164. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Prospects for a Separate Egyptian-Israeli Settlement
Our Ambassadors in Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have all been asked to comment on the prospects for, and consequences of, a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. We have received lengthy responses from each Ambassador, the main points of which are summarized below:
1. Egypt. Ambassador Eilts feels that President Sadat is serious when he says that he will try to work out with Israel principles for a comprehensive settlement. He will then present these principles to the other Arab states for approval, and will proceed to negotiate his own agreement with Israel in that context. Ambassador Eilts finds it difficult to believe that the Israelis will offer Sadat the kind of comprehensive settlement that he could present to an Arab Summit as the basis for a just and durable peace. Sadat recognizes this possibility and will look to American pressure on Israel to prevent this from happening.
If Sadat cannot achieve agreement on principles for a comprehensive settlement, he will nonetheless try to work out some kind of a Palestinian agreement. He is toying with the idea of UN control over the West Bank and Gaza for a period of time and has also discussed the idea of a Palestinian state in Gaza and part of Northern Sinai. Sadat has recently been placing less emphasis on the PLO, and has been looking for other sources of leadership among the Palestinians.
[Page 795]In the end, Sadat will probably consider a separate deal with Israel if it is a sufficiently good one. Ambassador Eilts believes that the Egyptian public and the military leadership will go along with Sadat if he takes this course. Sadat does not seem to be particularly concerned about Saudi reactions. Ambassador Eilts concludes that the Saudis would probably continue to support Egypt. The Ambassador notes that if the Israelis want a separate peace with Egypt, they are going to have to pay a price for it, and probably a higher price than they presently think. Sadat is not determined to have peace at any price with Israel. Ambassador Eilts believes that we should continue to press Sadat and the Israelis for a comprehensive settlement. (Ambassador Eilts’ cable is attached.)2
2. Israel. Ambassador Lewis feels that Prime Minister Begin is genuinely prepared to make a try at a comprehensive settlement. He notes, however, that considerable momentum is building for a separate deal with Egypt, and that Dayan and Weizman are particularly tempted to move in this direction. Dayan apparently sees comprehensive negotiations primarily as a cover for the pursuit of a bilateral agreement. The key obstacle to moving beyond a bilateral agreement with Egypt is the current Israeli position regarding the West Bank. While many in Israel would agree to substantial withdrawal from the West Bank in return for peace, Prime Minister Begin still seems reluctant to consider that possibility seriously.
3. Syria. Ambassador Murphy believes that if the Syrians see Egypt moving in the direction of a bilateral agreement, they will not necessarily immediately turn rejectionist or decide to join the negotiations. Assad does not want a confrontation with Israel while his army is bogged down in Lebanon. He might well continue to reject Sadat’s initiatives, without being stampeded into the arms of the rejectionists. Continued Saudi support and an open dialogue with the United States will be important to Assad during this period if he is to resist the rejectionists’ alternative.
4. Jordan. Ambassador Pickering thinks that King Hussein is genuinely concerned about the consequences of Sadat’s move. He fears radicalization in the area, with Jordan being caught between Egypt and the other Arabs. Hussein very strongly favors emphasis on a comprehensive settlement, and particularly hopes for American pressure on Israel concerning the future of the West Bank. Jordan will try to maintain high level contacts with both Syria and Egypt as well as Saudi Arabia. Hussein will not take a forward role in negotiating for the West Bank at present, but this could change if the Israelis make a sufficiently [Page 796] attractive offer. Ambassador Pickering believes that Jordan would prefer a continuation of the status quo to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.
5. Lebanon. Ambassador Parker, who has had long experience in the Arab world, believes that Sadat can get away with a separate peace with Israel. Despite radical opposition to such a move, he thinks that an Egyptian-Israeli agreement would have good prospects for lasting. The Saudi role will be critical. Whether the Saudis will support an agreement reached between Egypt and Israel will depend to a large degree on circumstances. Ambassador Parker concludes that the Israelis, at a minimum, would have to make concessions which the Palestinian majority can accept, even if the PLO, Syrians, and rejectionists do not. He suspects that something well short of the PLO maximum demands could eventually be sold to Palestinians, but he sees no signs that the Israelis are going to meet even minimalist demands.
He does not believe that a separate peace between Egypt and Israel will create a momentum for a wider settlement unless Begin is able to offer terms which are considerably more attractive than anything the Israelis have mentioned to date. The impact of a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement in Lebanon would quite likely be very serious. If Syria and the Palestinians decide to fight Sadat’s move, Lebanon could become a battleground. In those circumstances, a resumption of the civil war would be a possibility, with the Christian rightists turning to Israel and Egypt for support in their objective of carving out a separate Christian state.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 19, Geneva: Egypt: 12/77. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum. A December 6 covering memorandum attached from Quandt to Brzezinski requests that the memorandum be sent to the President. Brzezinski indicated his approval.↩
- Telegram 289268 to the White House, which repeated the cable from Cairo, is attached but not printed.↩