Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

8. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–22¹

Washington, March 24, 1977

TO

• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Attorney General
• The Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy
• The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy
• The Director-designate, Office of Science and Technology Policy

ALSO

• The Secretary of Commerce
• The Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
• The Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT

• A National Integrated Telecommunications Protection Policy (U)

I am concerned over the Soviet Union’s clandestine intercept activities of our telecommunications systems and the lack of a well defined protection policy to deal with these activities in a comprehensive manner. I, therefore, direct that the NSC Special Coordination Committee undertake a thorough review of prior and contemplated U.S. counteractions to the Soviet activities, and to examine all the legal, diplomatic and technology issues involved.

1. A subcommittee of the SCC under the chairmanship of the Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy shall:

— Consider for disposition the segments of NSDM 266,² “Improved Security of Telecommunications,” NSDM 296,³ “Improved Communications Security,” NSDM 296 Follow-Up, “Telephone Security” and NSDM 338,⁴ “Further Improvements in Telecommunications Security.”

— Review the unimplemented NSDM 346,⁵ “Security of U.S. Telecommunications” within the scope and framework of this PRM.

— Develop an integrated National Telecommunications Protection Policy and propose the necessary governmental framework for its implementation.

The foregoing should include, but not be limited to considerations of existing law, diplomatic factors, economics, technology social impact, executive-legislative relations, and government-industry relations.

2. The Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence should consider the diplomatic and Soviet reaction factors including:

— Soviet reactions to the various options of the OTP Plan or if the U.S. were to adopt a policy of retaliation in kind through the use of such techniques as “jamming.”

— U.S. denial of further Soviet requests to purchase additional U.S. property e.g., the Valeria Estate, the Mountain View apartment complex, etc.

3. The Secretary of Defense shall review the technology under research and development, in testing or procurement. Protected Radio Modulation for terrestrial microwave, methods for satellite link protection and critical mobile radio-telephone systems shall be included as well as:

— A complete review of the entire DUCKPINS project.

— Existing or potential legal, management or budgetary problems with the foregoing.

— Considerations of Soviet denial of U.S. intelligence “windows” in retaliation to U.S. countermeasures.

4. The Attorney General shall review Executive and Legislative authority, existing laws and National Security Council Directives including:

— The Justice Department’s anti-trust suit against AT&T.

— The government’s exclusionary dealings with AT&T in planning and technology development.

— Legal ramifications of continuing DUCKPINS and the MCI service offerings.

Recommendations for implementing a countermeasure program must include considerations for an implementing or program manager. The derived assessments, conclusions, recommendations and policy should include alternative options for dealing with the issues by the SCC, which shall evaluate these and make recommendations to me. Until such time the findings and recommendations are reviewed and acted upon by the Special Coordination Committee, the Director, OTP will be the Executive Branch’s focal point for all telecommunications protection and related programs either recommended or ongoing. New initiatives and plans will be submitted to the Director, OTP for consideration as they may affect or interrelate with the objectives of this PRM.

The review and recommendations should be completed by July 15, 1977.

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 37, PRM–12 through PRM–41: 1/77–11/78. Top Secret; COMINT.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 176.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 177.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 180.
5. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 182.