151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel and the Consulate in Jerusalem1
277905. WH for Brzezinski. Subject: Briefing on Role of Plenary for Begin/Dayan. Ref: Tel Aviv 9442.2
1. Begin and Dayan should know from extensive conversations we and Israelis had in New York as well as subsequently that to get Syrians to come to conference, we will undoubtedly have to agree that plenary will have some form of continuing existence. Although plenary may thus have to be convened from time to time under this concept, we would expect it would not have a very important role. We believe once conference is launched it will develop its own dynamics which will reinforce bilateral format, especially given both Israeli and Egyptian preferences in this regard. The Israelis have our assurance that we will work to keep the plenary from being used to block or veto progress toward a settlement in any of the working groups, or to obstruct or complicate working group proceedings.
2. You may convey foregoing to Begin and Dayan in connection with guidance we have provided earlier. If they indicate Israel seeks more specific assurances as to U.S. position, say it is difficult to see any need for being more specific.
3. FYI—In conveying this information bear in mind that we want if possible to avoid exercise of negotiating U.S.-Israeli agreements about procedural issues beyond agreed minute on Palestinian representation.3 It may come to this on one or other point, but we do not want to give Israelis any encouragement in this direction, since clearly we need to retain maximum flexibility to play our middleman role. End FYI.
[Page 763]4. Also, remind Begin and Dayan, if you get on this subject and pass to them above information, they must absolutely ensure that our comments about U.S. position on plenary does not leak. If it does, Syrians will immediately say they can accept no such arrangement. We simply must not go down this road again.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850106–1576. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Quandt, and Robert Perito (S/S–O); and approved by Habib. Sent Immediate for information to the White House.↩
- In telegram 9442 from Tel Aviv, November 18, Ambassador Lewis noted his upcoming meeting with Begin and Dayan and asked the State Department if it could provide more guidance on the role of a unified Arab delegation as well as offer more reassurances to the Israelis regarding U.S. “willingness to reach private procedural understandings with them to safeguard their basic position, whatever ambiguities or symbolic concessions might be required for public purposes.” Lewis noted this “could be critical to a forthcoming Israeli position with Sadat.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2456)↩
- Not further identified. Possibly a reference to the September 12 statement; see footnote 17, Document 103.↩