Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

129. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 13, 1977, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Arab-Israeli Peace Efforts; Israeli Domestic Politics

PARTICIPANTS

• Israel
• Yigael Yadin, Leader of Democratic Movement for Change
• Ambassador Dinitz
• United States
• The Secretary
• Under Secretary Habib
• Assistant Secretary Atherton
• Walter B. Smith II, Director, NEA/IAI (notetaker)

Professor Yadin asked the Secretary how he saw the situation. The Secretary said he thought we had made some progress, although there remained some tough obstacles. The New York talks² had moved things along. He was glad Israel had agreed to the working paper, which we were sending to the Arab countries with a note from the President urging agreement.

Yadin asked whether there had been any Arab reactions yet. The Secretary replied we had only told the Arabs the outlines of the paper so far. We had not wanted to give them a piece of paper until Israel acted. As for reactions to the outlines, in the case of Jordan and Egypt there had been an understanding and a rather positive attitude. Syria was much more skeptical. Yadin asked if this was an understatement, and the Secretary agreed, adding that the Syrians would be tough. The Secretary thought the Soviets might be difficult too, although he was only guessing. Yadin asked if the paper did not fall within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet joint statement from the U.S. viewpoint. The Secretary said the Soviets would watch closely what the Syrians would say.

Yadin asked whether the Geneva conference would convene if the Syrians refused to go. The Secretary said the Syrians probably would go to Geneva, but there would be a lot of hard work to get them there. Yadin commented that the Arabs usually became suspicious of any proposal which had Israel’s prior approval. He found it amazing that the Israeli Cabinet had approved the working paper unanimously.³ He had been informed in a telephone conversation earlier in the morning by a colleague in Israel that the other parties had been very critical of the government’s decision. Dayan had been attacked the day before by all the parties on some of the points. The Secretary asked which points. Yadin said that Peres, whose attitude happened this time to coincide with Rabin’s, was against the idea of a united Arab delegation and was against going for a peace treaty. Peres in fact was against trying to reconvene Geneva.

Dinitz observed that Peres was not so much against Geneva as he was against a united Arab delegation and a role for the Palestinians. Yadin commented that the united Arab delegation and Palestinian issue united the parties in Israel. Yadin had anticipated that the Begin government would approve the working paper, but he thought that the paper represented the maximum flexibility that the government could have. It was ironic that Israeli doves were now attacking the hawks for being too dovish. The question now was whether the Arabs would accept the working paper as it stood. If the Arabs insisted on changes, there would be serious trouble in Israel. Herut⁴ was now criticizing Begin himself.

Yadin asked if there was a fair chance that Egypt and Jordan would accept the paper as it now stood. The Secretary replied he thought they might. The Secretary emphasized, however, that the worst thing that could happen would be for someone to suggest publicly that Egypt and Jordan were ready to accept it. They would have to appear to be dragged into it. Yadin asked again if in the end they would accept, and the Secretary said that he hoped so. Habib voiced the opinion that getting their agreement would be tough. He was certain we would receive Egyptian and Jordanian comments that we would have to raise with Israel. The Secretary thought this was especially true in the case of Syria. Habib added that the Soviets would also back the PLO view, as well as the Syrian one, and the Secretary agreed. Habib felt that a major note of caution was therefore needed. Yadin predicted serious troubles in Israel over any amendments to the working paper.

Habib asked Yadin about the views of his party.⁵ Yadin replied that there was a unanimous consensus in Israel against the creation of a third state in addition to Israel and Jordan and against negotiating with the PLO. Whenever the Israelis suspected in a paper that these two things were implied, everyone in the country would stand together. The Israelis differed on the future of the West Bank. Yadin’s party favored returning part of the West Bank to the Arab country located to the east of Israel. If the Arabs objected to the absence in the working paper of reference to the PLO, Yadin predicted that the Israeli Government would have the full backing of the whole country. Habib thought that this matter could be dealt with. However, repeated Israeli statements between now and the reconvening of Geneva about possible solutions which would circumvent the PLO could force the Arab governments to back off. Yadin replied that Begin was compelled to state publicly the things that were not possible, such as the fact that a third state run by the PLO could not be discussed at Geneva. If there was to be a working group comprising the Palestinians, Jordanians, and Egyptians, everything in fact would be discussed, but the exclusion of the PLO was the crux.

The Secretary confirmed that point 3 of the working paper⁶ did provide for participation by Palestinians, Jordanians, and Egyptians. Yadin said that the Israelis had discussed this matter long ago and had recognized that there would be discussion of any subject that any party wanted. Yadin asked if the working paper provided that working group 3 would be third one chronologically. The Secretary said the working paper did not deal with timing. Habib suggested it would be better before Geneva not to go into the timing question, and the Secretary agreed. Yadin asked if the working paper implied that working group 3 would be the third one chronologically, and the Secretary said no. Dinitz interjected that Dayan had not permitted him to raise such questions as the timing factor. Yadin predicted that if the Arabs said that the deliberations of working group 3 had to come first, there would be a problem.

Yadin said he personally thought that the working paper was the lesser of evils, provided the Arabs would agree to it without change, but he feared the possibility of further Arab reactions and Israel’s being asked to accommodate them. Surely the Arabs had known the essentials. The Secretary said that they did because he had given the essentials to the Arabs. The Arabs knew that the working paper called for bilateral working groups except on the subject of the West Bank, Gaza, and refugees. Yadin observed that not only Egypt but also Jordan had initially opposed multilateral working groups. The Secretary noted that the Jordanians were now more flexible. Dinitz commented that originally the U.S., Jordan, Egypt, and Israel had all opposed a united Arab delegation. Yadin described the adoption of the idea of the united Arab delegation as a big concession to Syria, and the Secretary agreed.

Yadin asked when Geneva might reconvene, and the Secretary said December. Yadin wondered if this would be before Christmas, and the Secretary thought that it would. Yadin speculated that there would be a Christmas break, and Habib pointed out that only the Lebanese cared about Christmas. The Secretary thought there would be an effort to complete the plenary before Christmas and continue thereafter in working groups. Yadin asked how long the plenary would last, and the Secretary suggested that it would take several days. Yadin said he gathered it had not been decided at what level the plenary would be held. The Secretary felt that the plenary would last a week at most. Habib opined this would depend on the co-chairmen. The Secretary commented he had gavelled down speakers in the past.

Yadin said that when he left Israel on October 7 there had been a sense of crisis there. Pressures were growing on the DMC to agree to a national unity government. The party would have to take tough decisions, but it was possible that Begin this time would help with those decisions. Yadin was of the opinion that eventually there would be a national unity government, as Israel would face perilous moments. Begin would have to compromise with the DMC. The Secretary asked on which issues. Yadin replied that his party was more moderate than Begin on foreign policy issues and would have to be given a free hand at least to express its views. Begin himself had now gone amazingly far in the foreign policy field, thanks to Dayan, which would make matters easier for the DMC. However, there were internal problems, above all on the issue of electoral reform. Begin had been adamant on this issue because the religious parties did not want to be annihilated. Yadin thought a formula could be found. There also were some personal problems, as Yadin had spoken too harshly about Begin and the way he had conducted the negotiations with the DMC. There was now a growing sentiment within the DMC in favor of joining the government because of Israel’s external situation and Begin’s health.

The Secretary asked if the Labor Party might also join. Yadin said he did not know. Shortly before leaving Israel he had taken part in a television interview with Rabin, and Rabin’s attitude toward joining the government was negative. Rabin had said that Labor could not join because of differences over foreign policy and its opposition to the pursuit of peace treaties instead of interim agreements. Peres too had voiced opposition to joining the government. Yadin was not so sure that the opposition was firm, especially if Begin made a concrete proposal. The Secretary asked if Peres truly was the head of the Labor Party. Yadin said he was, although Rabin was vying for the role. Yadin added that Peres could work well together with Dayan. Although the declared policy of the Labor Party was not to join the government, pressures from the U.S. and from the situation, plus internal problems, could bring about changes.

Dinitz remarked that the U.S. would not use pressure on Israel, only “leverage.” Yadin said he wanted to discuss the term “leverage” with Brzezinski. Habib said that all the U.S. wanted was for Israel to let the U.S. preserve the ambiguities in the working paper so that the U.S. could get something done. The Secretary said he had made very clear to the press, even though the press would not print it, that the U.S. would not withhold military or economic assistance as a form of pressure. He had told Dayan that he would say this and it did appear once in the New York Times. Yadin asked if he could quote the Secretary to the Israeli press. The Secretary replied that Yadin could say that the Secretary had informed Yadin that he had already made this statement publicly and had repeated it to Yadin.

Yadin asked if the Secretary would be coming soon to Israel. The Secretary said he did not think so. Yadin asked who would represent the U.S. at Geneva after the Secretary’s attendance at the plenary, observing that the conference could go on for a year or two. The Secretary said he did not know and that there were no volunteers.

The Secretary asked if the reaction in Israel against the U.S.-Soviet joint statement remained as strong as it was initially. Yadin said yes. The Secretary wondered why. He could partly understand the Israeli concern but considered the statement a major Soviet step forward. The Soviets had come out for full peace, and the PLO was mentioned nowhere in the statement. On the territorial issue the statement simply reiterated the formulation in Resolution 242. There was nothing about a Palestinian state, for which the Soviets had pressed very hard. Eban had said the other day he saw no reason to worry about use of the term “legitimate rights.”

Yadin said that the statement had caused him real concern, but perhaps he had given it the wrong interpretation. As he had seen it, the U.S. faced a problem because the PLO had said no Geneva conference if based on Resolution 242, and the U.S. found it impossible to amend 242 and thought of the joint statement as a way out. The statement would constitute an amendment to 242 if it were brought before the Security Council. The Secretary recalled we had later declared that the statement reflected our views but was not a prerequisite for Geneva. Yadin said this had eased Israeli fears. Nevertheless, the statement brought the Soviets back into the picture. Yadin personally understood that the Soviets were indeed in the picture. The Secretary noted that the Soviets could be a spoiler but now perhaps might play a constructive role. Yadin said the bad thing was the timing of the statement because everyone in Israel was so suspicious of U.S. intentions. In fact, the October 13 Knesset session had been called by the DMC and the Labor Party on the subject of the joint statement. But now the interest in debating the joint statement had waned and the working paper would be the main issue. Perhaps the joint statement was necessary from the U.S. viewpoint, but it was not helpful to Israel.

The Secretary said we had thought that the statement would be helpful to Israel. One point made very clear to us by all Israelis, both the Labor and Begin governments, was the need for not only an end to the state of war but also the establishment of normal relations. Dinitz interjected that this point in the joint statement was not novel, as the Soviets had previously favored full peace in the Middle East, as in the Brezhnev statement.⁷ The Secretary replied that past Soviet formulations had been different. Atherton added that the Soviets previously had not used the term “normal relations.” Dinitz insisted the Soviets had talked previously about contractual peace, and the nuance therefore was not so sharp. Habib pointed to the fact that our success in getting the Soviets to support the establishment of normal relations had come on the eve of the reconvening of Geneva. Dinitz conceded that the use of the word “normal” represented Soviet movement. The Secretary pointed out that he had been told repeatedly that full peace should include normal relations. Habib added that the joint statement also spoke of contractual relations. There was an interrelationship between the content of the statement and the fact that it was made on the threshold to Geneva.

Dinitz said that one could argue that the Soviet agreement to omit negative elements from the joint statement, such as a Palestinian state, the 1967 borders, and the PLO did not mean that the Soviets had ceased to advocate these things. One had to judge the areas of agreement expressed in the statement and not its omissions. The U.S. had assured Israel that the sense of Resolutions 242 and 338 was present in the statement even though the resolutions were not mentioned. It was the area of express agreement that concerned Israel, such as the stress on negotiations only within the framework of Geneva and the mention of Palestinian rights. Israel felt that the statement put the U.S. in a certain straitjacket and for that reason it was not good from the U.S. view-point. Therefore, when the U.S. said that Israel should have liked the statement, it raised Israeli eyebrows. Furthermore, Israel was not given an opportunity really to discuss the statement, having been given a draft U.S. version and draft Soviet version. The Secretary observed that Israel had presented detailed criticisms, and the U.S. had discussed them at length. Dinitz said that the U.S. had dismissed the Israeli criticisms. The Secretary replied that the U.S. simply had not agreed with Israel, but the U.S. had sought Israel’s views.

Yadin characterized the issue of the joint statement as spilt milk and said that the question of how to go forward was the main point. In his assessment the working paper was the maximum that Begin could offer. Habib said he wanted to be certain that Israel would allow the U.S. to preserve the ambiguities. It worried him when Israel said that a given formulation was immutable and nothing else would do. This document should not be considered immutable. The Arabs might suggest changes which would leave the ambiguities intact. Yadin acknowledged this would be all right, but if the Arabs wanted to pin down the ambiguities, there would be a problem. The Secretary agreed and predicted that some Arabs would want to do so and others would not.

Yadin repeated his feeling that the unanimous acceptance of the working paper by the Israeli Cabinet was remarkable and wondered whether Begin’s poor health might not have been a factor. Dinitz suggested that the main reason was the realization by Likud that it would have a difficult argument over the working paper with the Israeli public at large and that it should present a united front. Yadin agreed with this interpretation, noting that in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on October 12, Dayan had been attacked violently even by Likud members.

Yadin asked whether the U.S. would receive Arab reactions within a week. The Secretary predicted about ten days and noted that the Arabs might want first to convene their foreign ministers. The Secretary confirmed to Yadin that the U.S. message urging Arab acceptance of the working paper had been at the chief-of-state level. Atherton predicted that at least Syria would want a foreign ministers’ meeting. Habib thought it might be better not to have a rapid Arab response. Yadin thought that an inter-Arab meeting would be bad. The Secretary recalled that an Arab foreign ministers’ meeting was scheduled for mid-November and suggested that the confrontation-state foreign ministers might convene afterwards.

Yadin suggested that following his meeting with the Secretary the press be told that these problems had been discussed but that nothing specific be said. The Secretary told Yadin he wanted to ensure the latter understood the U.S. stood four-square behind its commitment to the security of Israel, and there had been no change at all in this respect. Yadin asked if this meant the U.S. stood with its previous written commitments to Israel. The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. had specified this in the joint statement with Israel issued before Dayan left.⁸ Yadin recalled there had been some recent misunderstanding on the matter. Ambassador Lewis had told him he should ask Evron. Dinitz said Evron had cabled him about it. What actually happened was that Rosenne had raised legal questions, and Habib had then explained that the U.S. and Israeli sides were not discussing those questions at that point. The Israeli protocol of the conversation lost the nuance. Habib confirmed that the protocol evidently had lost the context and that the misunderstanding had been disturbing.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance Nodis Memcons 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Smith on October 17. A copy was sent to Ambassador Lewis at the Embassy in Tel Aviv. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. A reference to Vance’s conversations from October 1 to 7 in New York with the Foreign Ministers of Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and Syria.
3. The New York Times reported that the Israeli Cabinet unanimously approved the working paper on October 11. (William E. Farrell, “Israeli Cabinet Backs US ‘Working Paper’ for Talks in Geneva,” New York Times, October 12, 1977, p. 1) On October 13 in Jerusalem, Dayan released the text of the paper, which the New York Times printed in full the next day. (October 14, 1977, p. 9)
4. Established during the 1940s, the Herut Party based its political philosophy on Revisionist Zionism and represented the right wing of Israeli politics.
5. See footnote 4, Document 35.
6. Point 3 concerns discussions of the West Bank and Gaza by a working group composed of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestinian Arabs. See the first attachment to Document 124.
7. Not further identified. Possibly a reference to Brezhnev’s statements during Fahmy’s visit to Moscow in June. See Document 45.
8. See the second attachment to Document 124.