38. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant (Jordan) to President Carter1

I have attempted in this memorandum to measure the domestic political implications of your foreign policy and outline a comprehensive approach for winning public and Congressional support for specific foreign policy initiatives.

As this is highly sensitive subject matter, I typed this memorandum myself and the one other copy is in my office safe.


Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives

The Need for a Political Plan

A. Consultation with Congress on Foreign Policy Initiatives

B. The Role of the American Jewish Community in the Middle East


—Voting History

—Political Contributions

—The Jewish Lobby

—The Present Situation with the Jewish Community

—Taking the Initiative with the American Jewish Community



Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives

Because you have chosen to be active in many areas of foreign policy during your first year in office, there will evolve in the near future a number of critical decisions that will have to be made. And each of these decisions will be difficult politically and will have domestic implications that will require the support and understanding of the American people and the Congress.

The most significant of these decisions relate to specific countries and/or areas of the world. As best I can determine, those decisions which will require action on our part and/or the political support of the people and Congress are:

  • —The Middle East
  • —Normalization of relations with Cuba and Vietnam
  • —Treaty with Panama
  • —Withdrawal of troops from Korea

It is my own contention that this confluence of foreign policy initiatives and decisions will require a comprehensive and well coordinated domestic political strategy if our policies are to gain the understanding and support of the American people and the Congress.

It is important that we understand the political dimensions of the challenges we face on these specific issues:

1. There is a limited public understanding of most foreign policy issues. This is certainly the case with SALT II and the Middle East. This is not altogether bad as it provides us an opportunity to present these issues to the public in a politically advantageous way. At the same time, most of these issues assume a simplistic political coloration. If you favor normalization of relations with Cuba or Vietnam, you are a “liberal”; if you oppose normalization with these same countries, you are “conservative”.

2. To the extent that the issues we are dealing with have a “liberal” or “conservative” connotation, our position on these particular issues is consistently “liberal”. We must do what we can to present these issues to the public in a non-ideological way and not allow them to undermine your own image as a moderate-conservative.2

3. Congressional support in some form is needed to accomplish most of your foreign policy objectives. A modest amount of time invested in consultation with key members of Congress will go a long way toward winning the support of Congress on many issues. Whereas members of Congress do not mind—and sometimes relish—a confrontation with the President on some local project or matter of obvious direct benefit to their district or state, very few wish to differ publicly with the President on a foreign policy matter.

4. We have very little control over the schedule and time-frame in which most of these foreign policy issues will be resolved. Consequently, a continuing problem and challenge will be to attempt to separate out the key foreign policy issues from domestic programs so the two will not become politically entwined in the Congress. This dictates a continuing focus on the historical bipartisan nature of U.S. foreign policy so the Republican members of Congress will be less tempted to demagogue these issues during the 1978 elections.

5. Conservatives are much better organized than liberals and will generally oppose our foreign policy initiatives. To effectively counter conserva[Page 281]tive opposition, we will have to take the initiative in providing coordination of our resources and political leadership. Our resources at present are considerable, but they are scattered among a variety of groups and institutions. To the extent our policy goals are being pursued, they are being pursued unilaterally by groups and people and without coordination.

The Need for a Political Plan

The very fact that your administration is active simultaneously in many areas of foreign policy dictates a comprehensive, long-range political strategy for winning the support of the American people and the Congress. To accomplish this goal, I would recommend a three step process:

I. CONSULTATION. Early consultation with Congress and interested/affected constituent groups is critical to the political success of these policies. In almost every instance, Senate ratification of a treaty and/or military and economic support which requires the support of Congress will be required to accomplish these foreign policy objectives. Consequently, it is important that we invest a small amount of time on a continuing basis in consultation with members of Congress and groups/organizations.3

II. PUBLIC EDUCATION. Public understanding of most of these issues is very limited. To the extent these issues are understood and/or perceived by the general public, they are viewed in very simplistic terms. This is a mixed blessing. On one hand, it becomes necessary to explain complex issues to the American people. On the other hand, because these issues are not well understood, a tremendous opportunity exists to educate the public to a certain point of view. In the final analysis, I suspect that we could demonstrate a direct correlation between the trust the American people have for their President and the degree to which they are willing to trust that President’s judgement on complex issues of foreign policy.

In terms of public education, we have a tremendous number of resources. They include:

  • —Fireside chats
  • —Town meetings
  • —Speaking opportunities for President, Vice-President, First Family, Cabinet, etc.
  • —Public service media opportunities
  • —Groups outside government who support particular policies
  • —Democratic National Committee
  • —Mailing lists
  • —Etc.

III. POLITICAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION. Once foreign policy goals are established, it is critical that political strategies in support of those goals be developed and implemented. And it is important that the resources available to the Administration—both inside and outside of government—be coordinated and used in a way that is supportive of these objectives.

I have attempted in this memorandum to outline the first step in this process—consultation—as relates to foreign policy generally and the Middle East specifically. Steps II and III—public education and political planning and coordination—are the subject of a separate memorandum.

Consultation With Congress on Foreign Policy Initiatives

With many complex foreign policy issues surfacing in the near future and the need for some form of Congressional support for these policies, I believe that it is important that we take the initiative in consulting with Congress.

The consultation that has taken place to date has been extremely beneficial, but one of the inherent problems is that the same people (bipartisan leadership, Foreign Relations Committee, etc.) are briefed time and again; and little is done to increase the general understanding of our policies among the general membership of the House and Senate.

I would recommend that we begin a comprehensive consultation program with members of the Senate which will allow you and several other key members of the Administration to meet with individual members of the Senate and review with them our progress and problems on each of the following subjects:

  • —Middle East
  • —Africa
  • —Panama
  • —Cuba
  • —Vietnam

This will not only result in an increased understanding of and support for our policies, but it will allow us to identify Congressional support and opposition. With a Panama Canal Treaty imminent, SALT II negotiations ongoing and the Mideast situation fluid as a result of the recent Israeli elections,4 I believe that it is important that we begin this process at the earliest possible date.

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I have attempted to outline in the following pages the manner in which this consultation could take place. There are five persons in the Administration who are well enough informed and sufficiently involved in these issues that they could contribute to this process. They are:



Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

National Security Adviser

As demonstrated in the following chart, if each of these persons would contribute an hour each week to a luncheon meeting or briefing with two senators, we could complete the entire process in ten weeks.

President Vice President Secretary of State Secretary of Defense NSC Adviser
Week 1 Nunn Moynihan Bentsen Ford Glenn Chafee Abourezk Bumpers
Week 2 Stennis Talmadge Hart Culver Church Kennedy Inouye Hollings Griffin Domenici
Week 3 Sparkman Eastland Leahy Matsunaga Muskie Eagleton Clark Durkin Danforth
Week 4 Ribicoff Long Sarbanes Nelson Case Bayh Zorinsky Hathaway Gravel Schweicker
Week 5 McClellan Cannon Percy Heinz Burdick Hatfield Stafford Lugar Roth Young
Week 6 Morgan Sasser Anderson Brooke Mathias Stevenson Magnuson Randolph Goldwater Curtis
Week 7 Johnston Stone Williams DeConcini Biden McGovern Packwood Pearson Hayakawa Wallop
Week 8 Chiles Huddleston Melcher Metcalf Allen Byrd, H. Schmitt Hansen
Week 9 McIntyre Haskell Proxmire Weicker Stevens Laxalt
Week 10 Javits Metzenbaum Reigle Pell Tower Thurmond

Rationale for Assignments

The assignments made were arbitrary on my part, but basically reflected the following thinking:

President—Assigned key committee chairmen, Southern senators and senators who are up for re-election in 1978 and will be politically concerned and/or affected by foreign policy decisions made in the next eighteen months.

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Vice-President—Assigned generally liberal Democrats and Republicans on the assumption that most of these people will support our policies but cannot be taken for granted.

Secretary of State—Assigned key Democrats and Republicans who would be flattered to have the Secretary of State take the initiative to consult with them.

Secretary of Defense—Assigned conservative Democrats and Republicans who are likely to be concerned with the military dimensions of the foreign policy decisions we will make in the next couple of years.

National Security Adviser—Assigned a mix of the above.

There is certainly nothing sacred in these assignments, and I would expect Frank Moore to have ultimate responsibility for matching senators with the appropriate briefers.


As we go into the Summer with the prospect of a visit from the new Israeli head of state and the possibility of a new Vance mission to the Middle East, I think that it is important that we appreciate and understand the special and potentially constructive role that the American Jewish community can play in this process.

I would compare our present understanding of the American Jewish lobby (vis-a-vis Israel) to our understanding of the American labor movement four years ago. We are aware of its strength and influence, but don’t understand the basis for that strength nor the way that it is used politically. It is something that was not a part of our Georgia and Southern political experience and consequently not well understood.

I have attempted in the following pages to do several things:

  • 1) Outline the reasons and the basis for the influence of the American Jewish community in the political life of our country;
  • 2) Define and describe the mechanism through which this influence is used;
  • 3) Describe—as I understand it—the present mood and situation in the American Jewish community as relates to you and your policies; and
  • 4) Define a comprehensive plan for consultation with the American Jewish community with the ultimate goal of gaining their understanding and/or support for our efforts to bring peace to the Middle East.

Voting History

To appreciate the direct influence of American Jews on the political processes of our country, it is useful and instructive to review their extraordinary voting habits.

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1. Of all measurable subgroups in the voting population, Jews vote in greater proportion to their actual numbers than any other group. In the recent Presidential election,5 for example, American Jews—who comprise less than 3% of the population—cast almost 5% of the total vote.

2. Of all subgroups in the voting population, Jews register and vote in larger numbers than any other group. Voter turnout among Jewish voters measures close to 90% in most elections.

3. Jewish voters are predominantly Democratic. Heavy support for the Democratic Party and its candidates was founded in the immigrant tradition of the second and third generation of American Jews and reinforced by the policies and programs of Wilson and Roosevelt. Harry Truman’s role in the establishment of Israel cemented this party identification. And despite an occasional deviation, Jewish identification with the Democratic Party has remained intact and generally stable despite economic and educational pressures which have traditionally undermined party identification.

In recent national elections, Jewish voters have given the Democratic candidates the bulk of their vote, ranging from the low received by McGovern (65%) to the high received by Humphrey (90%). You received approximately 75% of the Jewish vote nationwide.

4. As Jewish voters are predominantly Democratic and turn out in large numbers, their influence in primaries is often decisive. In New York State, Jews comprise 12% of the population but traditionally cast about 28% of the votes in Democratic statewide primaries. In New York City, the Jewish population is 20% but Jews cast about 55% of the votes in the citywide Democratic primaries.6

5. The variance in turnout between Jewish voters and other important subgroups in the voting population is staggering and serves to inflate the importance of the Jewish voter. Again, New York State is the best case in point. In New York, Jews and blacks comprise about the same percentage of the state’s population. Whereas the turnout in the black community was 35% in the recent Presidential election, the turnout in the Jewish community was over 85%. This means that about 500,000 blacks voted in this election and about 1,200,000 Jews voted. You received 94% of the black vote and 75% of the Jewish vote. This means that for every black vote you received in the election, you received almost two Jewish votes.

Political Contributions

Nowhere in American politics is Jewish participation more obvious and disproportionate than in the area of financial support for po[Page 286]litical candidates and political parties. But it is a mistake to take note of Jewish contributions to political campaigns without seeing this in the larger context of the Jewish tradition of using one’s material wealth for the benefit of others.

The amount of money the American Jewish community contributes to political campaigns is slight when compared to the monies contributed to favorite charities. In 1976, the American Red Cross raised approximately $200 million. In that same year, Jewish charities raised $3.6 billion. In the two week period following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the American Jewish community raised over one billion dollars.

Whereas disproportionate Jewish voting is only politically significant in areas where Jewish voters are concentrated, Jewish contributions to political campaigns are disproportionate nationally and in almost every area of the country.

Some facts that confirm this premise:

  • —Out of 125 members of the Democratic National Finance Council, over 70 are Jewish;
  • —In 1976, over 60% of the large donors to the Democratic Party were Jewish;
  • —Over 60% of the monies raised by Nixon in 1972 was from Jewish contributors;
  • —Over 75% of the monies raised in Humphrey’s 1968 campaign was from Jewish contributors;
  • —Over 90% of the monies raised by Scoop Jackson in the Democratic primaries was from Jewish contributors;
  • —In spite of the fact that you were a long shot and came from an area of the country where there is a smaller Jewish community, approximately 35% of our primary funds were from Jewish supporters.

Wherever there is major political fundraising in this country, you will find American Jews playing a significant role. As a result, Bob Dole is particularly sensitive to the tiny Jewish community in Kansas because it is not so small in terms of his campaign contributions.

The Jewish Lobby

Having previously discussed and established the great influence that American Jews have on the political processes of our country, it is equally important to understand the mechanism through which much of this influence is wielded.

When people talk about the “Jewish lobby” as relates to Israel, they are referring to American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). AIPAC is an aggregate of leaders from 32 separate organizations which [Page 287] was formed in 1956 in response to John Foster Dulles’ complaint that he did not know which of the many Jewish groups to deal with.

The leaders from member organizations of AIPAC, although active on behalf of their own organizations on domestic issues, have ceded to AIPAC overall responsibility for representing their collective interests on foreign policy (Israel) to the Congress.

It is important to understand that AIPAC has one continuing priority—the welfare of the state of Israel as perceived by the American Jewish community. AIPAC has wisely resisted efforts to broaden their scope and has continually concentrated on the issues that relate to Israel.


AIPAC is headed by Executive Director Morris Amitay and Legislative Director Ken Wollack. As an umbrella organization, AIPAC is composed of leaders from major Jewish groups in the United States, including:

  • —American Jewish Congress
  • —American Mizrachi Women
  • —American Zionist Federation
  • —Anti Defamation League
  • —B’nai B’rith
  • —B’nai B’rith Women
  • —B’nai Zion
  • —Central Conference of American Rabbis
  • —Hadassah
  • —Jewish Labor Committee
  • —Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation
  • —Jewish War Veterans
  • —Labor Zionist Alliance
  • —National Committee for Labor-Israel
  • —National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods
  • —National Jewish Community Relations Council
  • —National Jewish Welfare Board
  • —North American Jewish Youth Council
  • —Pioneer Women
  • —Rabbinical Council of America
  • —Rabbinical Assembly
  • —Union of American Hebrew Congregations
  • —Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
  • —United Synagogue of America
  • —Womens’ League for Conservative Judaism
  • —World Zionist Organization
  • —Zionist Organization of America
  • —Council of Jewish Federation and Welfare Funds

Although the combined membership of these organizations is only several million, their collective mobilizing ability is unsurpassed in terms of the quality and quantity of political communications that can be triggered on [Page 288] specific issues perceived to be critical to Israel. When AIPAC feels that the interests of Israel might be affected by a legislative or executive action, their target lists are mailgrammed.

Several thousand mailgrams to the leadership of the member organizations can be counted on to generate thousands of telegrams, letters and telephone calls to pivotal Congressmen and/or Senators. As vote counts are developed, targeted efforts by AIPAC are accelerated. Key Jewish leaders and/or financial contributors are encouraged to visit personally the wavering legislator.

Qualitatively, the principal contacts are articulate, bright and well informed on issues related to Israel. They do not have to be briefed, and many have visited Israel and speak with first-hand knowledge of the issues they are lobbying on. The organizations and people represented by the AIPAC umbrella are the most motivated and skilled primary contact group in the country. They have good relations with other important political constituencies (labor groups, civil rights organizations, etc.) and will not hesitate to use the pulpit to generate support for those issues perceived as being critical to Israel.

The cumulative impact of the Jewish lobby is even greater when one considers the fact that their political objectives are pursued in a vacuum. There does not exist in this country a political counterforce that opposes the specific goals of the Jewish lobby. Some would argue that even the potential for such a counterforce does not exist. It is even questionable whether a major shift in American public opinion on the issue of Israel would be sufficient to effectively counter the political clout of AIPAC.

Support for Israel in the Senate

The following is a brief analysis of the support for Israel in the United States Senate. On a given issue where the interests of Israel are clear and directly involved, AIPAC can usually count on 65–75 votes. Their breakdown of support in the Senate follows:

Hard Support/Will Take Initiative















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*Member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Sympathetic/Can Be Counted On In Showdown




Byrd, H.

Byrd, R.





























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Questionable/Depends on Issue
























Generally Negative





31 Hard Votes
43 Sympathetic/Count On In Showdown
23 Depends on Issue
3 Generally Negative

To gain a majority on any issue before the Senate, the Jewish lobby has only to get its “hard” votes and half of the votes of those that are “sympathetic”. This would concede all of the votes of those in third catagory.

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The Present Situation With the American Jewish Community

For many years, the American Jewish community has basically reflected the attitudes and goals of the government of Israel. The American Jewish community has seldom questioned—or had reason to question—the wisdom of the policies advocated by the Israeli government. The tremendous financial and political support provided to Israel by the American Jewish community has been given with “no strings attached.”

One of the potential benefits of the recent Israeli elections is that it has caused many leaders in the American Jewish community to ponder the course the Israeli people have taken and question the wisdom of that policy. As a result, I think there is a good chance that the American Jewish community will be less passive and more inclined to provide the new government advice as well as support.

This new situation provides us with the potential for additional influence with the Israeli government through the American Jewish community, but at present we are in a poor position to take advantage of it.

The American Jewish community is very nervous now for a combination of internal and external reasons. It is important that we understand the reasons for their apprehension.

1. The election of a new President whose policies have been developed and presented in a manner different from previous Administrations. It is not so much what you have said as the fact that the things you have said (“defensible borders”, “homeland for the Palestinians”, etc.) have been publicly discussed. The leadership of the American Jewish community has heard these things before, but they were always said privately with ample reassurances provided.

2. You are not known personally to most of the national Jewish leaders. And even those that know you have not worked with you over a long period of time at the national level on matters of direct interest to Israel. Whereas they know and instinctively trust a Humphrey or a Jackson, you are less well known and more unpredictable.

3. The cumulative effect of your statements on the Middle East and the various bilateral meetings with the heads of state has been generally pleasing to the Arabs and displeasing to the Israelis and the American Jewish community. You have discussed publicly things that have only been said before privately to the Israelis with reassurances. Press reports of your meetings with the Arabs were always very positive while your meeting with Rabin was described as being “very cool”. The simple fact that there were four Arab heads of state to meet with—and each meeting was perceived accurately as being positive and constructive—and only one meeting with the Israeli head of state—which was widely reported as being unsuccessful—added to this perception problem.

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4) The election of Begin has resulted in widespread uncertainty among the Jewish community in this country. The leadership of the American Jewish community has had close personal relationships with the leadership of the Labor Party since the creation of the state of Israel. They do not have the same close relationship with the leaders of the Likud Party and are suddenly dealing with new and unpredictable leadership in both countries.

5) With the election of Begin, the American Jewish community sees for the first time the possibility of losing American public support for Israel if the new government and its leaders prove to be unreasonable in its positions and attitudes. This would put the American Jewish community in the terrible position of seeing its emotional and political investment in Israel over the past 30 years rapidly eroded.

Taking the Initiative With the American Jewish Community

I think it is accurate to say that the American Jewish community is extremely nervous at present. And although their fears and concerns about you and your attitude toward Israel might be unjustified, they do exist. In the absence of immediate action on our part, I fear that these tentative feelings in the Jewish community about you (as relates to Israel) might solidify, leaving us in an adversary posture with the American Jewish community.

If the American Jewish community openly opposed your approach and policy toward a Middle East settlement, you would lack the flexibility and credibility you will need to play a constructive role in bringing the Israelis and the Arabs together. I am sure you are familiar with Kissinger’s experience in the Spring of 1975, when the Jewish lobby circulated a letter which had the names of senators which reaffirmed U.S. support for Israel in a way that completely undermined the Ford-Kissinger hope for a new and comprehensive U.S. peace initiative.7

It would be a great mistake to spend most of our time and energies persuading the Israelis to accept a certain plan for peace and neglect a similar effort with the American Jewish community since lack of support for such a plan from the American Jewish community could [Page 293] undermine our efforts with the Israelis. Our efforts to consult and communicate must be directed in tandem at the Israeli government and the American Jewish community.

I would advocate that we begin immediately with an extensive consultation program with the American Jewish community. This program would focus on:

The Process—Review of what has taken place to date (bilateral with heads of state) and what is planned for the future (probable Begin visit, possible Vance mission, etc.). Also, a definition of the U.S. role. We should stress that we are not trying to “impose a U.S. settlement” nor attempting any “quick fix solution”. We are being widely criticized in the Jewish press for these things.

The Principles—Review of the key items which are being discussed as the basis for a settlement: 1) the nature of peace; 2) the question of borders and security for Israel; and 3) the Palestinian question.

The Prospects—A vision of what Israel could be if peace were permanent and political stability came to the Middle East. Outline of the U.S. belief that Israel would serve as the model of democratic government in the Middle East and become the center of regional trade and finance.

In addition to reviewing these topics, I believe that the American Jewish community should be encouraged—for the first time—to take an active role in analyzing the obstacles to peace and advising the Israeli government on these matters. Any thoughtful analysis of the situation would lead to the conclusion that concessions on both sides are necessary for peace.

To develop a comprehensive plan for consultation with the American Jewish community, it is first necessary to develop a list of individuals, groups and institutions who should be reached.

They include:

Key members of the U.S. Senate—Senators like Humphrey, Jackson, Ribicoff and Church who have been close to Israel and supported it in the Congress.

Key members of the U.S. House—A comparable group in the House who have been close to Israel.

Jewish members of the House—There are 22 members of the House who are Jewish (See attached listing).8

Senate Foreign Relations Committee—It is important to keep them informed and involved.

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House International Affairs Committee—It is important to keep them informed and involved.

The American Jewish Press—The American Jewish Press is a powerful instrument for pro-Israeli statements, news and solicitations. These papers—collectively—provide the main analysis of American policy vis-a-vis Israel to the American Jewish Community.

Leaders of National Jewish Organizations—The lay, political and religious leadership of the Jewish community.

Local Leaders from Key Communities—About 80% of the American Jews are situated in ten cities and/or areas (See attached listing).9

Persons with Close Relationships with Israeli Government Officials—There are a number of persons who have unofficially represented Israeli interests in our country and have close ties to the leadership of the Israeli government. With the Labor Party out of power, this will change; but it is inevitable that the new government will develop close ties with some of the leadership of the American Jewish community. We should develop relationships with these people.

In the following pages, I have outlined a program that will allow us to take the initiative in dealing with the American Jewish community in a positive manner. Using very little of any one person’s time, we could begin and complete this consultation process in the next eight weeks. This plan is targeted at the groups and individuals previously mentioned.

At the end of the process, I believe that we would have the good faith and trust of the American Jewish community going into the next stage of talks. It is difficult for me to envision a meaningful peace settlement without the support of the American Jewish community.

Summary Recommendations

If you agree with the premises stated in this memorandum and the recommendations presented, I would recommend the following actions:

1. A meeting with you, the Vice-President, Zbig and Frank Moore to discuss the overall consultation process with the Congress.

I agree.10

Let’s talk first.

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2. A meeting with you, the Vice-President, Zbig, Frank Moore, Bob Lipshutz and Stu to discuss the overall consultation process with the American Jewish community.

I agree.11

Let’s talk first.

3. That I undertake a planning process that attempts to: 1) inventory our political resources; 2) develop a specific workplan for each foreign policy initiative that focuses on public education; and 3) develop an informal mechanism for the overall12

  1. Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, a Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo, 6/77. Confidential; Eyes Only. The date is handwritten.
  2. Carter wrote underneath the paragraph, “To Challenge Soviets for influence is ‘conservative.’”
  3. Carter wrote underneath the paragraph, “Meeting this week.”
  4. See Document 35.
  5. A reference to the November 2, 1976, Presidential election.
  6. Carter wrote “?” next to the last line of the paragraph.
  7. The Washington Post said, “The Senatorial Letter makes Kissinger nothing more than an errand boy and assures the Arab states that he is powerless to arrange a deal. . . Kissinger might as well stay home. . . Under the terms the Senate has laid down, it could send one of its pages to handle the negotiations.” From Sheehan in The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger, “Obviously, the (Senate) letter was a stunning triumph for the (Jewish) lobby, a capital rebuke for Kissinger in Congress. Whatever resentment many congressmen may inwardly entertain about the unrelenting pressures of the lobby, the American system predestines them to yield. Israel possesses a powerful American constituency; the Arabs do not. . .” [Footnote in the original. See Document 175, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976.]
  8. The list is not attached.
  9. The list is not attached.
  10. Carter indicated that he agreed and wrote, “Include Cy.”
  11. Carter indicated that he agreed and drew an arrow from his previous note to include Vance.
  12. The original is incomplete. The remaining pages have not been found.