Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

41. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 10, 1977, 4–5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Shmuel Katz
• Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Robert Lipshutz
• David Aaron
• William B. Quandt

Mr. Katz: I spoke to Mr. Begin last night and he sends you his best greetings and hopes to see you soon. He is not sure when a government will finally be formed, because this depends on the outcome of negotiations with the Democratic Movement for Change. Mr. Begin does now have a majority, but he prefers to broaden his base. He hopes that within one week or ten days this can be settled.

I have come here because there has been a great deal of distorted and inaccurate publicity about Mr. Begin. I would like to be able to describe the pillars of his policy, but obviously not the details. First, the government that he heads will respect the international obligations undertaken by previous Israeli governments, specifically UN Resolutions 242 and 338. He will abide by the interpretation of Resolution 242 that has been given by previous Israeli governments. We believe that the first step toward peace should be negotiations, direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, leading to a peace treaty. Our later actions will flow from that peace treaty. We are not prepared to negotiate with the New York Times or Time Magazine, in the sense of publicly saying how much we will give in advance of negotiations. We will negotiate with the parties concerned. Mr. Begin does not believe, however, that the Arabs will accept the invitation that he has extended to meet directly with them. He feels, therefore, that the United States has a role to play in bringing about negotiations. This is necessary to say, because of some of the preliminary criticism that has been raised in the press.

He is concerned about the recent statements coming from the White House, about the 1967 borders and the Palestinian homeland and compensation. The question of a Palestinian homeland and compensation are not included in Resolution 242. If Israel abides by 242, it must be binding on all parties, and there can be no additions or changes before negotiations have started.

Dr. Brzezinski: Please give Mr. Begin my warm personal greetings. My visits with him have been most interesting and I have found him a very engaging and attractive person. The President very much looks forward to meeting with him. I am pleased to hear your position on Resolutions 242 and 338, which, among others, set the framework for an understanding. They spell out the key issues, but that does not mean that other issues must be excluded. At some point, this has to be understood. I would like to ask you about your policy on settlements. There has been some controversy on that. That seems to affect these resolutions.

Mr. Katz: There has been a difference of opinion between Likud and the Democratic Movement for Change on this. I am not sure how it will be resolved. Mr. Begin’s attitude is closely tied to the attitude of the Likud concerning the basic right of the Jewish people to Western Palestine as a whole. This view is founded on international law, ever since the mandate was promulgated. The rejection of the 1947 partition by the Arabs—and the Jewish Agency then accepted those lines—but the Arab rejection in the war that followed restored the full legal basis for our claims to all of Western Palestine. From 1948 to 1967, we consider that there was an illegal occupation of the West Bank by Jordan. This is one of the reasons that Mr. Begin objects to the term “annexation” as applied to the territories. The question of settlements in our view does not affect Resolution 242. We are still prepared to negotiate without preliminary preconditions.

Dr. Brzezinski: Could that include the PLO?

Mr. Katz: No, only the Arab states. In such negotiations, if we reach agreement on withdrawal, including part of the West Bank, and this is possible even for us, although we would not do it happily, but in a peace agreement it is possible. Why should Jewish settlements, even if Jewish sovereignty is not there, constitute a problem? Why can 500,000 Arabs live with us with no difficulty in the 1967 boundaries, if the idea of Jews living elsewhere in Palestine is unacceptable? In peace, real peace, this should not be a problem. We do not see any contradiction. Refraining from settlement would preempt the outcome of negotiations, which we want to avoid.

Dr. Brzezinski: Would you encourage settlements in areas populated by the Arabs, as compared to the policy of the previous government?

Mr. Katz: Yes, this is a subject of controversy. These have not just been security settlements in the past. Gush Etzion and Hebron are not security settlements.² That is not their purpose. We have a deep attachment to the land. We hope in these negotiations that we can persuade the Arabs that their best bet is not to have us withdraw. If I can give you the vision that I have, after forty years of contacts with the Arabs, I would try to convince the Arabs in Western Palestine that their greatest chance for security and prosperity, without loss of their cultural identity and with local autonomy, lies in a unitary state under an Israeli government, with the right to citizenship for those who want it, or they can remain Jordanian citizens.

If an Arab entity of any kind is formed west of the Jordan River, it would be a threat to Israel. We would have a second Lebanon in Western Palestine, with the hazard of Soviet intervention. Syria sees Palestine as southern Syria. They would not allow the peaceful evolution of the Palestinian state. Nor would the West Bankers or the PLO accept it. I don’t know if they would agree. Why should I preempt, however, the solution that I prefer? Their population can live as a minority in a Jewish state. We don’t have to preclude that. Mr. Begin might propose this to the Arabs, and in a different atmosphere of peace, it might be possible. It sounds like a dream, but the whole idea of peace is nebulous. When I think of Judea and Samaria, this is my concept.

Dr. Brzezinski: The net result would be an incorporation of the former British mandate as the state of Israel. This would leave you with about a two-to-one population ratio of Jews to Arabs?

Mr. Katz: That’s right, but we would hope for immigration. There is a great need for the in-gathering of Jews. Mr. Begin intends to make a drive for more immigration, so that we could at least keep the ratio in our favor.

Dr. Brzezinski: Why would you expect one-third of your population of Arabs to accept cohabitation in that context, given the desire for national identity? Are there any signs they would accept this?

Mr. Katz: No, but they have had no encouragement to do so. After 1967, there were many indications of that kind when it seemed that Israel would extend its law to the territories, but the West Bankers have a memory of what happened to Gaza in 1957. Then the local leaders had collaborated with Israel, thinking that we would stay. When we withdrew, some were forced to flee and others were executed or jailed. This was an unfortunate example for the Arabs in the West Bank. The situation, of course, has deteriorated since this, but the holding of negotiations will be predicated on a change of attitudes.

Dr. Brzezinski: What would it take for the Arabs on the West Bank, Syria, Jordan, and maybe Egypt, to accept your idea?

Mr. Katz: It is hard to say. First, they must know that they cannot eliminate Israel. Then they would have to begin to think of the best framework for cooperation. This would provide a context for real peace.

Dr. Brzezinski: In negotiations, you see the Arabs trading peace for their acceptance of your continued occupation of the territories and their incorporation into Israel. Why would this be a realistic possibility unless the Arabs were so fully defeated that they would have no second chance? Short of that, can the Arabs accept a permanent peace and the incorporation of the occupied territories, both?

Mr. Katz: If Israel did withdraw to the 1967 lines, this would not convince the Arabs to make peace, unless other conditions had already been accepted.

Dr. Brzezinski: Such as?

Mr. Katz: I can’t conceive of them. There are no other conditions combined with the 1967 lines that would work. But we do want diplomatic relations and trade, and so forth. We believe that the 1967 borders constitute a death trap. From the Arab point of view, if they do agree to peace, this would include an atmosphere in which they would not think of destruction of Israel. It is then only asking them to cede a small part of the Arab nation—they are all one people after all—to remain under Israeli control. If they accept Israeli sovereignty, but they cannot get peace on the 1967 lines, they will be open to other suggestions. We could offer economic guidance to them.

Dr. Brzezinski: I am confused. Are you saying that the 1967 frontiers are as unacceptable to you as the other alternative is to the Arabs?

Mr. Katz: No, I didn’t mean to say that. Maybe that is true now, but in peace they can be moved to our position. It does not sound very practicable, because there is the problem of an Arab population in the heart of our country. Mr. Allon tried to solve this by finding a line in between the 1967 line and the present,³ but there is no easy line that can be drawn.

Dr. Brzezinski: Do you believe the Soviet re-entry into the Middle East is likely or not?

Mr. Katz: Do you mean they are not there now?

Dr. Brzezinski: They are not as prominent now.

Mr. Katz: The most likely way of bringing them back in would be by weakening Israel territorially, or because of conflicts among the Arab states over the territory of Palestine. I can see Soviet influence increasing in that context. The relations between the Soviets and the PLO are very close. Arafat often goes to Moscow. You saw what the Soviet attitude in Lebanon was. My guess is that a Palestinian entity of any kind would either invite Syrian intervention or Soviet intervention.

Mr. Aaron: I am interested in the question of how you would achieve what you want.

Mr. Katz: Off the top of my head, I have told you how I think. This may not be Mr. Begin’s policy, but it is the best solution from our point of view. On the question of how to get there—we could start with an agreement on peace, the ending of mutual hostilities, and then I see no problem.

Ambassador Dinitz: I think he asked how to get there, not what the outcome would be.

Mr. Aaron: The solution seems difficult to reconcile with the peace that you want. There is something of a circular argument. If peace is a pre-condition, I don’t see how there can be real negotiations.

Mr. Katz: We differ on the basis of the problem. What is the conflict all about? Some say the heart of the problem is the Palestinians, but this is not true historically. We were not in occupation of the West Bank before 1967, but the Arabs were hostile to us. This was also true before 1948. The conflict stems from the Arab refusal to recognize our existence in any area. I don’t put much store by Arab recognition. The basic problem—if you look at the map of the Middle East, the Arabs have a region stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. Israel is a small white triangle in a red sea of Arab states. In the Arab states, children are taught that Zionism is evil, that Israel is occupied territory, that it is intrusive and divisive and must be eliminated. They go through a long list of our vices, which adds a moral imperative to the desire to destroy Israel.

I understand the Arabs perfectly. They quite simply believe that Israel must be eliminated. Partial withdrawal would only be in their interest as a way of making Israel more vulnerable. They use the Palestinian problem as a cover, as an esthetic presentation to the world of the dimensions of the problem. It is better to describe Israel as a state which has robbed the Palestinians of their home than to express their real desire to destroy Israel. This is an essential difference in perception. It leads to a difference of opinion on policy. When we think of withdrawal to vulnerable frontiers, frontiers that Mr. Eban himself has called a death trap, we know that the Arab world would see us within those frontiers as a sitting duck. We believe that the situation can only change when the Arabs see that it is an impossible task to destroy Israel. If Sadat and Asad do not understand this, it may take the next generation.

Mr. Aaron: You see this peace being achieved over a generation?

Mr. Katz: Sadat does not see peace in this generation. I don’t know, but it is not brought closer by encouragement given to the Arabs that suggests that Israel could be reduced to the 1967 lines with support from both great powers. Their willingness to negotiate is weakened by the belief that negotiations will take us back to indefensible frontiers.

Mr. Aaron: What signs would you have to see to believe that the Arabs are prepared to accept peace? What would you accept as evidence?

Mr. Katz: We’ll have to take some risks. Given the history of Arab intransigence and their refusal to negotiate with us, simply sitting with us at the table might be viewed as a sign that they are serious about peace. If they talk to us directly, it would be reassuring and we would be prepared to take a reasonable risk. There are no other conditions that would help us to accept this psychologically. A minimal acceptable condition is direct negotiations. We would be prepared to see this as a sign of Arab willingness for peace. We know that the United States has other interests in the Middle East and we do want peace.

Mr. Lipshutz: You mentioned the possibility of a unitary state in which one-third of the population would be Arab and would enjoy the right of citizenship. You are talking about a pluralistic society. But is this realistic for Israel to accept, given the population growth on the Arab side? And the Arabs would have to have the right to immigration also. In one or two generations, you might have an Arab majority. Is this a realistic alternative? If you give them real equality, the Arabs will have a majority.

Mr. Katz: I don’t accept that. When the UN resolved to divide Palestine into two states, the small Jewish area contained 55% Jews and 45% Arabs, but we were not afraid and we accepted, because we believed in large-scale Jewish immigration. If there were no such immigration, then our situation in an event will be difficult, and maybe dangerous. Before 1967, in a period of economic recession, there was an outflow of immigrants. So we conceive of a development in an era of peace in which there would be large-scale immigration. The Zionist state was predicated on this, and without it we will have a questionable future.

Mr. Lipshutz: But there are only two large Jewish populations in the world, Russia and the United States, and it is not very likely here, barring a catastrophe, that large numbers of American Jews will go to Israel. So how realistic is your view?

Mr. Katz: We expect an increase in the birth rate among Jews. This is realistic. Likud will initiate a policy of subsidizing rental housing. This will have implications for labor and for the birth rate. It is now a burden on young families to buy apartments, and this keeps the size of the families down, so we hope for immigration and to inspire Jews to want to live in a free country with a sense of the Zionist venture. It happened before and we hope to achieve this. At least, we hope to keep the ratio the same. The birthrate among Arabs in Judea and Samaria is lower than that among Arabs in Israel.

Dr. Brzezinski: When you refer to Judea and Samaria, does that mean that you do not consider them occupied territories?

Mr. Katz: They were occupied in a recent war, but they are part of western Palestine. Judea and Samaria are old names. The West Bank is a recent Jordanian name.

Dr. Brzezinski: You began by saying that the new government will keep its commitment to Resolution 242.

Mr. Katz: It refers to territories occupied in the recent war and it was a hard decision, but Mr. Begin was a member of the government in 1968 which accepted Resolution 242.

Dr. Brzezinski: Do you view Resolution 242 as applying to all of the territories?

Mr. Katz: Yes, they can all be placed on the table and we will fight very hard for our view. We do not want to preempt anything.

Dr. Brzezinski: Does Resolution 242 deal with all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war?

Mr. Katz: Resolution 242 refers to it. We may say what we want about keeping the territory, but we will not preempt the issue.

Mr. Lipshutz: Were you implying that the situation in which some Jews might live in the Arab part of Palestine just as Arabs lived in Israel could be a step which would help keep the desire for peace intact?

Mr. Katz: I didn’t imply that, but you could draw that conclusion.

Mr. Lipshutz: That would mean an Israel with a Jewish and Arab population and a Jordan-Palestine with a small Jewish population. That would be a new factor, but it might be a positive factor.

Mr. Katz: It’s a simple element that cannot be frozen. If there is peace, there is no reason it could not work. I have a feeling from my own contacts with Arabs in Palestine that co-existence with them is possible, provided that other pressures do not intrude. And, of course, provided that the government is in the hands of Israel. There is no doubt that the Arab minority in Israel will have a good time and that it will have fewer hardships, less income tax, and no army service. They have a wonderful time. We are the ones who pay the taxes. I hope that we will not be that liberal toward them in the future!

Dr. Brzezinski: (jokingly) That could be dangerous. They will want to come in from outside if you make it too attractive.

Mr. Katz: You know, 100 years ago Palestine was almost empty. Most of the Arabs came after the Zionists already made the area livable. There was no such thing as an Arab-Palestine that existed for 1300 years before we came. The total population of Palestine in the mid-19th century was only a quarter of a million. There was more increase in the Arab population of Palestine between the two World Wars than there was an increase in Jewish population.

Mr. Aaron: Do you consider Geneva to be face-to-face negotiations?

Mr. Katz: (hesitation). Mr. Begin has said that he will lead a delegation to Geneva. He regards it as consistent with his demand for face-to-face negotiations. Personally, I prefer negotiations only with the United States present, not with the Soviet Union there.

Dr. Brzezinski: The two are not incompatible. They might be done sequentially.

Mr. Katz: Maybe.

Dr. Brzezinski: I am sorry, but I have another appointment. I am pleased to have had the chance to talk with you.

Mr. Katz: I had planned to visit the United States even before the election, and I would have hoped to see you even then.

Dr. Brzezinski: Please give my warm regards to Mr. Begin.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement 1977: Volume II [I]. Secret. The meeting took place in Dr. Brzezinski’s office.
2. Soon after Israel gained control of the West Bank following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Jewish settlers moved into both areas.
3. A reference to the Allon Plan. See footnote 2, Document 2.