181. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
23005. For the Secretary From Ambassador. Subject: Sadat on Ismailia Summit.
Summary: Sadat voices guarded satisfaction with his meetings with Begin. Atmosphere was good and candor prevailed. Because of in[Page 898]ability reach agreement on mutually acceptable declaration of principles, he and Begin decided simply declare respective positions and agree to disagree. This posture, as declared in joint press conference, helps both Begin and him. Positive progress made on Sinai in that Israelis agree to international border, though differences remain on Israeli settlements and airfields. Cairo Conference upgraded to ministerial level with ministerial level Political and Military Committees subsumed thereunder. Political Committee will deal with unresolved Palestinian question, Israeli settlements in Sinai, possibly demilitarized zones in Sinai and nature of peace. Re latter, Sadat reiterates Egypt ready for diplomatic relations, open borders, etc., but these may not be stipulated in treaty lest doing so suggests they were imposed. Military Committee will address itself to two-phased Israeli withdrawal, airdromes which Israelis wish retain, demilitarization. Re latter, Sadat envisages four types of military zones in Sinai. Sadat looks to continued U.S. role in terms of guarantees, at appropriate time, and in meantime for continuing discreet pressure on Israelis to accept concept of self-determination for Palestinians. He would like to have President Carter present should satisfactory declaration of principles or a model agreement for Palestinian question be worked out. Hot line established today between Abdin Palace and Jerusalem. Sadat will send reports of Ismailia meeting to Saudis, Gulf States and Hussein. End summary.
1. Met with Sadat this morning for about an hour and half at his Gaza residence. He was in a somber mood, but also indicated guarded satisfaction with his meetings with Begin. Said he was tired and recalled he had not had a day to relax for the past three or four months. He wished to give President Carter and you a report on the Ismailia talks. As is usually the case, his presentation was somewhat disjointed, with frequent repetition, but I have sought to order it below.
2. Atmosphere: Sadat described atmosphere of the talks as good. Begin was “fair, strong and decisive.” The two men had dealt with each other in a candid and open way. He liked Begin. Begin had not been “nervous” when controversial issues concerning the Palestinians were discussed. As before, “Ezer” (Weizman) had been very positive. Dayan had been “showy,” but had also indicated a genuine desire to establish peace.
3. Declaration of principles: Sadat recalled that he had earlier informed President Carter of the need for a suitable declaration of principles. He had had to accept something of a change in that concept. The Israelis had tabled a draft in which they spoke of “self-rule” (later he used “self-autonomy”) for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. Had this been announced, it would have created difficulties for Egypt. He had then tried out on the Israelis an Egyptian draft calling for “self-determination.” Begin had rejected this, pointing out that it [Page 899] would ultimately mean an independent Palestinian state. All Israelis, Begin had insisted, including the opposition parties, are opposed to an independent Palestinian state. They believe such a state will sooner or later come under “outside” influence or dominance. Sadat interjected that he thought the Israelis were worried about the Soviets influencing such a state.
4. Since neither draft was acceptable to the other party, Sadat said he and Begin had decided simply to declare their respective positions and to agree to disagree on the subject. This had been done at their joint press conference.2 From Begin’s vantage point, this was fair enough. It in effect “postpones” any such declaration. It will also help Begin in meeting the objections of some Likud members who oppose him. Such an agreement to disagree also serves Egypt in the Arab world. It makes it clear that Sadat is seeking self-determination for the Palestinians and also demonstrates that GOE is seeking a comprehensive settlement.
5. Sinai: Positive progress had been made on the Sinai issue. Begin had told him in their private talk immediately after arrival that the Israeli Cabinet had agreed that the international border should be the boundary. True, some differences remain on the retention of the Israeli settlements and leasing or acquiring in some way the two airdromes in Sinai. These points will be discussed between Defense Ministers in their meetings.
6. Upgrading Cairo Conference and ministerial committees: Sadat noted that Begin had proposed at the outset that the Cairo Conference be elevated to ministerial level and that Political and Military Committees (also at the ministerial level) be subsumed thereunder. He, Sadat, had agreed. The Political Committee is to meet in Jerusalem and the U.S. and U.N. will be asked to “join.” (Roy Atherton had suggested I ask the President why the change of designation for the U.S. and U.N. from “participants” to “observers” had been made for the Political Committee. Sadat seemed puzzled about the change, although he noted that the principal discussions will be between Egypt and Israel. He also commented that the Israelis had not asked for “observers” in that committee.) The Military Committee will consist of the two Defense Ministers. No U.S. or U.N. participation is needed because of the high sensitivity of the subjects discussed. U.S. and U.N. participation would also invite press interest, which is undesirable. He had told Begin that the U.S. is already “behind us.” When the parties are ready to talk about guarantees, they could contact the U.S. Begin saw no need for the U.N. to participate and he, Sadat, agreed. He had also suggested to Begin that if any difficulties arise, SFM-type monitoring stations could be set up. Begin had agreed.
[Page 900]7. The two sub-committees will work in the context of the Cairo Conference and “report to the plenary when they reach decisions.” The Political Committee will meet on the fifteenth, since Dayan has a previous engagement. The Military Committee will meet on the seventh or eighth, probably at Gianaclis. Weizman can arrive via Israeli aircraft.
8. Work of the Political Committee: Sadat said he regards the Political Committee as of lesser importance than the Military Committee, but had not so indicated to the Israelis. As he saw it, the Political Committee will discuss the following:
(A) The unresolved Palestinian issue. He envisaged two alternatives coming out of its discussions:
—A declaration of principles along the lines he had previously proposed, provided mutually acceptable language can be devised. He doubted that this would be possible, however, since several unsuccessful efforts to do so had been made during the Ismailia summit.
—In six to eight weeks time (Begin had opined in perhaps three months) a “model agreement or treaty” might be prepared, which would set out the principles of resolving the Palestinian problem in its various aspects. He was hopeful this would prove possible. Time had been too short at Ismailia to try to do so. Begin had said everything is negotiable except the destruction of Israel. This is reasonable enough, but “no one” today is thinking in terms of destroying Israel. In the first direct negotiations with Israel, the Israelis had behaved fairly. “Let us hope it will continue like this,” Sadat said. The Israeli objection to self-determination for the Palestinians is weak, in Sadat’s view, and world public opinion should be able to help change it.
9. Sadat again noted that, even if a Sinai settlement is worked out earlier, he will not announce or implement anything until some solution is found to the Palestinian impasse. Asked if he had said this to Begin, Sadat replied in the negative. However, he had spoken of the need for a comprehensive settlement in the press conference and Begin had agreed.
(B) The Israeli settlements in Sinai: Begin had again urged that they be allowed to remain. Sadat had refused. Sadat noted that the Israeli position on wanting to retain the settlements is weak in the eyes of world public opinion.
(C) Demilitarized zone in the Sinai: Sadat claimed that Dayan had pressed to have this item discussed in the Political Committee. Despite the fact that it is basically a military question, Weizman had been “shy” and had only mildly argued for its inclusion in the Military Committee. In view of the difference between his two Ministers, Begin had proposed that the subject be dropped for the moment. He and Sadat will agree before the committees meet in which of the two committees the demilitarized zone issue will be discussed.
[Page 901](D) Nature of peace: Sadat again mentioned that, as part of a “package” deal, he had told Begin (and Weizman earlier) that Egypt is ready for diplomatic relations with Israel, open borders, trade, etc. However, he would not agree to stipulating this in any treaty, the Israelis will have to take his word for it. He thought he had amply demonstrated that he abides by his word. If such things are in a treaty, it would appear as if they were imposed on him. (Sadat wanted President Carter to know that on the points concerning the nature of peace about which he and President Carter had differed last April,3 all of these are now agreeable in a “package” settlement.)
10. Work of the Military Committee: The Military Committee will address itself to following problems:
(A) Withdrawal in Sinai: Begin had proposed that this take place in two phases: the first, Israeli withdrawal to a line beginning just east of Arish (with Arish under Egypt) to Ras Mohamed; the second, from that line to the international boundary. Begin had mentioned three–five years and the President had spoken of his desire to have withdrawal completed by October 1978, or by the end of 1978 at the latest. Details will have to be worked out by Gamasy and Weizman.
(B) Israeli desire to retain two airdromes: Begin had repeated to him what Weizman had requested, namely, Israel is anxious to retain the airfields at Ras al Naqb and Sheikh al Suwaiyid. These are needed for Israel’s large aircraft inventory (which USG has given Israel, Sadat pointedly noted) and, in the case of Ras al Naqb, to protect Eilat. Sadat had rejected Israeli offer to lease or cede these areas and had emphasized that he cannot accept any continuing Israeli presence in Sinai. The airfields could be “plowed up.”
(C) Sharm el Sheikh: This had not been an issue. Weizman allegedly agreed it is no longer of strategic importance, since Bab al-Mandab can be blockaded. Sadat had agreed in principle to UNEF forces being stationed there, so long as no Israeli troops were included.
(D) Demilitarization of Sinai: Sadat assumed that this subject will be discussed by the Military Committee, where he thought it should properly be handled. The Israelis had wished to demilitarize the entire Sinai. This was unacceptable to him. He had told Begin that his main forces “will not exceed east of the passes” with details to be discussed by the committee.4
[Page 902]11. Having in mind the apparent confusion that has arisen on Sadat’s ideas with respect to the Sinai, I asked him to clarify this point. He said he envisaged a four-zone concept:
—In the area between the Suez Canal and the passes (including the Heights), the main Egyptian forces will be stationed. The exact eastern line could be worked out in the military committee.
—In the area east of the passes to El Arish, about eighty kilometers in breadth, there will be a limited armaments zone. High-caliber, long-range artillery will not be stationed in this zone.
—In the area between Arish to the borders, approximately forty kilometers in breadth, there will be light, frontier-type forces with light weapons.
—A ten kilometer zone from the border will be demilitarized and manned by the U.N. or some other force. (Nothing was said about a similar demilitarized zone on the Israeli side of the border, but to best of our knowledge this is still an Egyptian concept.)
12. U.S. role: Asked how he envisaged future U.S. role, Sadat said he had been thinking about how the situation might evolve. He hoped that in the next six to eight weeks some way might be found out of the Palestinian impasse. Assuming that this takes place and the Sinai problems are satisfactorily resolved, the parties would have to turn to the U.S. to assist with guarantees and early warning stations. But, Sadat emphasized, there should be continuing quiet “U.S. pressure” on Israel to be more forthcoming. He saw no need for President Carter to be in a confrontation posture with the Israelis, at least not at present. He hoped nevertheless that President Carter will be willing to continue to urge upon the Israelis the need to resolve the Palestinian question through self-determination. President Carter has publicly stated his support for “self-determination” for the Palestinians. As Sadat saw it, the difference between the Israeli concept of “self-autonomy” and his concept of “self-determination” is not that great. Begin, Sadat said, needs continuing “pressure.” Weizman had in fact made this point to Mubarak. Such pressure should come from the United States, Western Europe and international public opinion. It will make it easier for Begin to make the right decisions, which he cannot do in one step.
13. Sadat emphasized that, now that he has in effect given the Israelis what they want in the context of the “nature of peace,” he has made all the concessions that he can. Now it is up to the Israelis to make some concessions. He did not regard withdrawal as a concession, since the Israelis are illegally on Egyptian territory. He hoped that his actions have given President Carter “full maneuverability” to urge the Israelis to be responsive. Should a satisfactory declaration of principles or, better still, a model agreement on the Palestinian question be worked [Page 903] out, he hoped President Carter might be present in Cairo when it is announced.
14. Communications between GOE and GOI: Sadat also noted that he had today agreed to establish a “hot line” between Abdin Palace (the Presidency PBX switchboard) and Jerusalem.
15. Sadat is sending report of Ismailia summit to Saudis, Gulf State leaders and to King Hussein.
16. Sadat’s comments on Hussein’s role being sent septel.5
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–2236. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis; Cherokee. Sent immediate for information to Tel Aviv.↩
- See footnote 9, Document 180.↩
- See Documents 25 and 27.↩
- The Military Committee, headed by General Gamasy and Weizman, began meeting in Cairo on January 11. The meeting recessed on January 13 and Weizman returned to Israel. (“Chronology of Recent Events,” Department of State Bulletin, February 1978, p. 37)↩
- Apparently telegram 23057 from Cairo, December 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2232)↩