166. Message From the White House to the Embassy in Egypt1
WH70027. Please deliver the following message to Secretary Vance immediately.
To: Secretary Vance
From: Zbigniew Brzezinski
The President asked me to convey to you the following:
Please inform President Sadat that you will raise with Begin the desirability of a public Israeli statement expressing willingness in principle to withdraw from Arab lands occupied in 1967 and to resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects, through negotiations with all the parties. Please explain to Sadat that he retains the option to call for such a statement publicly in the event that the Israelis are unresponsive.
At the same time it is important for Sadat to understand that movement towards peace in the Middle East will require the involvement of other Arab parties, and notably moderate Palestinians, the Jordanians, and the Saudis. He should therefore refrain from actions or rhetoric that have the effect of dividing the Arabs and focusing international attention on Arab extremism rather than on the need for Israeli moderation. Sadat risks engaging in self-defeating policies if his initiatives detract from the need for serious negotiations beyond the purely Israeli-Egyptian relationship.
In talking to Begin, you should emphasize that the proposed statement would not bind the Israelis, for it would leave the truly thorny questions to be worked out in negotiations. In the meantime, it would help to generate pressure on the other Arabs to come in and to negotiate seriously. From Begin’s point of view this could have the advantage of engaging the Egyptians, the Jordanians and the moderate Palestinians in a serious negotiating process, leaving for the time being the Syrians and Soviets on the sideline. A generalized statement as suggested above would enable Sadat to claim that he has achieved a significant breakthrough; it would reinforce Israel’s position as the peace-seeking party; and it would make it difficult for the moderate Arabs to object to more direct Israeli-Egyptian negotiations.
[Page 806]I suggest that Sadat invite highest level of negotiators to meet in Cairo, perhaps the Foreign Ministers. Begin should be encouraged likewise.
End of President’s message.
Enclosed please find the text of a letter which the President has approved for Prime Minister Begin.2
Brzezinski
Begin text:
December 9, 1977
Text of letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
President Sadat has suggested in a message to me3 and in his conversations with Secretary Vance, that additional important initiatives are needed to exploit the momentum generated by your historic meeting with President Sadat in Jerusalem.
President Sadat has suggested that a public Israeli statement regarding Israeli willingness in principle to withdraw from Arab lands occupied in 1967 and to resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects through negotiations with all the parties would have the effect of generating significant pressure on the Jordanians, the Palestinians, and the Syrians to negotiate more seriously. President Sadat is also prepared to offer specific suggestions to be used in order to persuade the other Arabs to face up to realities.
I believe that such a statement would be helpful while leaving you the necessary flexibility to negotiate a peace agreement that protects and enhances Israel’s national interests. It is sufficiently generalized to leave open the key negotiating issues and yet sufficiently positive to make it difficult for the Arabs to block peace and lay blame for failure on you and Sadat.
Secretary Vance will discuss the issues in considerable detail with you but I thought you would be interested to know that President [Page 807] Sadat is looking for ways to promote the momentum that has been achieved.
With warm regards and admiration,
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter
End text
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 8, Backchannel Messages: Middle East: 2/77–1/78. Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. Vance traveled in the Middle East December 9–15, visiting Cairo from December 9–10, Jerusalem December 10–12, Amman December 12–13, Beirut December 13, Damascus December 13–14, and Riyadh December 14–15.↩
- In telegram Secto 12023 to the White House, December 9, Secretary Vance noted that it would be “useful for me to have a personal message from you to deliver to him [Begin] which encourages more flexibility on the part of the Israelis so as to make it easier for Sadat to deal with the other Arabs.” He noted that a previous “personal letter from you to him is on the way,” but suggested that “something more substantive may be needed.” He then proposed the text of a message from Carter to Begin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–1428)↩
- No message has been found. Possibly a reference to a message Carter mentions in his diary entry for December 7: “Sadat sent me a message wanting me to urge Begin to make a public statement on withdrawal from occupied territories and working toward a solution to the Palestine problem. We’ll pursue this, either directly to Begin or through Vance’s personal visit later this week.” (White House Diary, p. 146)↩