143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1
264772. For the Ambassador From the Secretary. Subject: Message From the President to King Khalid.
1. You should arrange urgently to convey following letter from the President to King Khalid.
2. Begin text:
Your Majesty: I am asking Ambassador West to deliver this letter to you urgently because of my concern that we not lose momentum in our efforts to reconvene the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. In the certainty that you share my conviction of the importance of this goal for our two nations, I am writing to seek your help in bringing the Arab parties together so that we may not lose the present opportunity.
As Your Majesty is aware from my discussions with Prince Saud,2 and from further details that Ambassador West has conveyed to His Highness, we believe that no further time should be wasted on procedural questions, and that we must proceed directly to reconvene the Conference. This requires acceptance by both sides of pragmatic solutions to the problems we have been discussing. Palestinian delegates who can effectively represent Palestinian views should be included as members of the unified Arab delegation, but the Arab parties should [Page 747] understand that Israel will not negotiate with well known PLO members. There must also be agreement that primary emphasis in negotiations will be on bilateral working groups, except for a multilateral group or groups that would take up the Palestinian issues. The 1973 procedures, which we approve, give the plenary group a significant role to play.
I am convinced that under such arrangements the Arabs will be able to negotiate with confidence and with the assurance that the substantive issues of deep concern to them will be fully dealt with. You have my guarantee that the United States will not permit conference procedures to be used to place any party at an unfair disadvantage. At Geneva, we will be able to use our full influence to ensure progress toward a just and lasting peace. I hope I can count on your trust and confidence in my determination to pursue this course whatever the difficulties, because the national interests of the United States require it.
We have had encouraging initial responses from Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat and King Hussein, but I am frankly more concerned about Syria and the Palestinians. It is evident that significant differences persist within Arab ranks. As time passes while the Arabs consider their reply, public statements are beginning to appear that indicate growing disillusionment with the prospects of reconvening the conference.
I am convinced, Your Majesty, that our two governments must act vigorously and promptly if we are to arrest this dangerous drift. It would be a tragedy if Arab disunity or the persistence of unrealistic demands on the part of some of the Arab parties were the cause of our missing the opportunity to get to Geneva. If we allow the present opportunity to slip by, I do not believe another will occur for a long time to come.
Our two nations have much at stake in seeing that no further time is lost in achieving agreement on a reconvened conference. The friendship between our two countries is such that I know that you will do your utmost to bring the Arab parties together in a prompt and positive response to our proposal which I conveyed to Presidents Sadat and Assad and to King Hussein after discussing it with Prince Saud in Washington.
With my warm personal wishes for Your Majesty’s continued success and good health.
Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2089. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Habib, Quandt, and Lowell Fleischer (S/S–O); and approved by Secretary Vance.↩
- See Document 136.↩