200. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance’s Delegation to the White House and the Department of State1

Secto 1045. White House for the President and Dr. Brzezinski. Department for S/STarnoff. Subject: Secretary Vance’s Meeting With Prime Minister Begin.

1. Secretary and Ambassador met with Begin, Yadin and Weizman little after midnight January 19.2 Cabinet meeting was just breaking up as Secretary arrived, having been in session more or less continuously since 8:00 pm. Begin was in surprisingly composed and relaxed mood, especially in light of his earlier telephone conversations with Secretary [Page 956] in which he had seemed clearly shaken by events of evening.3 Evidently, Cabinet meeting and his session with Kamel had provided some catharsis.

2. Secretary Vance began by briefing Prime Minister on his telephone conversations with President Carter and President Sadat.4 He said that both he and President Carter had urged Sadat to continue the Political Committee talks, at least through Thursday.5 Sadat’s response had been that unfortunately he had gone too far to reverse. But, however, he had decided in light of President Carter’s call that he wished the Military Committee to continue its work. Sadat had told the Secretary that he understood the importance of continuing the process, that perhaps his decision to break off the Political Committee talks had been a mistake but that he had gone too far to reverse it immediately.

3. Begin then recounted to the Secretary the nature of his 45-minute meeting with Foreign Minister Kamel. He said it was largely taken up by Kamel’s giving a series of reasons for the breaking off of the talks. Among these were various public statements by the Israelis which indicated a continuing intransigence on basic issues, several negotiating positions assumed by the Israelis in the early sessions—such as refusal to accept the President’s Aswan language in toto, Begin’s toast at the State Dinner Tuesday night which was “embarrassing to him and distinctly not helpful,”6 and the sense of pressure the Egyptian delegation felt itself to be under in Jerusalem from the Israeli press and the general atmosphere. Begin said that Kamel had indicated he considered his recall to be in the nature of a suspension rather than a termination, and he hoped ways could be found to reconvene the Political Committee soon.

4. Begin said that he had then responded in measured tones to Kamel, citing an “avalanche of statements” from the Egyptian side which had been offensive to the Israelis in recent days. Among these he had cited an Egyptian press commentary in late December which had said he was “lucky not to be beaten up at Ismailia in light of his positions,” the reference to him as “a Shylock,” recent threats of “another October” and most recently Sadat’s interview in October magazine.7 [Page 957] Begin said he made clear to Kamel that he hoped the Egyptians would come back soon and the Israelis would be ready to resume the talks at any time. He also said that he told Kamel he would “keep his sentiment for President Sadat despite everything which has happened.”

5. Begin then discussed for about 15 minutes the significance of what he termed “this astonishing development.” He and the Secretary agreed that the negotiations were making good progress and that there was no justification from that standpoint for the action. Begin said “It’s a whim, Sadat is a whimsical man.” He went on to defend in a matter-of-fact way his toast at the dinner saying that political speeches at such dinners were perfectly customary, and he should not have taken offense. “What was wrong with it?” The Secretary did not reply.

6. Begin then told the Secretary that the subject of what to do next had been discussed at the Cabinet meeting, and that he had conveyed the Secretary’s views to the Cabinet to the effect that it would be most unfortunate not to agree to continue the military talks now that Sadat has said he would like them to continue. In light of the Secretary’s views, the Cabinet had decided to reverse its initial decision to refuse to continue the military talks. Instead, the decision was to keep Sadat’s proposal under consideration and the door open pending hearing the Secretary’s report on his meeting with Sadat Friday.8 General Tamir and the other members of Weizman’s team will remain for the time being in Cairo.

7. Yadin said that there had been a great deal of strong opposition in the Cabinet to keeping the door open in this way. He said it would be very important to try to avoid a Sadat speech on Saturday9 before the People’s Assembly which is tough and provocative. Begin interjected that obviously one cannot prevent him speaking since he has every right to do so, but he hoped the tone would be “good”.

8. The Secretary said that Kamel had made a public statement after returning to the hotel from Begin’s office that the negotiating process had not been broken off; rather he was going back on “consultation”. Both Begin and Vance agreed this was good and a hopeful sign. The Secretary urged Begin to keep “things as cool as possible.” He said there many examples in his past negotiating experience of such crises and they usually can be overcome.

9. As the meeting was about to break up, Weizman said he did not want to flash any red lights, but the Secretary should know that the Israelis are watching very carefully the increasing rapprochement between Syria and Iraq, and were apprehensive about their being [Page 958] “naughty.” He also cited the growing armed build-up in south Lebanon as a worrisome factor and the possibility that Boumediene “running around the area” was a prelude to some kind of blow-up in south Lebanon which “would be the last thing we need at this moment.” The Secretary agreed there were some worrisome signs.

10. Begin and Vance agreed they would meet sometime Thursday at Begin’s convenience for a serious review of the overall situation. Begin seemed very pleased with the meeting and it ended on a sober but guardedly hopeful note.

11. For Amman, Jidda and Cairo: In talking with host governments about current situation and what is in prospect for peace negotiations, you may refer to this conversation and draw on following analysis to extent you feel this will be helpful in calming reactions. You should say that door is open for resumption of Political Committee negotiations and we are hopeful that Security Committee will meet as scheduled this weekend. Secretary will be meeting again with Begin today and, later, with Dayan. He will meet as scheduled with Sadat tomorrow. Obviously, a further assessment of what comes next must wait on those talks.

12. You should emphasize that while not underestimating seriousness of Egyptian move and degree of Egyptian concern, negotiations yesterday were serious, constructive and in good atmosphere. We see no reason why they cannot be resumed from that point when parties are ready. Discussion has focussed, of course, on how Palestinian and West Bank/Gaza issues will be dealt with in a declaration of principles governing a comprehensive peace settlement. They are difficult but had not yet gone long enough to reach impasse. Sadat’s decision came as a surprise and we do not repeat not think it reflected a crisis in the actual negotiations.

13. Israeli reaction has been to resist what they see as pressure tactics. They feel that his decision was not warranted in light of the progress that was being made in negotiations. They are certainly not inclined to be more flexible on issues after this move. Our immediate objective is to get negotiations back on the tracks, but decisions as to how we should now proceed must await Secretary’s meeting with Sadat and Sadat’s speech to Peoples Assembly Saturday, purpose of which we do not know but which we hope will not close the door or worsen the atmosphere. We intend to continue low key treatment, reflected in Secretary’s observation that all negotiations “have their ups and downs”, and concentrate on getting back to negotiations on the issues. In final analysis, there is no way to make progress on hard issues and move toward comprehensive negotiations for overall settlement except through ongoing process of negotiations between the parties, tedious [Page 959] as they often seem. We will have clearer picture and fuller report for you after Sadat meetings.

14. Should be noted that public mood here in Israel has not been at all enhanced by decision to withdraw Egyptian delegation. After two months of buffeting by unexpected developments that have moved ahead at a pace faster than Israelis have been able to adjust to, they appear to be reacting unfavorably to this latest shock. This is reinforced by their inability to relate the move to the talks underway, which they understood from the media were making progress, however slowly. End result is a prevalent feeling, reflected in the “morning after” press, that Sadat is simply maneouvering to exert pressure on Israel through us, a possibility which inevitably draws Israelis together in support of their government.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2356. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Treat as Nodis. Sent immediate to Amman and Jidda. Sent immediate for information to Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus.
  2. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
  3. A reference to Sadat’s decision to recall the Egyptian delegation from Jerusalem. See footnote 4, Document 198. No record of Vance’s telephone conversations with Begin have been found.
  4. No memoranda of conversations have been found. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Vance spoke with Carter on January 18 from 5:36 to 5:44 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
  5. Thursday was January 26. Carter urged Sadat to continue the Political Committee talks in a January 18 telephone conversation. See Document 198.
  6. See footnote 3, Document 198.
  7. See footnote 11, Document 194.
  8. January 20.
  9. January 21.