208. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

2690. Literally Eyes Only for the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Invitation to President Sadat. Ref: State 18379.2

1. Met with Sadat for half an hour this morning3 at the Barrages before both of us helicoptered to Heliopolis to attend funeral of VP Mubarak’s mother-in-law. Sadat was cordial, but also somber. He looked tired and, while he claimed recent events have not “frustrated” him, they obviously are very much on his mind.

2. Conveyed to him President Carter’s hope that it will be convenient to visit our President at Camp David for discussions on how to proceed. If agreeable, President Carter believes visit should take place at earliest possible dates convenient to Sadat. I stressed need to treat this information with utmost confidentiality. Also transmitted President Carter’s and your personal regards to Sadat.

3. After listening attentively, Sadat said that he had mentioned to you that he did not exclude the possibility of visiting the United States for a further talk with President Carter. He described this latest message as “significant in regard to timing.” He had not had much opportunity to discuss substantive issues with President Carter at Aswan4 because of the shortness of the layover. He agreed that the visit should take place as early as possible and liked the idea of having it at Camp David. He said he is not interested in ceremonies. Asked when might be convenient for him, his first reaction was that he wanted to think about it some more. A few minutes later he said that, although he has a full schedule for the next couple of weeks, next week would be agreeable to him if convenient to President Carter. By next week, he pointed out, he means the Muslim week beginning January 28. He asked what dates in that week would be best for President Carter. He said that, as is his custom, he will make the trip in two days, overnighting the first day probably in Paris. Sadat recognized need for strict confidentiality and said only Vice President Mubarak will at this time be told about invitation.

4. I also took the occasion to inquire whether he had come to any conclusion about resuming the effort to arrive at a mutually agreeable [Page 985] declaration of principles and recalled Roy Atherton had remained in the area for this purpose. Sadat commented that the version you had handed to him is, as a whole, agreeable.5 There are, however, some elements in it that need revision. He had turned it over to FonMin Kamel and latter’s MFA “experts” to go over it in detail with a view to coming up with proposals. He thought it might be best to defer any new effort to arrive at a mutually agreeable draft declaration until after his proposed visit with President Carter next week in the United States.

5. Continuing, Sadat observed the Israelis should not be given the opportunity to regain the initiative. While the draft declaration of principles is being worked on, a concurrent and parallel effort should be made to work on a model peace treaty. The initiative for this should come from Egypt and the United States. What is needed now, Sadat asserted, is a “dramatic and courageous act on the part of the United States” commensurate with his own visit to Jerusalem, which had galvanized the world. He was not asking U.S. stop providing arms to Israel or anything like that. What he hopes the United States will be willing to do is to declare a specific American position and inform the Israelis that, while the United States’ commitment to Israel’s security is unchanged, we will not defend Israel’s acquisition of occupied territory. If President Carter could do this, it will do much to bring peace to the area. If he cannot, Sadat thought the area (and the African continent) “is heading for catastrophe.”

6. As we were leaving, Sadat noted that he had seen press reports today that the administration is considering providing 100 or 150 F–5Es to Egypt. He said this seemed to miss the point. He did not want F–5Es. He had mentioned to you his request for military equipment similar to that being given to Israel. This request, he had noted, could be used as “leverage” with the Israelis to make them more amenable to sincere negotiations for peace. Sadat emphasized that his basic objective remains a peace settlement.

7. Comment: Please advise what dates next week might be best for President Carter to receive Sadat. I expect to see the President tomorrow morning at 1100 local (0900 GMT) at a police academy ceremony. I could take that occasion to convey any additional information.

Eilts
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850059–1924. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
  2. Telegram 18379 has not been found.
  3. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
  4. See Document 185.
  5. Apparently a reference to the January 20 version (see Document 203) that Vance discussed with Sadat in Cairo. See Document 205.