Palestinian refugee situation. From 1961 to 1962, Johnson pursued a plan by which Palestinians would be given a choice of remaining in exile and receiving financial compensation or returning to their homes in Israel.↩
- See Document 75.↩
- Atherton.↩
- A reference to General Assembly Resolution 3236 adopted on November 22, 1974.↩
- Basil Akl was a PLO representative and head of the Palestinian delegation to the United Nations.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩