Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

125. Memorandum of Conversation¹

October 5, 1977, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Bilateral Meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam

PARTICIPANTS

• Syria
• Foreign Minister Abd al Halim Khaddam
• Ambassador to U.S. Sabah Kabbani
• Mr. Abou Fares, Interpreter
• United States
• The Secretary
• Under Secretary for Political Affairs Philip Habib
• Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
• Ambassador Richard W. Murphy
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Arthur R. Day
• David Korn, Policy Planning Staff
• Issa Sabbagh, Interpreter

The Secretary welcomed Foreign Minister Khaddam. Khaddam said that he was happy to meet with the Secretary, especially after the Secretary’s several meetings with Foreign Minister Dayan. Khaddam added that he would be leaving New York today to return to Damascus.

The Secretary said that he had had two meetings with Dayan in the last few days. He had had two meetings with Gromyko on the Middle East. The Secretary said that in the meeting with Gromyko he had discussed the problems that had to be overcome before Geneva could be reconvened. We discussed the desirability of issuing a joint statement which would reflect our views regarding the Geneva Conference and the key issues to be decided at Geneva. We and the Soviets then worked out a joint statement which we issued last Sunday² and which reflects the views of the co-chairmen. The Secretary noted that the Israelis do not agree with some parts of the US-Soviet joint statement, and the Arabs do not agree with some parts of it. It is a statement of the views of the co-chairmen the Secretary reiterated. We plan to tell this to the press today and to make clear that we are not asking the parties to agree to these views as a condition for the reconvening of Geneva. The Secretary pointed out that we had made a statement last night saying that Resolutions 242 and 338 are the basis for the reconvening of Geneva. The Secretary said that in the conversation with Dayan last night we discussed subjects concerning the reconvening of Geneva and we issued a joint statement at the end of the talk. The Secretary then gave Khaddam a copy of the statement issued the previous evening at the close of the meeting with Dayan.³

The Secretary asked if Khaddam would like to comment on the joint Soviet-US statement. Khaddam said he did have some comments. The joint US-Soviet statement refers to certain political principles, but some of the principles that appear in the statement do not appear in Resolution 242. Khaddam asked if the statement issued at the close of the talk with Dayan cancelled out the joint Soviet-US statement. The Secretary said no, Israel doesn’t agree to everything in the joint US-Soviet statement, and the Arabs don’t agree to everything in it, but the statement still represents our views. The Secretary said we hope to convince the Arabs and Israel that the principles of the statement are sound but we do not consider them a basis for reconvening Geneva. The Secretary then again asked Khaddam if he would like to give his views on the joint US-Soviet statement.

Khaddam said the joint statement has not yet been discussed by the Syrian government and thus he could only give his own initial reaction. Khaddam said he felt the statement ignored certain basic matters. First of all, it refers to withdrawal from occupied territories. We reject this, Khaddam said. Syria rejects giving up even one inch of territory. Secondly, the statement ignored the question of Palestinian representation at Geneva. Thirdly, the statement went beyond Resolution 242 as far as the concept of peace is concerned. Khaddam said these were his initial impressions. The Syrian government will have to discuss the joint statement, however, in the light of what has happened in the US meetings with the other parties. Khaddam added that the Arabs will also have to arrive at a consensus regarding the Soviet-US statement.

The Secretary said he understood that this is Khaddam’s initial view and that we will be given further Syrian views later. The Secretary said we hope the statement will commend itself to Syria’s acceptance. Khaddam replied that it was not easy to accept something that was being imposed. The Secretary said we are not trying to impose anything. We said last night that the statement is our view and the view of the Soviets and we hope that it will commend itself. We hope the inherent wisdom of what was contained in the statement will commend itself to Syria and the other parties. Khaddam reiterated that the views he had expressed were his initial reaction. Syria’s final view on the matter will be decided by the Syrian government. He pointed out again however that he felt the statement had gone beyond the terms of Resolution 242.

The Secretary said we intend to keep fully in touch with all parties. We will not say one thing to one party and another to the other. Khaddam said he had noted that President Carter’s speech to the General Assembly⁴ went beyond the terms of the joint statement. He said the speech did not please a number of the Arab delegations. The Secretary asked what was the problem. Khaddam said first of all the speech was not balanced. It mentioned all the Israeli interests but said the Arab interests would be subject to negotiation. Secondly, it did not say one word about withdrawal. Khaddam said the President’s speech defended the Israeli position. The speech was a justification of the wars waged by Israel against the Arabs. The President referred to human rights and praised the role of Israel in protecting human rights. Our question, Khaddam said, is what kind of human rights are you talking about when Israel butchered the Arabs and drove them from their homes. Khaddam said the State Department had recently made public documents which include a report from the American Consul General in Jerusalem describing Israeli atrocities.

Khaddam said his final point was that the President said Palestinian rights are a subject for negotiations. We find this a step back from the President’s earlier statements, in particular the statements on the Palestinian homeland, Khaddam said. For instance, the Soviet-US communiqué referred to the participation of all the parties, including the Palestinians, at Geneva. In the President’s speech there was no mention of Palestinian representation at Geneva. Khaddam said that if a President before President Carter had spoken in this manner, we would not have been so upset, it would have been considered normal. But now President Carter is playing the role of mediator. A mediator should know that just as Arab rights are subject to negotiation, so should Israeli rights be subject to negotiation. Khaddam said the Arabs had discussed the President’s speech among themselves yesterday and agreed not to make a statement that would embarrass the President or even to refer to the President’s speech in public remarks. They agreed on this position, Khaddam said, because they wanted to facilitate the role that President Carter has taken on himself. Khaddam said that in making his comments on the President’s speech, he only wanted to be frank.

The Secretary said he appreciated Khaddam’s frankness. The Secretary pointed out that it is very difficult in a speech to say exactly the same things that were said before. If one word is dropped, the impression is given that there has been a change in position. The Secretary said he wanted to assure Khaddam that neither President Carter’s position nor that of the US has changed. The Secretary added that he felt it was very constructive of the Arabs not to issue a public statement about their concerns but instead to raise them with him privately. Our common objective, the Secretary said, is to resume negotiations toward a just and lasting peace, and that can come about only through serious negotiations. All of us will have to work together and have frank exchanges of views.

The Secretary said we will be interested to hear Syria’s views on the question of the organization of Geneva after Khaddam returns to Damascus and talks to President Assad. The Secretary said we believed that the most desirable way to approach the problem of Palestinian representation is through a united Arab delegation which includes Palestinians. The Secretary noted that on the question of the organization of the work of the conference there appear to be differences of views between ourselves and Syria. Our view is that there should be both bilateral and multilateral working groups. The Secretary said both the President and he had explained why we think this is the most constructive way of discharging the work of the conference. Syria has indicated that it has a different point of view. The Secretary said he would like to ask Khaddam to discuss this problem with President Assad and to communicate with us. The Secretary said we would be awaiting Syria’s answer.

Khaddam said he would discuss this with President Assad, but it would be useful for him to know what progress was made in the discussions with Dayan and with the Egyptians, the Jordanians and the Syrians. Khaddam remarked that the Secretary had spent six hours with Dayan yesterday. The Secretary said yes, and he had not gotten to bed until after 2:30 this morning. The Secretary said we had asked the views of the parties on two matters: the question of Palestinian representation at Geneva and the organization of the work of the conference. There seems to be agreement among all, albeit reluctantly by some, that a united Arab delegation, including Palestinians, is the best solution to the first issue. Khaddam asked if the Palestinians in the united Arab delegation would be represented by the PLO. The Secretary said that the exact makeup of the Palestinians is yet to be agreed upon among the parties. The Secretary said that we hope to have something concrete to put to the parties on this as a result of further discussions.

Regarding the organization of the conference, the Secretary said, the parties are split. Syria and Jordan lean toward a functional approach. The Egyptians lean strongly toward a non-functional approach, i.e., a geographic approach. The Israelis also strongly favor a geographic approach. Khaddam asked what the Soviets’ position is. The Secretary said the Soviets lean toward a functional approach. Khaddam said that puts us in the majority. (Laughter)

The Secretary said we believe the working groups should be both bilateral and multilateral, depending on the work to be done. We believe, for example, that the negotiation of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel should be between Syria and Israel. However, when you start dealing with Palestinian issues such as the West Bank and Gaza, we believe that these cannot be resolved on a bilateral basis. They must be handled multilaterally and obviously the Palestinians have got to be included in the working group so that they may speak for themselves. Khaddam said that if one follows the view that the treaty between Syria and Israel has to be negotiated bilaterally, why should not Palestinian issues be negotiated bilaterally between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The Secretary replied that Jordan has an interest in the West Bank, so it should be included in the negotiations on that subject. Egypt has an interest in Gaza, so it should be included also. Khaddam objected that Jordan’s interest in the West Bank and Egypt’s interest in Gaza date from a period that is no longer with us. Khaddam said the Council of the Arab League as far back as 1949 took the position that the West Bank and Gaza were trusts in the hands of Jordan and Egypt, pending Palestinian independence. Khaddam said Syria does not believe that the Palestinians lack men who can represent them at Geneva better than the Jordanians or the Egyptians. Syria’s view is that there is a problem which has two parties to it, one Israeli and the other Arab. Syria feels that the Arab side should be included for negotiations for all matters, just as the Israeli side should be included for all matters. Khaddam recalled that in his previous conversation with the Secretary he had said that Syria would have no objection to having any Arab country represent it in the negotiations with the Israelis.⁵ He wanted to reiterate that position now.

The Secretary replied that, as a lawyer, Khaddam of course knew that even though the West Bank and Gaza were held in trust for the Palestinians, until a trustee has discharged his trust, he is still responsible for it. Therefore, Jordan and Egypt should be able to speak on West Bank and Gaza matters until these problems are resolved. Khaddam said Syria would agree to Israel’s handing over these trusts to Jordan and Egypt; then the Jordanians and the Egyptians could hand them back to the Palestinians. But, Khaddam said he realized the question is not so simple. He wanted to say in the utmost earnestness that if you desire to have peace, the Palestinians must be invited to the negotiations and must shoulder their responsibilities. The Secretary said that as a practical matter both Egypt and Jordan have said they want to be parties to the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. We have taken their wish into account. Obviously, the Palestinians must be included also. The Secretary added that we will look forward to receiving Syria’s views on the organization of the conference after Khaddam returns to Damascus and discusses the matter with Assad.

The Secretary said he wanted to mention two other things and then would have to go to the UN to be with the President for the signing of the Human Rights Convention. The Secretary recalled that he had promised to tell Khaddam when we talked with the Iraqis and the PDRY. The Secretary said he had a talk two days ago with the Foreign Minister of Iraq.⁶ He had indicated that we would be pleased to help develop bilateral relations between the United States and Iraq. The Secretary said the conclusion of the conversation was that until there is further progress on the Middle East conflict, the Iraqis prefer to leave matters as they are. In our discussions with the PDRY we have agreed in principle to renew diplomatic relations. We will be sending a representative to discuss the details of how this should be implemented. The Secretary said he wanted to tell this to Khaddam because we had sought Khaddam’s advice regarding both countries. Khaddam thanked the Secretary.

In closing, the Secretary said he thought President Carter would be sending a letter to President Assad by about the end of the week. Ambassador Murphy would deliver it.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 107, 9/19/77–10/25/77 Vance Meetings with Middle East Foreign Ministers: 9–10/77. Secret. Drafted by Korn on October 6. No location is noted for the meeting, but Vance was still in New York.
2. October 2. See Document 120.
3. See the second attachment to Document 124.
4. See footnote 3, Document 124.
5. See Document 115.
6. No memorandum of conversation has been found.