Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Egypt and Israel¹

Washington, June 22, 1978, 1910Z

159176. Subject: Proposed Scenario for London Middle East Talks. Ref: (A) Tel Aviv 7713; (B) Cairo 15340.²

1. For Cairo: We have now reached the point where we need to begin to pin down the scenario we have been considering, and which we have explored in preliminary way with Egyptians, for getting Israelis and Egyptians engaged again in negotiations. You should therefore approach Sadat and/or Kamel along following lines:

• —Egyptians will have seen our statement June 21 on Israeli response to our questions.³ We believe the time has now come to move forward along the lines already discussed with them, beginning with Foreign Minister level talks in London. The best dates for Secretary Vance would be to arrive in London July 10 for talks July 11–12, after which he would proceed directly to join President at Economic Summit in Germany which begins July 13. We are aware, however, that OAU Foreign Ministers’ meeting is scheduled during this period. If for this reason these dates are not possible for Kamel, Secretary could make special trip to London July 6 for talks July 7–8, although he would strongly prefer July 11–12.
• —Purpose of London talks as we see them would be to discuss Israeli position on West Bank/Gaza issues as well as Egyptian proposal on this subject, as part of continuing effort to reach agreement on declaration of principles as framework for broadening negotiations looking toward a comprehensive peace settlement. In this regard, we appreciate Egyptian willingness to revise their proposal with our comments in mind. In our opinion, it is improved in several respects from earlier versions and now constitutes more fully developed negotiating document. In order that it can be on the table for the London talks, we would like Kamel’s agreement to transmit it to Israelis two or three days before London talks. (FYI. Given expected Israeli reaction to Egyptian proposal, we have concluded it is better to pass it to them after Vice President’s visit to Israel so that it does not become diversionary issue during his talks there. End FYI.)
• —We would also appreciate knowing if proposed dates for London talks—preferably July 11–12—are convenient for Kamel. We have not yet broached idea of London talks with Israelis and would like to do so in next day or so. We would therefore appreciate earliest possible reply. Once details have been pinned down and both Sadat and Begin have agreed, we would plan to have President Carter address letters to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin formally extending invitation to send their Foreign Ministers to the London talks, with a view to announcing such talks early next week (i.e., week of June 26). We believe it important that announcement make clear that purpose of talks is to discuss Israeli position on West Bank/Gaza and Egyptian proposals on this same subject. We would need to state publicly at time of announcement, therefore, that Egypt has informed us its proposal will be conveyed to Israelis before London talks start.
• —Except for somewhat later dates for London talks than we had originally suggested, our suggested strategy will remain the same—i.e., President Carter will invite President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to send their Foreign Ministers to meet with Secretary Vance in London; following those talks and Economic Summit (which ends July 17), Secretary would be prepared to proceed to Middle East in accordance with strategy we have previously discussed. Even though actual talks will not begin immediately, we believe early announcement will demonstrate clearly that U.S. is moving into a more active role as Egyptians have urged us to do.
• —We ask that Egyptians hold idea of London meeting closely until we have chance to discuss it with Israelis and it has been agreed to all around and is publicly announced.

2. If Egyptians tend to take more negative stance about talks as result of their disappointment over Israeli replies to our questions, you should say President Carter believes renewed direct contact between parties remains highly important in terms of U.S. being able to play helpful role in negotiations we have discussed with Sadat. We are particularly anxious to show as soon as possible that the U.S. intends to act and is not prepared to allow impasse to develop in wake of Israeli replies. You should also tell Kamel that we understand his point about appearances as far as other Arabs are concerned. We want him and Sadat to know that, as soon as we have his and Dayan’s confirmation, we will make urgent and firm approaches to both King Hussein and Prince Fahd to explain that meeting in London is our initiative. We will explain that U.S. role cannot be effective in negotiating vacuum and that this is opening step in scenario for more active U.S. role. Fact that talks are our initiative will also be made clear in our public announcement which will state explicitly invitation being extended by President Carter.

3. For Tel Aviv: We need to put idea of London talks to Israelis at early date. Our thinking, therefore, would be for you to take this up with Dayan as soon as we have report of Eilts’ approach to Egyptians so we can be certain things are still on the rails at that end. Ideally, if Eilts can get response Friday,⁴ you could make your approach Saturday and our public announcement could be made early next week. You should therefore approach Dayan along following lines subject to final go-ahead from us and any adjustments that may be indicated in light of Egyptian reaction to Eilts’ approach in paragraph 1, above:

—As Dayan knows, we agree with Israel on importance of a resumption of direct Egyptian-Israeli talks. In response to our representations on this point, Sadat has consistently taken position he would be ready for renewal of direct talks whenever Israel introduced “new elements” into the discussion.

—Egyptian public reaction to Israeli response to our two questions makes clear they are disappointed and do not see much new. From our soundings with Sadat, we conclude that he is not repeat not ready at this stage for formal resumption of direct bilateral negotiations in Political Committee or other forum in either Egypt or Israel. As a step in this direction, however, our soundings indicate Sadat will agree to a proposal by President Carter to have Foreign Minister Kamel meet with Dayan in a neutral capital if Secretary Vance were also present for at least some of their sessions, for the purpose of discussing Israeli position on West Bank/Gaza and any new ideas Israelis might wish to put forward, as well as the Egyptian West Bank/Gaza counterproposal which Egyptians have been working on. (If Dayan queries about a site nearer [garble] you may say we have specifically explored this with Sadat who prefers European capital; Sadat points out, in response to our query on this aspect, that Kamel could be in frequent telephonic contact with Sadat for instructions.)

—President Carter would, if both sides agree, be prepared to suggest to Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat that they send Foreign Ministers Dayan and Kamel to talks in which Secretary Vance would also be prepared to take part. London would be most convenient site for Secretary, and the best time for him would be to arrive in London July 10 for talks July 11–12 on route to join President Carter for Economic Summit in Germany which begins July 13.

—We have instructed Ambassador Eilts to sound out Kamel on these dates. We understand there will be an OAU Foreign Ministers meeting during this period and, if these dates are not possible for him we will suggest July 7–8 (with arrival in London July 6) as an alternative. If this idea commends itself to Israelis, we would appreciate knowing whether these dates are convenient for Dayan. (This paragraph can be modified in light of any information we receive from Eilts’ talk with Kamel prior to your approach to Dayan.)

—Our thought is that London talks would take place in informal format with mix of trilateral and bilateral meetings. Hopefully exploration would prove fruitful enough to enable further direct contacts to be scheduled, perhaps at different venue. In addition, Secretary would be prepared to follow up through personal visit to Middle East after Summit, if this seemed necessary to keep negotiating process going.

—If GOI is agreeable to this proposal, President Carter would plan to address letters to Sadat and Begin formally extending invitation to send their Foreign Ministers to the talks, with a view to announcing such talks early in week of June 26.

—We will approach Egyptians about transmitting their West Bank/Gaza counterproposal to Israelis (presumably through us) prior to London talks so that Israelis will have opportunity to study it in advance and so that announcement of London talks can state that the purpose is to discuss (A) Israeli position on West Bank/Gaza issues and (B) Egyptian proposals on this same subject which will be made available to Israel before talks begin.

—Finally, we urge that Israelis hold idea of London meeting closely until it has been agreed all around and is publicly announced.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 11, Egypt: 6/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
2. In telegram 7713 from Tel Aviv, June 19, Ambassador Lewis addressed scheduling conflicts for the Israelis relating to the coordination of the London Conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2308) In telegram 15340 from Cairo, June 17, Ambassador Eilts reported on a discussion with Foreign Minister Kamel regarding the “optimum timing” for the United States to pass Egypt’s West Bank/Gaza Strip counterproposal to the Israelis. Eilts informed Kamel it was Egypt’s decision. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2302)
3. The State Department issued a statement on June 21 expressing “regret that the Israeli replies did not fully respond to our questions.” The statement also noted that “active consultations” would continue “as to the next steps which might be taken to help the parties resume negotiations.” (Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1978, p. A1)
4. June 23.