261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
173787. Subject: Preparation for London Talks.
1. Now that we have Israeli agreement to attend London talks,2 we need to begin to get both Egyptians and Israelis aboard common concept of how talks should be run, and what should emerge from them. On Egyptian side we have two basic objectives. First, we want to persuade Sadat/Kamel that it is important to make London talks more than a pro forma exercise and that Kamel should prepare to keep his end of the dialogue going; second, we would like Egyptian agreement before the talks begin, with as much specificity as possible, to further direct contacts, presumably Dayan/Kamel, but perhaps Gamasy/Weizman or conceivably both.
2. Absence from Egypt of both Sadat and Kamel (according to our information until July 14) complicates consultations. We leave it to your judgment whether you think it would be useful to take this up with Mubarak in the first instance, or whether it is best to wait until Sadat and Kamel get back. It will be important, if Kamel seems unresponsive to our ideas, to plan to see Sadat so as to get Kamel properly instructed. Whatever approach you decide is best, your comments to Egyptians should be along following lines.
3. We understand reasons for Egyptian skepticism about utility of London talks. We ourselves do not expect it to provide major breakthrough in the negotiations. Nevertheless we are not regarding this as mere pro forma exercise, and we believe it would be mistake for Egyptians to dismiss it in this fashion. We see resumption and continuation of direct contacts between the parties as highly important. Negotiations involve tenacious probing of other side’s position and tenacious search for areas of accommodation. From our own conversations with Dayan we know he has definite ideas about how to approach West Bank/Gaza negotiations. While these may not be the same as Egypt’s approach, [Page 1176] they are worth exploring in depth and attempting to understand. That process in itself can lead to narrowing of gap.
4. It seems to us that London talks, first direct exchanges between two sides with U.S. present to take place since talks in Political Committee broke off in January, can serve this purpose. We are sure there is much in Israeli “self-rule” plan and in Israel’s responses to our questions which GOE feels is unclear and ought to be explained. There is no reason not to zero in on what Egyptians regard as key point: What happens at end of five years; can Dayan say what determining “the future relations” at the end of this period means? Dayan will also no doubt have number of questions or comments about Egyptian proposal that has just been handed to Israel.
5. We believe two days in London can best be used in this fashion, with both sides commenting upon and seeking clarifications on what it regards as key issues in other side’s proposals. We would therefore suggest that Kamel and his team come prepared with questions and comments addressed to Israeli position on West Bank/Gaza issues, and be prepared to answer questions and comments of similar nature from Israelis.
6. Our feeling is that format for these talks should be informal and that formal “conference” atmosphere should be avoided. We therefore propose that talks take place in various suites of delegations, with maximum of five on each side, so that even when all three Foreign Ministers are meeting overall group will still be small enough to preserve atmosphere of informality. With this kind of format in mind it seemed logical to house all three delegations in same hotel which also has advantages from security point of view.
7. We envisage mix of bilateral and trilateral meetings. On first day, the eighteenth, Secretary would propose to call on two Foreign Ministers separately in their suites. Following this, first trilateral session could open in Secretary’s suite. After some introductory remarks by Secretary and any discussion that may be necessary of schedule or arrangements, Secretary would open substantive discussions by inviting Kamel to set forth and explain various features of Egyptian plan. Dayan might then make any observations he might wish or pose questions about Egyptian plan. Procedure would then be reversed in subsequent sessions, with Kamel addressing himself to Israeli proposal. Following trilateral session first morning, Secretary would like to invite Kamel and Dayan and their delegations to luncheon. Afternoon would be given over to bilateral meetings between Secretary and each of Foreign Ministers. No activities would be scheduled for evenings but they could be used for further sessions if needed.
8. We think it important to have at least one bilateral meeting between Kamel and Dayan during the two days. This might most log[Page 1177]ically come morning of second day, prior to second trilateral session in Secretary’s suite. Afternoon of second day might again be given to bilaterals between Secretary and Foreign Ministers with perhaps final brief trilateral session prior to press conferences and departure.
9. Schedule of meetings, beyond those of first morning, might best be kept somewhat flexible so as to adjust to requirements of discussions. We put foregoing forward for planning purposes and would welcome Egyptian comments or alternative ideas.
10. We also need to give some thought to results we would like to see emerge from meeting. We believe it highly important that talks end with agreement that further direct Egyptian-Israeli contacts shall take place. This will be important not only to demonstrate Egypt’s continuing determination to pursue negotiated solution but also to enable U.S. to play more active role in the negotiations. Would Egyptians wish to propose venue and date for such meetings? Sadat has mentioned Al-Arish. This would probably be acceptable to Israelis, but if for some reason Egyptians have reservations about this, SFM could be alternative. (FYI. We leave to your judgment whether you see opportunity to sound out Egyptians about possibility of another round between Gamasy-Weizman, possibly at same time and location.)
11. We would like to have London talks conclude with joint statement that would have following elements: statement that talks were useful; that two sides plan to continue contacts with venue and dates specified for next round; Secretary affirming U.S. will be actively engaged; Secretary’s intention to send Ambassador Atherton to area immediately after London talks to maintain continuity of discussions, and Secretary’s willingness to make trip himself at later date.
12. Main purpose of Atherton mission would be to begin consultations with GOE on our concrete ideas for helping two sides reach agreement. Atherton would also go to Israel to continue consultations with GOI, and to Saudi Arabia and Jordan with purpose of building support for our ideas. Effort in Jordan would center on beginning to turn King Hussein around toward more positive attitude about eventually joining negotiations.
13. With respect to subsequent steps, it would seem to us to be best plan if next round of talks could be arranged at some site in area such as Al-Arish for late July or early August, to which Secretary might be invited to participate. Secretary could then continue participation in these talks with consultations in both Jerusalem and Cairo and at end of that round leave with both sides our suggestions for formulations that might bring two sides into agreement.
14. We would appreciate Egyptian reaction to these ideas. We will of course be in further contact with Egyptians between now and our [Page 1178] arrival in London to convey Israeli reaction to our suggestions for conduct of London talks.
15. FYI: As afterthought, if as we hear from Egyptian Embassy it is possible that Kamel will travel directly from Austria to London, we wonder if most sensible arrangement would not be for you to proceed to London via Austria in sufficient time to see both Sadat and Kamel there. If you decide this is best plan you have authorization to make this travel.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–2768. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Quandt, and Frank Wisner (S/S); and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Tel Aviv.↩
- In telegram 8597 from Tel Aviv, Lewis reported that the Israeli Cabinet on July 9 had accepted Vance’s invitation for Dayan to meet with Kamel and Vance in London. However, at the same meeting, the Cabinet rejected Egypt’s peace proposal called “Proposals Relative to Withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Security Arrangements.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780281–0873) Regarding the Egyptian proposal, see footnote 2, Document 259.↩