252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

144829. For the Ambassador. Subject: Messages From Secretary to Sadat. Ref: Cairo 13839.2

1. Please convey following message from the Secretary to Sadat: Quote I read with satisfaction the text of your May 30 remarks to the press regarding your willingness to resume direct negotiations as soon as Israel introduces new elements into the process.3 I believe it will have a beneficial impact on U.S. public opinion and will serve to improve the climate for Israeli Cabinet discussion of the two questions we have posed to Israel.4 Both President Carter and I appreciated very much your prompt and helpful response to his message.5 Unquote.

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2. If the opportunity presents itself when you next see Sadat we would also like you to make following oral comments to him, in manner you deem most effective:

A) We understand and indeed share Sadat’s view that there must be real movement soon in the peace process. However, in our view Egyptian references to “expiration” of the Sinai II agreement create definite problems and are not the best way to get this message across.6

B) In the first place, according to its terms the Sinai II agreement expires only when it is replaced by another follow-on agreement. Reference to the “expiration” of Sinai II by a specific deadline provides Israel with an issue on which it can persuasively criticize the Egyptian position.

C) Beyond this, we wonder whether attempting to place a specific deadline on the peace process serves Egypt’s purposes. Both the Israeli Government and public will tend to see such statements as pressure tactics and it is likely to have the effect of strengthening the hand of hardliners who are trying to depict Sadat as adopting inflexible positions.

D) We fully appreciate that Sadat has an Arab audience as well as Israel and the U.S. to think about when he makes public statements. However, we think there are other ways besides setting specific deadlines for Sadat to get across the message that time is not unlimited in the peace process.

E) We wanted to convey these thoughts to the President in the spirit of the close and candid consultation that we have been maintaining about how best to promote the peace process.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Archive, P840128–2156. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by C.E. Marthinsen (NEA/EGY) and Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Atherton, and Sydney Goldsmith (S/S–O); and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to the White House.
  2. Not found.
  3. In his remarks to the press, Sadat stated that Israel’s “position is still in stagnation like it was before.” He continued, however, that if Israel “can give new elements from their side, for sure there will be new elements from our side.” (Christopher Wren, “Sadat Ready To Talk With Israelis Again If They Ease Stand,” New York Times, May 31, 1978, p. A5)
  4. For the two questions, see footnote 3, Document 248.
  5. Apparently a reference to a letter Carter sent to Sadat between June 5 and June 7. In a revised draft letter dated June 5, Carter addressed the issue of Egypt’s withdrawal of its delegation to the Political Committee talks in January. He noted, “There are those who believe that the withdrawal of the Egyptian delegation at the time the political talks were just beginning is largely responsible for the subsequent impasse.” Carter urged Sadat to “agree to a resumption of negotiations by receiving Foreign Minster Dayan in the near future.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 11, Egypt 6/78) Sadat recalled the Egyptian delegation to the Political Committee on January 18. See Document 198.
  6. In his May 30 remarks, Sadat threatened to renounce the 1975 Sinai II agreement and claimed that it had to be renewed in October. In fact, the UNEF mandate in Sinai was due to expire in October.