Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, March 17, 1978, 2353Z

69649. Subject: Message From the President to King Hussein. Ref: Amman 2453.²

1. Please deliver the following message from President Carter to King Hussein.

2. Begin quote:

Your Majesty:

I have read with interest and care your message of March 14. It was helpful to have your thoughts in advance of my meetings with Prime Minister Begin.

I deeply appreciate your good wishes for the success of the efforts undertaken by the United States to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, and am grateful to you for taking the time to set out your views for me in detail. Each day’s events bring further proof—if any were needed—of the importance of moving quickly to end the conflict.

As you point out, Jordan has always been in the forefront of the quest for peace. It is Your Majesty’s courage and foresight over the years in providing leadership toward peace and willingness to take great risks for it that won the admiration of the people of the United States and brought about the expansion and strengthening of relations between our two countries.

It is my hope that the process which we have begun will lead to broader negotiations which Jordan will be able to join. It is our view, Your Majesty, that the best way of arriving at a satisfactory final solution of the problem of the West Bank and Gaza is through an interim arrangement of limited duration during which the inhabitants of those areas will be enabled to participate in the determination of their own future. Knowing the strength of the bonds between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, it has always been our view that final arrangements should provide for the restoration of ties between the two, and for the inclusion of Gaza in this framework as well.

I agree, of course, that both withdrawal from occupied territories and establishment of peace are goals of the peace negotiations. They are principles of UN Resolution 242 on which negotiation must be based. The United States has, likewise, taken the position that the Palestinian people must participate in determination of their own future. I believe we can agree that the application of these principles in detail is, of course, to be worked out in negotiation.

I well understand the problems for Jordan in joining the negotiations. I want you to know that the United States will do its utmost to assure that they lead to a just and reasonable settlement, and that Jordan’s interests are fully taken into account. I have personally committed myself to seeing the current peace effort through to a conclusion. This commitment reflects the fact that peace in the Middle East is vital to the interests and the security of the United States.

Before I close let me say a word about the tragic events that have occurred in the Middle East in recent days. The terrorist attack inside Israel,³ and Israel’s military action in South Lebanon,⁴ are of deep concern to the United States.

We deplore, as we have said, this pattern of violence that takes innocent civilian lives. We have made clear that we expect Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. But we are convinced, also, that Southern Lebanon must no longer be a battleground of non-Lebanese forces, not only to provide Israel security against cross-border attacks, but equally to restore to Lebanon control and sovereignty over its own territory.

We are currently considering moves which we hope will stabilize the situation in Southern Lebanon, through the strengthening of the UN presence in that area, and I hope that Jordan will lend its support to our efforts. But difficult and involved as this particular problem may be, I want you to know that we shall not allow it to distract us from our major goal of moving forward to negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement.

I want to thank Your Majesty again for writing. It is essential that we understand each other fully and therefore that we stay in close touch. Our greatest common task—the achievement of peace—lies ahead of us. If our two countries work together I am confident that we shall succeed.

With very best personal good wishes,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter.

End quote.

3. If, in delivering above, you have occasion to discuss further the South Lebanese situation, in addition to guidance provided septel, you may draw on the following:

—We have informed the Israelis that we expect them to withdraw from Lebanon⁵ and we are presently in urgent consultation with them to achieve this.

—The Israelis have told us that they do not intend to remain in Lebanon but they insist that their withdrawal must be followed by arrangements which put an end to attacks against Israel from across the border.⁶

—We are considering, among other possibilities, a UN peacekeeping force to resolve this problem and to support and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its authority and control in the south. We would expect that such a force would withdraw as soon as the Lebanese Army is again capable of assuming security responsibility in the south.

—We are presently engaged in discussions at the United Nations and with a number of governments. We hope to stay in close touch with Jordan and work together to help restore security and stability in Southern Lebanon.

4. FYI: As you will have seen, foregoing does not mention or allude to the possibility of visit by Hussein to the U.S. Our feeling is that this is a matter for the King to decide. Since Hussein did not raise the question in his message of March 14, and has stayed away from it in other contacts, believe most appropriate course is for President to do likewise in his response. End FYI.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176-1260. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Quandt, Brubeck, Atherton, and Frank Wisner (S/S); and approved by Secretary Vance.
2. Telegram 2453 from Amman, March 14, contains King Hussein’s message in which he explained that Jordan’s entry into negotiations with Israel necessitated “some concrete indication shown by Israel that the negotiations would ultimately result in Israeli withdrawal and a just settlement of the Palestinian question based on the right of self-determination.” He continued that this did not constitute imposing “prior conditions,” but “that the negotiations take place within a framework of recognized principles and goals.” He concluded that the United States needed to play an active role as “the stakes are so high and the interest so vital that the United States needs to act decisively to break the stalemate and make it clearer that the road to peace is one and irreversible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–1524)
3. See footnote 2, Document 229.
4. See footnote 3, Document 230.
5. See Document 230.
6. Telegram 3622 from Tel Aviv, March 16, reported Begin’s statement of Israel’s willingness to withdraw, but that he wanted “an arrangement by which the killers cannot return.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–1920)